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Autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) are primarily defined by problems with social 
interaction and communication, but they are also associated with a complex cognitive 
profile. One area of difficulty for children and adults with ASD is problem-solving, or 
the process of identifying a solution to a puzzle or question where the answer is hidden.  
This can be seen on the Twenty Questions Task (TQT), a commonly-used measure of 
verbal problem-solving and executive functioning. Children with autism are 
consistently less efficient than typically-developing children in their questioning on the 
task: for instance, rather than ask a general, category-based question (e.g. “Is it a living 
thing?”) they may ask about single items (“Is it the dog?”) or very restricted groupings 
(“Is it something you wear on your feet?”).  This has previously been interpreted as an 
example of a concept formation deficit in autism, deriving from underlying difficulties 
with complex and integrative information processing. However, success in problem-
solving relies on a number of cognitive and linguistic processes that may be impaired in 
ASD. This thesis attempts to identify which of these may better explain autistic 
problem-solving performance, using the TQT as a specific example.      
The first experiment presented here examines the role of executive functioning 
difficulties in this profile. The performance of 22 children with ASD and 21 age- and 
IQ-matched typically-developing (TD) children was compared on a version of the TQT 
adapted to assess planning skills prior to problem-solving and selective attention during 
the task. Compared to controls, ASD participants were less efficient in their planning of 
questions, although not all ASD participants had difficulty constructing a plan. No 
specific effects of selective attention were evident.  
The second and third experiments explore the importance of atypical language 
development to this profile, using the example of deafness. Experiment 2 compares the 
performance of deaf (n = 9) and hearing (n = 27) adults on the TQT, replicating prior 
evidence of less efficient problem-solving in deaf graduate students. Experiment 3 
contrasts TQT performance in 13 deaf schoolchildren with the ASD and TD data 
acquired in experiment 1. Like ASD children, deaf children were less efficient in their 




Both autism and deafness are associated with delays in early language development, 
whereas Asperger Syndrome (AS) is not. To test whether language delay explains 
autistic problem-solving difficulties, experiment 4 compares TQT performance in 15 
children with autism, 15 AS children and 15 age- and IQ- matched typically-developing 
controls. Participants with autism asked less efficient questions than both AS and TD 
participants, between whom no differences were observed. This suggests that the 
problem-solving profile in autism may be better explained as a consequence of atypical 





The research presented here builds on the findings of a previous piece of work that was 
conducted by the author in the completion of an M.Sc. by Research. The results for the 
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Autism is a developmental disorder that is characterised by difficulties in social functioning, 
problems with communication, and the presence of restricted interests and repetitive 
behaviours.  A diagnosis of autism (sometimes referred to as childhood autism or autistic 
disorder) requires evidence of each of these characteristics, and is typically associated with 
delays in language and intellectual development in the first three years of life (APA, 1994; 
WHO, 1993). The term “autism spectrum disorder” (ASD) is a collective label that is used to 
refer to autism and other conditions on the autistic spectrum, such as Asperger Syndrome 
(AS) and Pervasive Developmental Disorder – Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS; also 
known as atypical autism). These diagnoses are similar to autism in terms of their primary 
difficulties with social interaction, but differ in other respects: AS is associated with 
relatively intact development of language skills, while children with PDD-NOS may show 
autistic behaviours in only two out of three of the areas outlined above (APA, 1994).  
The first clinical descriptions of autism were made by Leo Kanner in 1943. Kanner (1943) 
described a series of children with an “inability to relate themselves in the ordinary way to 
people and situations from the beginning of life” (p. 242). They struggled with co-operative 
and imaginative play, while their overall behaviour was “monotonously repetitious” (p. 245) 
and “governed rigidly and consistently by the powerful desire for aloneness and sameness” 
(Kanner, 1943, p. 249).  In early years, their language skills were mostly limited to echolalia 
and often included inappropriate reversal of pronouns such as “you” and “me”.  By the age 
of 5-6 years, though, “...language becomes more communicative, at first in the sense of a 
question-and-answer exercise, and then in the sense of greater spontaneity of sentence 
formation” (p. 249). Generally, their intellectual abilities were described as being low, but in 
many cases this situation appeared to improve with age, and did not preclude the existence of 
specific areas of skill, such as rote memory (p. 243).      
In fact, underlying the characteristic behaviours of autism is a highly complex cognitive 
profile that encompasses a wide range of strengths and weaknesses (Frith, 2003; Mayes & 
Calhoun, 2003; Pellicano, Maybery, Durkin, & Maley, 2006). Most well-known are 
problems with Theory-of-Mind (ToM), or the ability to represent and understand the mental 
states of others (Baron-Cohen, 1989; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Heavey, Phillips, 
Baron-Cohen, & Rutter, 2000; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999; Kaland et al., 2002). The 
classic test of this ability is the false-belief paradigm, in which participants are witness to the 
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displacement of an object unbeknownst to a toy character. When participants are asked to 
indicate where the character will search for the object, four-year children are typically able to 
point to where the character would think the object is. That is, they judge that the character 
will retain a false belief and search for the item in the wrong location. Younger children, in 
contrast, point to its current location, suggesting a failure to take into account the knowledge 
state of another agent (Wimmer & Perner, 1983).  
Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) conducted the first study that applied this paradigm to 
group of children with autism. In contrast to four-year old, typically-developing children, 
and older children with a different developmental disability (Down Syndrome), the large 
majority of autistic children (80%) failed to pass the false belief task, despite having greater 
chronological age (10-15) and mental age (8-10). For the authors, this suggested a specific 
deficit of Theory-of-Mind in children with autism. Since then, a range of studies with ASD 
groups have documented persistent difficulties with theory-of-mind on false-belief tasks and 
other measures (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Castelli, Frith, 
Happé, & Frith, 2002; Colle, Baron-Cohen, & Hill, 2007; Happé, 1995; Kaland, et al., 2002; 
Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009). Problems with other cognitive skills relating to 
social functioning have also been reported, such as joint attention (Mundy, Sigman, & 
Kasari, 1990), gaze following (Charman et al., 1997), and recognising emotional expressions 
(Weeks & Hobson, 1987).  
Alongside difficulties with social cognition, individuals with autism show evidence of 
atypical cognitive processes in other, non-social domains. As already referred to, Kanner 
(1943) noted prodigious rote memory skills in the children that he saw. Participants with 
ASD have also been reported to excel on perception-based puzzle tasks where specific parts 
must be identified from a whole, such as on the Embedded Figures Test (Shah & Frith, 1983) 
and Block Design task (Shah & Frith, 1993). In contrast, they sometimes struggle on tasks 
were information must be processed globally or holistically, such as in the use of context to 
disambiguate the meaning of a sentence (Frith & Snowling, 1983). Such a pattern of skills 
has been referred to as demonstrating “weak central coherence”, or a difficulty with drawing 
together “diverse information to construct higher level meaning” (Frith & Happé, 1994, p. 
121). 
Finally, problems in a number of higher-order cognitive processes have been associated with 
autism. These have typically been grouped under the umbrella term of executive functions 
(EFs), or cognitive skills where task-related information must be maintained “online” and 
other information inhibited in order to achieve a goal (Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996). 
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Individuals with autism have been observed to have difficulty with EF skills such as 
planning (Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991), working memory (Bennetto, Pennington, 
& Rogers, 1996), cognitive flexibility (C. Hughes, Russell, & Robbins, 1994), inhibition 
(Rinehart, Bradshaw, Tonge, Brereton, & Bellgrove, 2002) and selective attention (Burack, 
1994; see Hill, 2004; and Kenworthy, Yerys, Anthony, & Wallace, 2008 for reviews of EF 
skills in ASD).  
 
Problem-solving in autism spectrum disorders 
Another complex cognitive skill, not typically included under the EF umbrella and not 
studied as extensively in autism research, is problem-solving. Problem-solving is a wide 
ranging term that has been used to refer to a variety of different tasks and cognitive 
processes
1
. Here, it is defined as the process of identifying a solution to a puzzle or question 
where the answer is not immediately apparent. Following its historical use within 
experimental research, problem-solving is also typically understood to require the generation 
of strategies and the completion of a series of moves, or achievement of certain sub-goals, in 
order to solve the problem (Newell & Simon, 1972).  
Meant in this sense, a number of studies have reported apparent difficulties in the problem-
solving of individuals with ASDs (Channon, Charman, Heap, Crawford, & Rios, 2001; 
Goddard, Howlin, Dritschel, & Patel, 2007; Minshew, Meyer, & Goldstein, 2002; Minshew, 
Siegel, Goldstein, & Weldy, 1994). When a scenario is presented in which participants have 
to come up with their own solution to a problem, or try out a variety of strategies that might 
help them work towards such a solution, individuals with ASDs tend to struggle.  
For example, in a study with adults with Asperger Syndrome, Channon et al. (2001) asked 
participants to generate strategies to deal with a scenario where a neighbour has a noisy dog. 
Typical strategies that may be expected are ones that involve negotiating with the neighbour, 
or, failing that, contacting the council or police. In contrast to typically-developing 
participants, individuals with AS came up with solutions that were often disproportionate 
(“Move house”) or socially inappropriate (“Poison the dog”) (Channon et al., 2001). Here, 
their self-generated answers failed to solve the problem in an effective way. Moreover, this 
                                                   
1 For an example of this just within autism research, compare its use in Rumsey (1985) to refer to 
performance on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Heaton, 1993) with its use in Soulieres et al. (2009), 
who class matrix reasoning as a form of problem-solving. In a minimal sense of the solution being 
hidden, these may be considered examples of non-verbal problem-solving, but they arguably lack the 
step-based structure of more classic problem-solving tasks. 
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is likely to extend to many other situations in the everyday lives of people with ASD: if 
coming up with the right solution is difficult even for hypothetical scenarios, then the ad-hoc 
problem-solving of the day-to-day could be very challenging indeed.  
The kind of scenarios presented by Channon and colleagues clearly involve a considerable 
social component, meaning that their results could just reflect a lack of social understanding 
in their participants. If that were to be the case, then problem-solving per se would not seem 
to be the problem; the definitional impairments in social interaction and function that are 
inherent in autism would appear to be the likely source of such difficulties. But problem-
solving in itself is actually an important process to look at, because it also relies on other, 
non-social processes that may function abnormally in people with ASDs. 
First, problem-solving requires the top-down imposition of a strategy in order to be 
successful. Here, “top-down” refers to the agent’s application of their own knowledge, or 
own organisation of information, onto task stimuli. This is in contrast to a “bottom-up” 
process where an agent’s response is guided simply by information inherent in the task. For 
example, a category matching task, where participants identify examples of a particular 
category (e.g. “red” or “square”), would be a bottom-up process. In contrast, a free sorting 
task, where participants choose the basis on which they sort exemplars, would be a top-down 
task. 
A number of studies on autism have observed apparently intact bottom-up skills, but 
difficulties or atypicalities in the application of top-down processes. Taking the above 
example, various studies have reported intact performance in ASD individuals in basic 
categorisation, i.e. bottom-up, tasks (Geurts, Verté, Oosterlaan, Roeyers, & Sergeant, 2004; 
Tager-Flusberg, 1985a, 1985b; Ungerer & Sigman, 1987; Verté, Geurts, Roeyers, 
Oosterlaan, & Sergeant, 2005). However, impaired or atypical performance has been 
reported on tasks where more abstract or complex forms of categorisation are required 
(Gastgeb, Strauss, & Minshew, 2006; Shulman, Yirmiya, & Greenbaum, 1995) or where 
participants are free to sort according to their own rule (Kovattana & Kraemer, 1974; Ropar 
& Peebles, 2007) – both of which require a more top-down application of former knowledge 
and strategy.  
An analogous discrepancy is seen in research on memory with autism. In cued recall, the 
stimulus to remember words is supplied bottom-up, whereas in free recall, the participant 
must generate their own top-down strategy to support performance. Many studies have 
reported intact levels of cued recall for word lists in autistic participants, alongside reduced 
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performance on free recall tasks, or a failure to strategically draw on semantic groupings to 
support recall (Cheung, Chan, Sze, Leung, & To, 2010; Gaigg, Gardiner, & Bowler, 2008; 
Hermelin & O'Connor, 1970; Minshew & Goldstein, 1993). Problems with generating and 
using effective strategies in individuals with ASD have also been reported on other cognitive 
tasks, such as multi-tasking (Mackinlay, Charman, & Karmiloff-Smith, 2006), and 
anecdotally by parents and teachers: in the classroom, children with autism often have 
difficulty with applying knowledge spontaneously to new problems, such as answering exam 
questions.   
A second significant characteristic of problem-solving is that it commonly involves an 
“open-field” or open-ended structure; that is, participants are free to respond to a task in a 
range of ways. This is often associated with tasks where a top-down response is required, but 
the two characteristics pose slightly different kinds of challenges. In a top-down task, 
individuals must generate their own strategy, or apply their own knowledge to a task, but the 
particular constraints of that task might mean that only one or a small number of strategies 
are actually appropriate to use – in other words, a strategy is required, but the potential set of 
responses is actually fairly constrained. In contrast, an open-field task will often require a 
top-down strategy, but there may be multiple potential routes to success: participants can 
choose to solve the problem in whichever way they see fit.   
When participants with autism attempt open-field tasks, they tend to perform worse than 
they would for tasks with a more directed set of responses (White, Burgess, & Hill, 2009). 
On the one hand, this could reflect a difficulty with handling the less directed format of such 
a task (White, In Press). On the other hand, it could reflect atypical styles or preferences in 
how individuals with ASD approach such tasks, given the freedom to choose their own 
strategies (Happé, 1999). A relatively recent trend in research on autism has been to 
recognise the possibility of an autistic “cognitive style” (Happé & Frith, 2006), where local 
details and features tend to be concentrated on at the expense of global or holistic forms (see 
Baron-Cohen, 2006, for another example of a style-based account). Much of the evidence for 
this idea is drawn from tests of visual perception (e.g. Shah & Frith, 1983), but such a style 
is proposed to extend to other, higher cognitive domains, where individuals with ASD may 
be approaching tasks in a different way to typically-developing individuals. Thus, in the case 
of open-field tasks, what may be being measured is an autistic cognitive style at work; a 
difference from the norm, rather than a difficulty or deficit. 
Thus, difficulties with problem-solving in autism, though often seen in social contexts, are 
not necessarily “purely” social. The cognitive requirements of solving a problem – 
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specifically, the application of top-down strategies in open-field contexts -  are suggested by 
a range of studies to be abnormal in people with ASD; possibly in the form of an impairment 
or deficit, possibly as a bias or tendency in cognitive processing. Whether deficit or style, 
though, it is still not clear why this happens in autism. And this is an important thing to 
explain, because – as the anecdotal reports attest to – not being able to apply knowledge or 
come up with problem-solving strategies can have a clear impact upon everyday skills for 
people with ASDs. 
A few theories have previously been put forward: Minshew, Meyer & Goldstein (2002) have 
proposed that this reflects a specific deficit in the spontaneous formation of integrative, 
organising strategies. In the context of memory research, Bowler and colleagues (Bowler, 
Gardiner, & Berthollier, 2004; Bowler, Matthews, & Gardiner, 1997) suggested that people 
with ASD rely on external “task supports” to deploy effective cognitive strategies more than 
typically-developing individuals.  Finally, a recent paper by White (In Press) has proposed 
that participants with ASD may struggle with the implicit, unsaid demands of such tasks.  
What these ideas do not do, however, is amount to any sort of consensus as to what may be 
driving problem-solving difficulties in autism. What follows is an attempt to clarify and 
explain some of the cognitive factors that may underlie these kinds of difficulties. This was 
done by focussing in depth on one particular problem-solving measure, the Twenty 
Questions Task (Mosher & Hornsby, 1966) and exploring how the problem-solving of 
individuals with autism on this particular task may be best explained. As will be argued in 
the following section, this is a task with a rich history in experimental psychology, and the 
potential to speak to a number of the issues concerning higher cognitive skills in autism.  
In focussing on Twenty Questions, this inevitably constrains the following work to certain 
theories and ideas at the expense of others. Based on their previous use of the TQT, the 
research presented here specifically engages with the theories of Minshew and colleagues 
(e.g. Minshew et al., 1994; Minshew et al., 2002). In contrast, the “task support” hypothesis 
of Bowler and colleagues (1997; 2004) is largely not discussed here, because of its primary 
concern with memory, rather than problem-solving. This idea is briefly returned to in the 
General Discussion, and Appendix 3 contains some preliminary data on memory and the 
TQT. The ideas of White (In Press) concerning open-ended tasks are not directly tested 





Twenty Questions as a measure of problem-solving 
In the game Twenty Questions, one player thinks of an everyday item and another has to ask 
questions to establish its identity. The questions can only be answered yes or no, and only a 
limited number of questions are permitted. Typically the best strategy is to ask questions that 
eliminate a number of alternatives, while establishing the sets or categories that the item 
belongs to. For instance, a player might ask “Is it a living thing?” or “Is it man-made?” 
followed by questions that further constrain the search: “Is it an animal?”, “Is it a mammal?”, 
“Is it a pet?” and so on. Once the search is narrowed sufficiently, a guess can be made: “Is it 
a dog?”, “Is it a cat?”. 
While it may be best known as a fairly repetitive game played on long, boring car journeys, 
Twenty Questions and similar games have a long history as experimental tasks within 
psychological research. The Twenty Questions Task (TQT) and its analogues have been used 
to examine cognitive skills in typically-developing children and adults (Denney, 1972, 1974; 
Denney, Denney, & Ziobrowski, 1973; Drumm, Jackson, & Magley, 1995; Drumm & 
Jackson, 1996; Herwig, 1982; Laughlin, Moss, & Miller, 1969; Mosher & Hornsby, 1966; 
Siegler, 1977; Taylor & Faust, 1952; Thornton, 1982; Van Horn & Bartz, 1968), children 
and young people with learning disabilities (Barton, 1988; Borys, 1979; Copeland & 
Weissbrod, 1983; Simmonds, 1990; Tant & Douglas, 1982), adults with chronic alcoholism 
(Laine & Butters, 1982; Saarnio, 1993), and adults with various types of brain injury (Baldo, 
Delis, Wilkins, & Shimamura, 2004; F. C. Goldstein & Levin, 1991; Klouda & Cooper, 
1990; Levin et al., 1993; Levin et al., 1997; Marshall, Harvey, Freed, & Phillips, 1996; 
Marshall et al., 2004; Marshall, Karow, Morelli, Iden, & Dixon, 2003a, 2003b; Marshall, 
McGurk, Karow, & Kairy, 2007; Upton & Thompson, 1999; Vilkki, 1988).  
Although an apparently simple game, the TQT taps a range of skills important to 
understanding typical and atypical cognitive processes. To solve the TQT, participants need 
to gather more information about the target, and its first main use in research was as a test of 
information-seeking in typically-developing children (Laughlin, et al., 1969; Mosher & 
Hornsby, 1966; Van Horn & Bartz, 1968).  To recognise that more information is required, 
and to select an appropriate strategy that identifies the target quickly and efficiently, is to 
engage executive functioning skills, such as planning and selective attention. It is in this role, 
as an executive task, that the TQT has been deployed in research with neuropsychological 
populations (Baldo, et al., 2004; Marshall, et al., 2003b). 
18 
 
Primarily, though, it is a measure of verbal problem-solving ability, in that the solution – the 
identity of the target item - is not immediately apparent from the task materials (Siegler, 
1977; Taylor & Faust, 1952). Because the solution is hidden, participants must generate a 
top-down strategy, via questioning, that allows them to move towards a state where they can 
guess at the identity of the target. On the TQT, the strategy is in the questions that 
participants select, some of which may be more effective than others in eliminating possible 
options. The “moves” towards the goal state are represented by the systematic elimination of 
alternatives. And though the range of possible answers is typically limited to a set number of 
options (usually 24-48 items), participants are free to ask whichever questions they consider 
useful to identify the target. In this sense, participants are presented with an open set of 
possible responses – allowing for assessment of not just whether participants can solve the 
problem, but how they go about doing so. 
Aside from the cognitive skills that it measures, a further advantage of a task like the TQT is 
its game format. On the one hand, this makes it very accessible for participants from a range 
of population groups, especially children. On the other hand, its open-field structure is 
thought to be more ecologically valid than many standard experimental tasks. For example, 
when trying to work out how best to search for a lost item round the house, there is no single 
right way to do it – you could search through each room systematically, or you could go first 
to the room you thought you last had it in, or ask someone, etc. In contrast, a number of 
laboratory-based experimental tasks only allow for a set range of responses.  Some 
commonly used tasks - particularly in executive functioning research - have been questioned 
for their relevance to real-world challenges for people with autism (Kenworthy, Yerys, 
Anthony, & Wallace, 2008). Using a task such as the TQT allows for measurement of 
cognitive skills, but in a format that gets closer to everyday cognition.  
 
Autism and twenty questions 
In the most commonly used version of the TQT, participants are presented with an array of 
42 black and white line drawings of everyday objects and items (see figure 1). The 
experimenter then chooses one of the items, and gives the participant instructions similar to 
the following: 
“Now I am going to think of one of these objects. Your task is to figure out which object I 
am thinking of by asking questions. You can ask any question you like, but I can only 
answer by saying “Yes” or “No”. The idea of the game is that you figure out the object I am 
thinking of with as few questions as possible” (Minshew et al., 1994, p.34). 
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Typically, participants have a maximum number of questions that they can ask (often 10 or 
20) and performance on the task has been measured in terms of overall success (the number 
of problems solved), efficiency (the number of items eliminated per question, or the number 
of questions used per problem) and general questioning strategy. Strategy is usually divided 
into grouping questions, where more than one item is referred to in the set, and guess 
questions, where only one item is eliminated (Mosher & Hornsby, 1966)
2
.  
A study by Minshew, Siegel, Goldstein and Weldy (1994) was the first to apply the TQT to a 
group of participants with autism. Performance in an ASD group of adolescents and adults 
(AgeRange = 11-41) was compared to performance in a sample of typically-developing 
participants matched for age, gender and IQ. The two groups attempted four trials of a 
Twenty Questions Task. Compared to typically-developing controls, participants with autism 
completed significantly fewer successful trials of the TQT. In addition, controls and autistic 
participants significantly differed in their strategy use. Whereas control participants used 
questions that eliminated groups of items for approximately 50% of each game, participants 
with autism only used such questions for 25% of their queries. Instead, participants with 
autism used guess questions as much as 50% of the time (Minshew et al., 1994).  
For example, instead of questions about general categories, such as “Is it an animal?”, 
participants with autism asked questions that only eliminated one item at a time, either by 
directly naming the item (“Is it a spoon?”) or referring to it in an elliptical way (“Is it 
something you eat soup with?”). This meant that participants with ASD were much less 
efficient in how they eliminated items to solve the problem. Similar findings were observed 
by Minshew and colleagues in follow-up studies involving adults (Minshew, et al., 2002) 
and children (D. L. Williams, Goldstein, & Minshew, 2006a) with ASDs. 
As outlined above, autism is associated with delays in language and intellectual development 
in early life (APA, 1994). In some cases, spoken language may only develop after six or 
seven years, if it all (Bennett et al., 2008; Luyster, Kadlec, Carter, & Tager-Flusberg, 2008). 
As such, differential performance on a task like Twenty Questions may not be thought to be 
surprising: a verbal and cognitive task would clearly pose a number of challenges for a group 
with linguistic and intellectual delays.  
                                                   
2 These are sometimes referred to as “constraint-seeking” and “hypothesis-scanning” or “hypothesis-
testing” questions, based on Mosher & Hornsby’s (1966) original terminology. Also reported in some 
studies are “pseudo-constraint-seeking” questions, where participants ask a question phrased in a way 
that sounds like it would pick out a set of multiple items, but in actual fact only removes one item in 
the set. For example, “Do you use it in the rain?” could refer to multiple items, but in the standard set 
would only eliminate one item, the umbrella. For clarity, here only grouping questions and guess 












Figure 1: The Twenty Questions Task array (From Mosher & Hornsby, 1966). 
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But the above research was conducted with individuals with “high-functioning autism” 
(HFA), who fall within the normal range (full-scale IQ>70) for general cognitive ability and 
generally have at least functional levels of speech. In addition, IQ abilities, which often 
differ between autism and typically-developing groups of participants, were matched in these 
studies. This suggests that the atypical performance of participants with autism on the task is 
not attributable to deficits in the general abilities required to engage in such a game (such as 
vocabulary, or knowledge of semantic categories). Furthermore, the fact that differences in 
questioning have been observed in autistic children and adults (Minshew et al., 2002) 
suggests that is not simply a feature of general delay that will disappear with age. It appears 
instead that participants with autism have the general skills required to play the game, and 
yet still do not always perform in the same as way as typically-developing counterparts. 
Here, then, would appear to be a prime example of individuals with ASD failing to 
effectively use a top-down strategy to solve a problem. But how best to explain it?   
As referred to above, participants with autism have often done well on category matching 
and recognition tasks, despite seemingly not using categories to effectively guide their search 
on the TQT.  Based on performance on the TQT and similar tasks, Minshew et al. (2002) 
proposed the existence of a dissociation between intact concept identification and impaired 
concept formation in autism. That is, they suggested that participants could essentially 
recognise category groupings that they knew (“concept identification”), when prompted by a 
direct question, or by task stimuli that serve to cue the relevant category, but they struggled 
with tasks that demand “concept formation”, or the unprompted combination of different 
items together in the form of a category. For Minshew and colleagues, the problem-solving 
performance of participants with ASD reflected an underlying “inability to spontaneously 
form schemata or paradigms that organize information” (Minshew et al., 2002; p. 333).  
The notion of a distinction between concept formation and concept identification predates 
the work of Minshew and colleagues – they attribute it to Bourne (1966) – but they were the 
first to explicitly apply such an idea to cognitive skills in autism. In its referral to using 
organising strategies “spontaneously”, their definition of a concept formation deficit also 
resembles proposals made by other researchers that children with autism have a problem 
with generativity, or the ability to produce novel responses without cues or prompts (Dichter, 
Lam, Turner-Brown, Holtzclaw, & Bodfish, 2009; Turner, 1997). 
On its own, pointing out such a dissociation would not necessarily have much explanatory 
power: as already discussed, problems with generating strategies, and differences in 
performance on tasks that do and do not cue a specific response, are reasonably common 
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observations in autism research (White et al., 2009). But Minshew and colleagues’ 
explanation sits within a wider theory about information processing in autism. They suggest 
that people with autism have a domain-general problem with complex, integrative forms of 
information processing, underpinned by disruptions to networks of distal brain regions 
(Minshew, Goldstein, & Siegel, 1997). The proposed mechanism for this is the presence of 
reduced communication in cortical networks in autism, making it harder for the integration 
of individual pieces of information, required for forming conceptual strategies, to occur (for 
futher explanation of this theory, see Minshew & Goldstein, 1993a; Minshew & Goldstein, 
1998; Minshew, Goldstein, & Siegel, 1996, 1997; Minshew, Sweeney, & Luna, 2002).  
At the time that Minshew and colleagues were first proposing their ideas, relatively few 
studies had reported on connectivity and network-based neural abnormalities in autism. Such 
a hypothesis stood in contrast to other cognitive deficits in autism, which were generally 
assumed to result from focal brain abnormalities: for example, problems with Theory-of-
Mind were proposed to result from atypical development of the amygdala, a structure 
strongly associated with emotional processing and social cognition (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 
2000). However, a number of subsequent studies have gone on to offer support for 
Minshew’s ideas, with evidence of reduced connectivity between a wide range of brain 
regions in ASD being reported, both structurally (Barnea-Goraly et al., 2004; C. Cheung et 
al., 2009; Courchesne & Pierce, 2005; Kana et al., 2006) and functionally (Castelli, et al., 
2002; Just, Cherkassky, Keller, Kana, & Minshew, 2007; Just, Cherkassky, Keller, & 
Minshew, 2004; Kleinhans et al., 2008; Villalobos, Mizuno, Dahl, Kemmotsu, & Müller, 
2005; Welchew et al., 2005)
3
. 
Thus, the idea of a “concept formation deficit” appears to describe and explain why 
individuals with autism struggle to perform effectively on the TQT. By drawing on what is 
known about categorisation skills in other studies on autism, and contrasting with autistic 
problem-solving performance, Minshew and colleagues provide a theory for a specific 
difficulty with the use of organising strategies in ASD.  Moreover, evidence from 
neuroimaging studies on autism appears to provide an explanatory basis for why this occurs: 
a failure of top-down strategy, due to more general problems with the effective integration of 
information across cortical networks in autism.  
                                                   
3 For reviews on connectivity in autism, see Belmonte et al. (2004), Geschwind & Levitt (2007), 
Hughes (2007), Rippon et al. (2007), and, more recently, Müller et al. (In press), Vissers, Cohen, & 
Geurts (In press).  
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This is one interpretation of what is happening on the TQT – but is it a correct one? As 
already explained, problem-solving is a complex process. This is especially the case for the 
Twenty Questions Task, which relies on a number of executive and linguistic skills to be 
performed effectively – as attested to by the wide range of ways in which the task has been 
used in previous research (Laine & Butters, 1982; Marshall, et al., 2003b; Mosher & 
Hornsby, 1966). The performance of participants with ASD on the TQT could reflect a 
specific problem with concept formation, but it could equally have arisen from a number of 
other demands that the task makes on a participant. The following section describes a 
Master’s thesis and subsequent paper by the author (Alderson-Day & McGonigle-Chalmers, 
2011) that attempted to address some of these concerns.  
 
“Is it a bird? Is it a plane?”: establishing the factors that affect TQT performance in 
autism  
While a potentially rich task, one problem with the TQT is that it arguably taps a number of 
cognitive processes that are thought to be impaired or develop atypically in autism. First, in 
asking participants to identify a target being “thought of” by the experimenter, the standard 
version of the task could be interpreted as requiring a certain amount of theory-of-mind 
ability. By placing the answer in the mind of the experimenter, this set-up may make it hard 
for some individuals with ASD to represent what the answer may be, or they may simply 
lack any motivation to find out what it is.  
Second, as reflected by its use with other neuropsychological populations, the TQT is a 
measure that relies on good executive skills, and failure on the task is often taken to reflect 
specific kinds of executive dysfunction (Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001). For instance, by 
having to ask a range of questions to reach the target, participants need a certain amount of 
cognitive flexibility: persisting with exactly the same questions, irrespective of the answer, is 
a strategy that is unlikely to identify the target quickly. In addition, for the standard TQT 
participants do not remove items as they proceed through the task; that is, the task array 
remains unchanged throughout each trial. This entails a demand on other executive 
functioning skills, especially working memory (which questions have been asked?), but also 
selective attention (which items do I still need to attend to?) and inhibition (which items do I 
need to ignore?). As explained above, studies on executive functioning in autism have 
reported problems in each of these areas, and all of them could conceivably be contributing 
to problem-solving difficulties on the TQT. 
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Finally, an effective approach to the TQT may require good “concept formation” skills, but 
not all concepts are necessarily equal. The TQT presents a mixture of everyday items that 
belong to relatively common semantic categories. Some organising strategies on the TQT 
may be based on purely perceptual categories (“Is it red?”), while others may rely on a much 
more sophisticated level of conceptual knowledge, such as knowledge for more abstract 
categories (“Is it man-made?”). On free sorting tasks, individuals with ASD have been 
reported to prefer concrete over abstract sorting principles (Ropar & Peebles, 2007): this 
may reflect a “top-down” failure of some sort, or it could indicate an adverse sensitivity to 
more abstract forms of grouping. Similarly, on the TQT, a problem with asking effective 
questions may be caused by a problem with flexibly using certain semantic categories, rather 
than a general problem with using organising strategies. 
Alderson-Day & McGonigle-Chalmers (2011) designed a study to test these explanations, by 
applying a modified TQT to a group of 14 young people with ASD and a group of age- and 
full scale IQ-matched typically-developing controls. In order to avoid the potential confound 
of theory-of-mind, the hidden item was selected by the experimenter using a “random 
generator” animation on a laptop computer, rather than asking participants to identify the 
item that the experimenter had in mind. Then, when participants identified the target, it was 
also revealed on the computer screen. This was done in an attempt to place the answer not in 
the mind of the experimenter, but as a matter of fact stored by the computer (akin to an 
answer on a quiz).  
The second set of modifications varied the executive demands of the TQT. To assess 
cognitive flexibility, the contents of the set were changed after three trials, such that the 
internal structure of categories that were available in the set had differed. This was done in 
order to prompt a change in questioning, as questions that had been useful previously would 
not necessarily be as effective following the switch. Also varied was whether participants 
could or could not eliminate items from the set after each question, by using a hinged-frame 
Guess Who? board. Participants attempted six trials where they could eliminate items from 
the set (by knocking them down), followed by two trials where this was prohibited. Any 
decrement in performance was taken to indicate that participants struggled with the 
additional executive demands – demands that would usually be in place for all trials on a 
standard TQT.   
The final modification made was to vary the task stimuli. To contrast with the use of 
everyday semantic categories in the standard task, a set of robot characters were included in 
a separate TQT condition. The robots were designed to vary only in perceptual 
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characteristics, in order to assess whether problems with strategy use on the task were 
actually more specific to the handling of semantic-conceptual categories in the standard 
TQT. The content of questions was also recorded, to assess for any preferences in 
participants’ strategies. 
What was observed partially supported Minshew and colleagues’ earlier findings. The study 
observed less grouping and more guessing in the ASD group than the TD group, even with 
the removal of theory-of-mind elements from the task. This tendency  a) was observed 
irrespective of the changes in set structure (designed to test flexibility of questioning), b) was 
present whether item elimination was or was not permitted, and c) was evident for both 
standard stimuli and the perceptually-categorised Robot stimuli.   
However, the performance of ASD and control participants also varied in other ways. For 
example, although ASD participants asked fewer grouping questions throughout the task, 
they were more likely to require extra questions to solve the problem when elimination was 
prohibited. This was taken to indicate a greater difficulty with searching the set when the 
executive demands of the task increased. In addition, the variation of perceptual vs 
conceptual task stimuli highlighted group differences in performance: ASD participants were 
generally more efficient and more successful on the task when dealing with purely 
perceptual stimuli than when handling the standard stimuli, whereas controls performed 
comparably on both forms of the task. ASD participants were also less likely than control 
participants to ask questions that referred to abstract categories (such as “Is it a mammal?”).     
A final key finding concerned the efficiency of questions asked by the ASD group. 
Participants with ASD not only asked fewer grouping questions on the task, they also 
eliminated fewer items per question (a measure referred to as “question quality”; Alderson-
Day & McGonigle-Chalmers, 2011). That is, each question that they asked tended to be less 
efficient and too restricted to subdivide the set effectively.  
In principle, this could have been produced by participants with ASD taking more guesses, 
as a guess by definition will only eliminate one item at a time. But differences in question 
quality were observed even when only grouping questions were analysed. That is, 
participants with ASD, even when they were using grouping strategies, were still eliminating 
too few items - they were casting their net in a way that was too restricted to be fully 
effective. For example, rather than ask a very general question first (“Is it a living thing?”) 
they may ask about a more restricted category (“Is it footwear?”).  
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This prompts a subtle but important distinction in how best to describe ASD performance on 
the task. Minshew and colleagues proposal of a concept formation deficit refers to a failure 
to spontaneously use organising strategies (Minshew et al., 2002). The analysis of grouping 
and guessing rates from the TQT supported this idea, as participants with ASD were taking 
guesses, rather than organising the items together in the form of category-based questions. 
But the analysis of question quality shows that even when they adopted a level of 
organisation, even when they were grouping, their focus was too restricted. That is, rather 
than the deficit being a categorical one, of either using or not using an organising strategy, it 
appeared to be a continuous one – a tendency towards smaller groupings when a grouping 
strategy is being deployed. 
Such a tendency was reminiscent of the aforementioned autistic “cognitive style”. 
Participants with ASD were focussing on the local (“Do you use it to brush your teeth”) 
rather than the global (“Is it a tool?”); on the particular (“Is it a dog?”) rather than the general 
(“Is it a living thing?”). This did not appear to be a purely perceptual bias – autistic 
participants, for example, were no more likely to ask questions about perceptual 
characteristics, or individual features, such as wheels – but a conceptual bias: a tendency 
towards the local in terms of how semantic categories were being utilised.   
 
Asking the right questions 
The data from Alderson-Day & McGonigle-Chalmers (2011) pointed to a range of ways in 
which the performance of ASD children on the TQT may differ from typically-developing 
children. Some of the results were compatible with the ideas of Minshew and colleagues, 
while others suggested the presence of additional factors that may impinge upon problem-
solving in this particular context. Participants with ASD were affected by the change in 
executive demands of the task; they appeared to be sensitive to the level of conceptual 
material in the task stimuli, and when grouping, they asked about fewer items than typically-
developing participants. 
These data could be taken to suggest that there are multiple cognitive difficulties affecting 
problem-solving performance in autism. Or, they could be used to argue for the absence of a 
concept formation deficit and the presence of an autistic cognitive style at work; a tendency 
towards the local in ASD problem-solving skills. But to endorse either of these positions,  
just based on the data from Minshew et al. (1994; 2002) and Alderson-Day & McGonigle-
Chalmers (2011),  would be premature, and would leave many questions about ASD 
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performance unanswered. In particular, three points can be made that highlight the need for 
further examination of this issue.  
First, the experiment conducted in Alderson-Day & McGonigle-Chalmers (2011) 
realistically only represented the starting point of a long process. Given the complexity of the 
TQT, many more cognitive factors remained that could explain why participants with ASD 
fail to ask effective questions, both in terms of what knowledge they bring to the task and 
how they are affected by the demands of the TQT itself. For instance, if participants with 
ASD apparently could use top-down strategies, but nevertheless chose ones that happened to 
be less effective, then one needs to understand how they think about questions in advance – 
in essence, how they plan their questions, and what they understand to constitute a “good 
question”. Also to be explained was why participants with ASD were affected by not being 
able to eliminate items from the testing set: it could be that a failure to allocate attention to 
relevant stimuli was affecting ASD performance, throughout the task.  
Both of these possibilities have the support of previous data suggesting problems with 
planning and attention skills in autism (Christ, Holt, White, & Green, 2007; Ozonoff, 
Pennington, et al., 1991). These are, in essence, further executive explanations of problem-
solving in autism. What they represent are examples of candidate explanations, drawn from 
previous autism research, that need to be tested before any particular account of problem-
solving in ASD can be endorsed. The research presented in the first part of this thesis 
(Chapters 1 & 2) examines these explanations. 
A second point concerns the explanatory power of a cognitive style. If the problem-solving 
of autistic individuals was taken to represent a style at work, rather than a deficit in concept 
formation, then still lacking from this explanation is an account of where such a style may 
come from. To say that this is evidence of a cognitive style is simply to redescribe the 
performance in terms of a wider tendency in autistic cognitive processes, but it does not 
provide a developmental story about why people with autism would be biased towards 
solving problems in a particular way. Any account that attempts to explain the pattern of 
problem-solving skills in autism, needs also to make some attempt at saying why a bias or 
tendency would develop – settling for style alone does not do this. The second and third parts 
of this thesis (Chapters 3-7) represent an attempt to provide such an account.  
Finally, whether understood as a deficit or style, these ideas only explain autistic problem-
solving with reference to theory and data from autism research. This, though, might ignore 
important ideas from elsewhere. Given the variety of studies that have used the TQT to study 
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cognitive processes, in both typical and atypical populations, there is a huge amount of 
knowledge available that could be used to inform understanding of problem-solving in 
autism. By using the examples of other atypical groups with similar difficulties on the TQT, 
new explanations and hypotheses can be formed and tested – explanations that may be more 
powerful than those that are only drawn from autism research.  
If these kinds of comparisons are not made, then there is a danger that an “autism-only” story 
emerges. That is, by only considering explanations of problem-solving from autism research, 
a bespoke explanation is constructed that fits the available data for autism in a “just-so” way. 
If the problem-solving difficulties seen in autism are indeed autism-specific, then this may 
be valid. But if they are not autism-specific, and if the same problems occur in other 
population groups, then an explanation is likely needed that draws on more general 
characteristics of cognitive development. Throughout the following chapters, the examples 
of other population groups are drawn on in an attempt to achieve this. 
A series of studies was planned to further clarify and explain problem-solving difficulties in 
people with autism spectrum disorders. The general question addressed was why people with 
ASD deploy inefficient strategies in their problem-solving. The specific question at hand was 
why this occurs on the Twenty Questions task; why ASD participants do not ask questions 
that effectively narrow down possibilities. This was done primarily via a task-analysis of the 
executive demands of the TQT, and secondly with reference to the problem-solving 










Being too specific, focussing on the the local and ignoring the global are familiar and well-
worn characteristics in research on autism. But an inefficiency in asking effective questions 
must be interpreted in the first instance as just that: an inefficiency. And if participants can 
attempt the task in other respects, and yet perform inefficiently, then a number of factors 
may be driving this kind of performance. Evidence from studies on typical development, 
brain injury, and executive functioning skills in autism combine to highlight two areas that 
ASD participants may also struggle with on the task: planning questions, and selectively 
allocating attention.  
 
Planning in Twenty Questions 
If a participant asks less efficient questions on the Twenty Questions Task, this may reflect a 
problem with how they prepare their questions. Selecting the right question to ask is a matter 
of assessing which categories will effectively subdivide the set. In most cases, this will be a 
category that refers to a sizeable proportion of items while still leaving a considerable out-
group, thus guaranteeing an elimination of multiple items whether the answer to the question 
is yes or no. A simple heuristic to achieve this is to use general questions in the initial 
approach to the task, but selecting consistently effective questions involves being able to 
think ahead about the consequences of different questions; in essence, being able to plan 
questions effectively. Thus, formulating good questions involves the weighing up of multiple 
options, adapting a strategy based on the set items remaining, and being able to think ahead 
through multiple game states. 
There is evidence from Mosher & Hornsby’s (1966) original verbal inquiry research that the 
ability to recognise effective questions may actually precede a tendency to consistently 
deploy such questions. Participants in the study played an open-set questioning game where 
a scenario was described, such as a car crash, and the player had to ask questions to ascertain 
the cause of the event. Six, eight and 11 year-old participants were then questioned after the 
task about their approach to the game. Participants were given a choice between a general 
                                                   
4 Sections of this chapter and chapter that follows are published in Alderson-Day (2011) and a poster 
presentation at the International Meeting for Autism Research (IMFAR) 2011 in San Diego, 
California. (“Asking the right questions: Planning differences during verbal problem-solving in 
children with autism spectrum disorders”. B. Alderson-Day, IMFAR, May 12th-14th, 2011).  
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question (e.g. “Was there anything wrong with the man?”) and a specific question (“Did he 
have a heart attack?”) and asked which they would choose if they started again and “wanted 
to get an answer in as few questions as possible” (p. 99). While the majority of six year-olds 
would select the more specific question (equivalent to asking a guess question on the TQT), 
eight and 11 year-olds would consistently select the more general question. However, when 
attempting the task, eight year-olds would actually ask specific questions instead of more 
general ones. To the authors, this suggested that they “appeared able to recognise a better 
strategy in the verbal game, but they seemed less able to mount the strategy on their own 
initiative.” (p. 99, italics theirs). 
There is little evidence regarding the extent to which children with autism may recognise the 
right question on the TQT, as such measures were not included in Minshew and colleagues’ 
previous uses of the task (Minshew et al., 1994; Williams et al., 2006). Evidence of intact 
sorting and matching abilities in categorisation tasks might be considered indirect support for 
the suggestion that ASD participants would be able to recognise efficient categories. If they 
did choose the right questions in a similar forced-choice format to Mosher & Hornsby’s, this 
would seem to suggest that the ability to discriminate more and less effective questions is 
unimpaired in ASD and that their inefficiency is genuinely to be found in the deployment of 
questions. Alternatively, if they did not consistently identify effective questions, this would 
suggest that their difficulty is more one of understanding what constitutes a “good” question. 
Another aspect of planning effective questions is being able to string together a sequence of 
categories that progressively narrow down available options. Asking one question that 
eliminates half the set is effective, but any advantage that this provides is largely lost if the 
question is followed up by a series of direct guesses. Truly effective strategies contain a 
series of questions that dissect the set each time; as in the sequence of 
“living/animal/pet/four legs”. 
From around the age of 11, children report strategies that resemble this approach (Drumm, et 
al., 1995; Drumm & Jackson, 1996). The choice of such a strategy appears to be mostly “on-
line”, that is, it occurs during the task itself, each question at a time. Very few players will 
work out a series of questions fully in advance, because the path of questioning will differ 
depending on the answers that the experimenter provides. Often the first, and maybe second, 
questions can be planned, but after that the set must usually be inspected again to see what 
questions will fit best.  
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However, there are reasons to believe that planning to narrow down possibilities is still 
important. Firstly, when people who have a traumatic brain injury (TBI) have attempted the 
TQT they have been reported to struggle with deploying narrowing strategies (Marshall, et 
al., 2003b). People who have had a TBI can show a range of executive functioning 
impairments, especially concerning inhibition and the ability to not act on a prepotent 
response. As such, direct guessing might be expected to contribute to narrowing failures in 
this group (as has been reported in other participants with cortical damage; Klouda & 
Cooper, 1990; Upton & Thompson, 1999). However, in some cases a much more subtle 
profile is evident. In Marshall et al. (2003b) participants with a TBI often asked effective 
grouping questions, but would then follow up those questions with restricted grouping, or 
“pseudo-constraint” questions, i.e. questions that only referred to one item, but in a 
roundabout way rather than a guess. This was interpreted by the study authors as a problem 
of planning and strategy shifting – participants were choosing a good initial question, but 
then failing to recognise the importance of maintaining a narrowing plan, and struggling with 
shifting their focus to a different category that could narrow down possibilities again in an 
efficient way (Marshall, et al., 2003b).      
A second piece of evidence is that planning out questions prior to a task appears to improve 
performance, at least for typically-developing young people. Siegler (1977), in an 
experiment utilising a numbers and letters analogue of Twenty Questions, observed 
improved question efficiency in a group of 13-14 year olds following the instruction to plan 
ahead the sequence of questions they wanted to ask. This was the case even when 
participants departed from the plan itself, suggesting that it was the the adoption of a 
planning strategy and the act of pre-planning that allowed participants to improve in their 
questioning, rather than actually possessing a plan and sticking to it during the task. Siegler 
(1977) argued that pre-planning had this effect because it prompted participants to conduct a 
deeper search of the “problem space” created by the task.   
If problems with planning a strategy can impair TQT performance, and the experience of 
making a plan facilitates effective problem-solving, then a failure to ask effective questions 
may not only reflect a difficulty in recognising which questions are best to use, but a 
problem with planning a series of questions to interrogate the TQT.  If this is true, it raises a 
candidate explanation of difficulty for ASD individuals, who in many executive tasks display 






As a core process in executive functioning, there is an extensive background of research on 
planning abilities in individuals with autism (Bramham et al., 2009; Geurts, et al., 2004; 
Goldberg et al., 2005; C. Hughes, et al., 1994; Ozonoff et al., 2004; Ozonoff, Pennington, et 
al., 1991). The large majority of studies have examined planning using basic non-verbal 
problem-solving tasks, where a series of moves or game states must be thought through in 
order to reach the solution quickly and efficiently.  
Much of this work has either used the classic “Tower of Hanoi” (ToH) problem, or close 
analogues of this task. In the Tower of Hanoi, participants must move a series of rings 
between three poles to arrange them in a new sequence, while limiting the number of moves 
used. In the simplest version, three rings of different sizes must be moved from the first pole 
to the third pole, although more complex versions are often used (See figure 2 for an 
example of a four-ring version of the task). Only one ring can be moved at a time, and a 
large ring can never be placed on top of a small ring. The most well-known use of the Tower 
of Hanoi task in experimental psychology is the work of Newell and Simon (1972), who 
used the puzzle as the basis of their formalised approach to problem-solving in healthy 
adults. 
The use of Tower tasks as specific measures of planning, particularly in neuropsychological 
populations, is typically attributed to Shallice (1982).  Shallice sought a task that could be 
used to highlight deficits in the executive control abilities of people with anterior lesions to 
the brain.  Based on the work of Simon and colleagues (Anzai & Simon, 1979) and others 
working in the field of artificial intelligence (e.g. Sussman, 1975), Shallice argued that 
Tower tasks involve a specific requirement  to plan ahead because they demand  the 
decomposition of the puzzle into a series of subgoals. Failure to plan ahead by thinking 
through such subgoals may lead to moves being attempting in the wrong order, or needing to 
be reversed in the course of the puzzle (Shallice, 1982). 
To test this idea, Shallice (1982) developed an analogue of the Tower of Hanoi, the “Tower 
of London” (ToL) and applied it to a group of 61 patients with localised unilateral lesions to 
the brain. The ToL differed from a Hanoi puzzle in requiring the movement of three 
coloured balls of the same size across three poles of differing size (a design chosen to allow 











Figure 2. A four-ring form of the classic Tower of Hanoi Task. Participants must move all of the 




structure, but the cognitive demands of the task were thought to be largely similar to the 
ToH. The results supported the existence of specific task difficulties in certain patients: in 
contrast to participants with lesions to either posterior or right anterior regions of the brain, 
participants with left anterior lesions were much less successful than controls in solving 3-,4- 
and 5-move puzzles on the ToL. As this was seen alongside intact performance on other 
neuropsychological tests, such as Block Design, the results were taken to support the 
existence of specific planning impairments in this particular patient group (Shallice, 1982). 
Since then Tower of London tasks have been used to study planning processes for a variety 
of conditions, including schizophrenia (Rasser et al., 2005), attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (Riccio, Wolfe, Romine, Davis, & Sullivan, 2004), dyslexia (Reiter, Tucha, & 
Lange, 2005), and Tourette Syndrome (Lavoie, Thibault, Stip, & O'Connor, 2007). Tower 
tasks have also been used in research with healthy adults to highlight specific 
subcomponents of planning and the main cognitive resources that effective planning appears 
to rely upon (Davies, 2003; Gilhooly, Wynn, Phillips, Logie, & Della Sala, 2002; Phillips, 
1999; Phillips, Wynn, McPherson, & Gilhooly, 2001).  
One main development coming out of this work has been the making of a distinction 
between pre-planning and on-line planning on Tower tasks (Davies, 2005; Rattermann, 
Spector, Grafman, Levin, & Harward, 2001; Ward & Allport, 1997). On the one hand, when 
participants are instructed to plan out their moves in advance on the ToL, the amount of time 
they initially spend planning has been observed to increase in line with the complexity of the 
puzzle (Ward & Allport, 1997). On the other hand, the amount of time spent planning does 
not always translate into better performance in solving the puzzle (Phillips, et al., 2001). It 
has also been suggested that pre-planning may only have a beneficial effect for puzzles of 
easy to moderate difficulty (Davies, 2003), possibly because the visuo-spatial working 
memory demands become too great on more complex problems. In addition, groups of older 
adults, who sometimes show impoverished or reduced levels of pre-planning, still perform as 
well as younger adults during the “move” stage of the task itself (Gilhooly, Phillips, Wynn, 
Logie, & Della Sala, 1999). Thus, though Tower puzzles demand a certain amount of 
planning ahead, the ability to pre-plan is not necessarily as important as once thought; 
instead, much of the planning skill may consist in being able to think one or two moves 
ahead during the task
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Planning in autism 
The first study to specifically report on planning processes in individuals with autism was 
conducted by Ozonoff, Pennington and Rogers (1991). As part of a study comparing theory-
of-mind and executive functioning deficits in ASD, Ozonoff and colleagues tested 23 high 
functioning children with autism (AgeM  = 12.05) and 20 typically-developing controls 
matched for age and IQ on a 3-disc Tower of Hanoi task. Compared to controls, participants 
with autism scored significantly lower for their “planning efficiency”, a composite measure 
based on how many trials they required to solve each problem (lower efficiency scores 
reflected the use of more trials to solve the problem). For the authors, this was interpreted as 
reflecting an example of core executive dysfunction in autism, possibly with a basis in 
damage to prefrontal regions of the brain (Ozonoff, Pennington, et al., 1991). 
The findings of Ozonoff et al. (1991) have largely been supported in subsequent studies that 
have applied Tower tasks to groups of participants with autism. ASD participants have been 
reported to require more moves to solve problems (C. Hughes, et al., 1994; Ozonoff, et al., 
2004; Robinson, Goddard, Dritschel, Wisley, & Howlin, 2009), complete fewer puzzles 
overall (Lopez, Lincoln, Ozonoff, & Lai, 2005; Pellicano, 2007), and take more time to 
complete solutions than typically-developing controls (Geurts, et al., 2004; Verté, et al., 
2005). In comparison to some other areas of executive functioning, the evidence of planning 
difficulties drawn from such studies has been considered to be among the strongest, in the 
conclusions of reviews by Pennington & Ozonoff (1996) and Hill (2004). 
More recently the strength of such conclusions has come under some scrutiny, as seen in a 
recent review of EF abilities conducted by Kenworthy and colleagues (Kenworthy, et al., 
2008). The first question relates to the consistency of evidence between desk-based and 
computer-based versions of Tower tasks. Studies of autism in the 1990s and early 2000s 
typically used desk-based versions of the ToH and ToL, while a number of studies after this 
used the Stockings of Cambridge (SoC), a computerised version of the ToL included in the 
Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery (CANTAB; Robbins et al., 1994). 
In contrast to previous findings, studies using the SoC have often reported either less marked 
group differences in planning, or no differences at all (Corbett, Constantine, Hendren, 
Rocke, & Ozonoff, 2009; Goldberg, et al., 2005; Happé, Booth, Charlton, & Hughes, 2006).  
For example, Corbett et al. (2009) compared a group of 18  children with ASD (AgeM = 
9.44), a groups of children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and a group 
of typically-developing children on a battery of executive tasks that included the SoC. 
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Planning performance was measured in terms of the number of problems solved with the 
minimum moves possible (“Min Moves”), the amount of time participants spent thinking 
before attempting the task (“Initial Thinking”) and the average amount of time spent 
completing each move (“Subsequent Thinking”). In contrast to a number of group 
differences for other EF variables (such as response inhibition and working memory) no 
group differences at all were observed on the three indexes of planning perfomance (Corbett, 
et al., 2009).     
One reason that Kenworthy et al. (2008) suggest for this disparity in findings is the removal 
of social components from computerised tasks. Whereas the original ToH would require a 
participant to understand instructions and feedback from a human experimenter, the use of a 
computer largely eliminates this interaction, making it easier for an individual with autism to 
attempt.  
Another criticism of Tower tasks raised by Kenworthy and colleagues is that they actually 
conflate a number of executive demands, as in the case of other widely used executive tasks 
(Ozonoff, 1995). The initial approach to the task may require planning moves in advance and 
on-line monitoring of possible moves, but this also depends on inhibition of unwanted moves 
and execution of intended moves. In this respect, deficient performance on one or more of 
the overall task outcomes does not necessarily indicate a specific problem with planning, but 
may reflect a separate executive difficulty, or even one that emerges with the interaction of 
multiple task demands (Kenworthy, et al., 2008). 
These concerns are important to consider when establishing the degree of planning 
difficulties in autism, and it is certainly true that the evidence for a “planning deficit” has 
been less consistent since earlier reviews. It is not the case, though, that such concerns are 
unanswerable.  
First – as Kenworthy et al. note - evidence of specific planning difficulties is certainly much 
less strong when SoC findings are considered, but normal performance by ASD individuals 
has not always been observed on the computerised task either. Studies by Landa & Goldberg 
(2005), Sinzig et al. (2008) and Ozonoff et al. (2004) have reported planning impairments in 
ASD participants across the age and ability range. In the latter case, a relatively large group 
of  ASD participants (n = 79) were observed to solve fewer puzzles in the minimum amount 
of moves, used more moves on average, and take longer than controls to think about their 
moves during the task (Ozonoff, et al., 2004). Thus, specific problems with Tower puzzles 
do not appear to be confined to tasks that require interaction with an experimenter.  
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Second, although most of the evidence for planning difficulties in autism may be drawn from 
Tower tasks, research using other tasks has also pointed to specific problems with planning 
in individuals with ASD (Bramham, et al., 2009; Mackinlay, et al., 2006; Rajendran et al., 
2010).  For example, Bramham et al. (2009) tested a large sample of ASD (n = 45), ADHD 
(n = 53), and neurotypical adults (n = 31) on an executive battery that included the Zoo Map 
task from the Behavioural Assessment of Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS: Wilson et al., 
1996). The Zoo Map task is a measure of spatial planning that requires participants to plan a 
route round a series of markers while following certain rules.  In contrast to both ADHD and 
control participants, ASD participants were significantly slower in their creation and 
execution of a plan to visit a series of fixed points on a map. The study authors interpreted 
this as an indicator of problems with initiating a strategic plan in the ASD group (Bramham 
et al., 2009).  
Similar problems with planning have also been observed in studies on multitasking in 
autism. Rajendran et al. (2010) used a computer-based measure of multitasking to assess EF 
skills in a group of 18 adolescents with ASD and 18 typically-developing controls, who were 
matched for age and verbal IQ but differed in non-verbal IQ (ASD<TD). The paradigm – 
which was based on the Virtual Errands Task (McGeorge et al., 2001) -   required 
participants to complete a series of jobs around a virtual reality office environment within an 
eight-minute period. The jobs were presented as a written list to participants that could be 
referred to throughout the task, although the order of the list did not present the jobs in their 
optimal order: efficient performance required the formation of a newly ordered plan. 
Overall, participants with ASD scored lower than controls in the number of tasks they 
successfully completed. In addition, the efficiency of their routes around the environment 
was reduced compared to controls, suggesting a failure to form an effective plan of which 
tasks to complete in what order. Participants with ASD were also less likely to depart from 
the initial order of the list of tasks, even when it made sense to do so, which the study 
authors described as a possible “inability to engage in on-line planning....forcing them to fall 
back on the strategy of completing the errands in list order” (Rajendran, et al., 2010, p. 
1453). Discrepancies in non-verbal IQ may have been expected to underlie some of these 
group differences, but planning difficulties were still observed in the ASD group even when 
NVIQ scores were controlled for using analysis of covariance (Rajendran, et al., 2010).    
In an earlier study on multitasking, Mackinlay, Charman and Karmiloff-Smith (2006) 
adapted a paradigm designed for adults (the Greenwich Multitask Test, Burgess, 2000) to 
study goal-directed skills in 14 children with ASD and 16 typically-developing children 
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matched for age and IQ. The paradigm consisted of three colouring and sorting tasks that 
needed to be completed as much as possible within a limited time (three minutes) and in 
accordance with certain rules, such as attempting all the games at least once within the 
allotted time, and only attempting tasks one at a time. Before beginning, participants were 
asked to produce a plan of how they were going to attempt the tasks, which was given a 
score based on its complexity and optimality. Compared to control participants, children 
with autism achieved significantly lower planning scores. ASD participants also scored 
lower for the following of their plans when attempting the task, although this difference 
disappeared when the problems with initial planning were taken into account. Thus, 
participants with ASD appeared to specifically struggle with effective pre-planning in this 
case (Mackinlay, et al., 2006). 
Any generalisation about planning skills made across these different measures must be done 
so tentatively, as the above studies clearly differ from classic Tower tasks in what 
participants are being asked to do
6
. In the case of measures like the Zoo Map task, the 
requirement is one of efficient spatial planning round a fixed route, rather than manipulation 
of moves “in the mind’s eye”. Planning skills across these tasks do not necessarily always 
correspond: for example, in a study of young children with autism (AgeM = 5.5 years), 
Pellicano (2007) observed impaired performance on a ToL task, but intact performance on 
the Mazes task (a measure of spatial planning).   
Such tasks may also differ in the level of pre-planning and on-line planning that they require. 
As already outlined, success on Tower tasks appears to be less related to initial planning and 
more to on-line or concurrent planning (Phillips, et al., 2001). The kinds of difficulties 
reported by Rajendran et al. (2010)  may  point to on-line planning difficulties, but the 
paradigm used by Mackinlay et al. (2006) highlighted problems primarily in the pre-planning 
of what tasks to do when.  
Nevertheless, studies such as these are informative exactly because they relate specific 
planning difficulties to specific task measures. Rather than talk of a general “planning 
deficit”, measured by overall task performance, they point to specific problems, both in 
initiating effective plans and executing plans on-line. Evidence of pre-planning difficulties is 
particularly significant, because this begins to answer the concern raised by Kenworthy et al. 
about planning tasks measuring multiple executive processes. A problem implementing a 
plan mid-task might plausibly be caused by other related executive difficulties, but 
                                                   
6 See also Scholnick, Friedman & Wallner-Allan (1997) for an analysis of how planning demands 
differ between Tower-based tasks and other measures. 
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differences in the initial time and depth devoted to preparation prior to the task arguably 
supports a specific planning problem. Interestingly, there is also evidence for this within the 
ToH literature: in Verté et al. (2005), ASD participants were observed to increase their 
planning time less than controls in relation to increases in task difficulty, suggesting a 
possible failure to use the planning stage effectively in attempting the task. 
In summary, there is arguably evidence for specific difficulties with planning among ASD 
individuals, despite recent concerns about the consistency and clarity of evidence drawn 
from planning tasks. Previous reports of impairments on Tower of Hanoi–style measures 
have not always extended to more recent, computerised versions of the task, but evidence 
from other tests does seem to suggest difficulties in the use of planning to support problem-
solving. Furthermore, the use of specific task measures has highlighted specific problems 
with planning efficiently, both in terms of pre-planning and executing plans “on-line”. For a 
task like Twenty Questions, where multiple moves must be weighed up, selected or rejected, 
this could have a considerable impact, both upon how questions are evaluated and how 
planning is effectively utilised in approaching a task. 
 
Selective attention during Twenty Questions 
Difficulties with planning may affect how participants with autism think ahead about the 
effectiveness of their questions. But what about other executive demands that affect 
performance specifically during the task? When ASD participants attempted the Twenty 
Questions task in Alderson-Day & McGonigle-Chalmers (2011) their inefficiency in 
questioning was in general lower than controls. However, group differences were also 
evident in the number of questions used when participants could not physically eliminate 
items from the set, suggesting a sensitivity in the ASD participants to the increase in 
executive demands. 
The task condition where elimination was prohibited was designed to test participants’ 
search abilities when they were required to track their own questions and the experimenter’s 
responses.  Without physical elimination, a participant would be forced to recall which 
questions they had already asked, and what the answers to those questions were, in order to 
establish which items remained at each stage of their search. This requirement was 
hypothesised to be especially problematic for ASD participants, given previous evidence of 
difficulties with verbal working memory (Bennetto, et al., 1996).  
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However, the prohibition of physical elimination also introduces another aspect of executive 
demand into the task procedure. Not only do participants have to remember their questions to 
mentally update the set; they also have to ignore all the items in the visual array that have 
already been eliminated, but are still present. Physical elimination removes items from the 
visual array at every stage, so when such elimination is prohibited, the redundant items 
remain in set throughout the search. This is significant, because it requires participants to 
ignore the eliminated items at each stage of their questioning, and selectively divert attention 
towards items which are still active in the search. Figure 3 displays an illustration of this. 
Not being able to physically update the set, then, not only draws on working memory 
resources, but also the ability to selectively attend to relevant items in the set, and ignore 
irrelevant ones. The executive demand is multi-faceted, and if any of those components were 
impaired in a participant, this would be expected to lead to poor selection of questions during 
the task.  
Furthermore, if there was a problem with selective attention in the face of perceptual 
interference, this could impact subtly on overall game performance, i.e. even when physical 
elimination was allowed. An inability to filter out redundant information might be most 
strongly expressed when inactive items are constantly part of the perceptual array, but it may 
also affect the extent to which a player can choose an appropriate question even when all the 
items are still active.  
For example, in the array shown in figure 4, a reasonable question to ask would be “Is it an 
animal?”, which would be guaranteed to eliminate five of the 27 remaining items. If physical 
elimination was not allowed, choosing that question could be tricky as the array would also 
contain many other redundant items that are no longer relevant to the search. But equally, 
choosing the right question might be disrupted if attention was captured by minority items 
present in the set: failing to selectively attend to the most global category (animals) might 
mean that the participant focuses on the appliances, or vehicles, and asks “Is it a telephone” 
or “Can it fly?” instead. Ignoring these items could be tricky because they offer a potentially 
quicker route to success on the task if the questioner is lucky. Thus, a salient response is 
available in the set and must be ignored in order to select questions which are the most likely 








Figure 3. An example of interference when items cannot be removed from the Twenty Questions 
array. When redundant items can be removed (top), distractors are no longer present. When this is 




Figure 4. Interference from minority items when elimination is permitted. Even when items can 
be removed, a problem with ignoring distractors could lead participants to ask a more specific 

























In this sense, the inefficiency ASD participants demonstrate in their questioning could be 
understood as a failure to selectively attend to relevant categories within the array and 
selectively inhibit redundant or minority categories. In extreme cases (where all items are 
present in the array), this would be expressed as a marked inefficiency in questioning, but 
even where redundant items were removed, this could lead to the inappropriate selection of 
questions mid-game. 
 
Measuring selective attention (and inhibition) 
As with planning, a large number of studies have examined attention abilities in people with 
autism (see Ames & Fletcher-Watson, 2010, for a recent review). Because the process of 
selectively attending to a stimulus necessarily involves ignoring other stimuli, this area has 
often been examined in tandem with research on response inhibition abilities, i.e. the ability 
to deploy and withhold a specific response, even when there is a strong impulse to do so. 
One consequence of this, though, is that sometimes paradigms end up mixing attentional and 
inhibitory demands, or using one term (inhibition) to describe areas that are, in principle, 
separable. 
 A range of paradigms have been used in this area of research. Typical measures of selective 
attention that have been used in autism studies include flanker tasks (e.g. Christ, Kester, 
Bodner, & Miles, 2011), spatial cueing tasks (Wainwright-Sharp & Bryson, 1993) and anti-
saccade tasks (Minshew, Luna, & Sweeney, 1999). Most flanker tasks have followed the 
methodology developed by Eriksen & Eriksen (1974), where participants must respond to 
the presentation of specific letters (e.g. H or K) while other letters are presented that “flank” 
the central stimulus. In some cases this will be the same letter, or another letter that is 
nevertheless associated with the same task response. In other cases, the flanking letters will 
be associated with an opposite response, creating a conflict in the participants’ response set. 
When this happens, participants are typically slower to respond to the central stimulus 
(Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974).      
Rather than focussing attention on a central stimulus, spatial cueing tasks and anti-saccade 
tasks are designed to manipulate the allocation of attention in a visual array. In the case of 
spatial cueing, arrows, eyes or other markers are often used to guide participants’ attention 
away from a central fixation point towards specific areas or stimuli, with responses being 
measured either via task performance (usually in terms of reaction times) or sometimes via 
eye-movements directly. In anti-saccade tasks, participants must suppress particular eye-
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movements when specific stimuli appear, and instead perform the opposite movement. For 
example, if a light appears to the left of the screen, participants are required to look only at 
the right hand side (Minshew, et al., 1999).    
Tasks that have been used in autism research to look more specifically at inhibition abilities, 
without involving the allocation of visual attention, have included Stroop tasks (e.g. Lopez, 
et al., 2005), Go-No Go tasks (Nydén, Gillberg, Hjelmquist, & Heiman, 1999)  and measures 
of negative priming  (Brian, Tipper, Weaver, & Bryson, 2003). The classic Stroop test 
consists of a series of colour words that are printed in incongruous colours (such as “RED” 
printed in blue ink). Participants must report on the colour of the words while inhibiting the 
automatic and potent response to read the words themselves (Comalli Jr, Wapner, & Werner, 
1962). On Go-No Go tasks, participants are entrained in providing a response to a series of 
stimuli, but must then withhold that response entirely when a specific stimulus appears 
(Drewe, 1975). In negative priming paradigms, the information from a previously 
encountered stimulus must be inhibited in order to respond appropriately to a target. For 
example, participants may be asked to indicate whether certain strings of letters are the same 
or different, when the immediately preceding stimuli had prompted the opposite response 
(Tipper, 1985).   
 
Selective attention in autism 
A first look at attention studies on autism may give rise to the conclusion that there is little 
consistency in findings to date.  ASD children and adults have been reported to successfully 
ignore distractors and potent responses in a number of  studies (Adams & Jarrold, 2009; 
Ames & Jarrold, 2007; Brian, et al., 2003; Griffith, Pennington, Wehner, & Rogers, 1999; 
Iarocci & Burack, 2004; Ozonoff & Strayer, 1997; Schmitz et al., 2006), while other studies 
have reported almost exactly opposite findings (Burack, 1994; Christ, et al., 2007; Ciesielski, 
Courchesne, & Elmasian, 1990; Geurts, Luman, & Van Meel, 2008; Geurts, et al., 2004; 
Henderson et al., 2006; Luna, Doll, Hegedus, Minshew, & Sweeney, 2007; Minshew, et al., 
1999; Ozonoff, Strayer, McMahon, & Filloux, 1994; Pellicano, 2007; Rinehart, Bradshaw, 
Moss, Brereton, & Tonge, 2008; Verté, et al., 2005). However, as two recent papers on this 
topic argue (Adams & Jarrold, 2012; Christ, et al., 2011), a lot of this inconsistency can be 
made sense of once differences in paradigms are taken into account.  
First, although impaired performance has been reported in some studies on children with 
autism (Adams & Jarrold, 2009; Chan et al., 2011; Lopez, et al., 2005; Pellicano, 2007) ASD 
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participants show largely intact performance on tasks where attention is not modulated, but a 
certain task response must be inhibited. For example, Goldberg and colleagues (2005) 
compared inhibition performance on a Stroop task in 17 children with autism, 21 ADHD 
children and 32 typically-developing controls, all aged 8-12. No group differences at all were 
observed, despite the ASD group being of generally lower ability (in terms of full-scale, 
verbal and non-verbal IQ) than both of the comparator groups (Goldberg, et al., 2005). 
Similarly intact performance for ASD participants on the Stroop Task has been reported in a 
number of other studies (Bryson, 1983; Christ, et al., 2007; Johnston, Madden, Bramham, & 
Russell, 2011; Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999; Schmitz, et al., 2006). 
One problem with the Stroop test, as argued by Adams and Jarrold (2009), is that the 
interference it creates depends on participants having a certain level of reading ability. That 
is, if participants do not automatically read the words in front of them, then focussing on the 
colour of the words rather than the text may not require any inhibitory skill. Many children 
with autism show delays or have ongoing problems with reading, particularly for reading 
comprehension (Nation, Clarke, Wright, & Williams, 2006). Thus, apparently typical 
performance on this task by participants with ASD may mask underlying problems with 
inhibition.  
However, the presence of intact inhibition skills on other tasks argues against this 
interpretation. In studies using Go-NoGo tasks and similar measures, unimpaired 
performance in participants with autism has been observed in studies by Griffith et al. 
(1999), Happé et al. (2006), Ozonoff and Strayer (1997), Schmitz et al. (2006) and, most 
recently, by Adams and Jarrold themselves (Adams & Jarrold, 2012). Similarly, intact 
inhibition skills in ASD groups have been reported in a studies using measures of negative 
priming (Brian, et al., 2003; Christ, et al., 2011; Ozonoff & Strayer, 1997).  
In addition, the findings of two recent studies suggest that difficulties with inhibition, where 
they are seen, may actually be confined to certain subsets of ASD participants. In studies by 
Sinzig et al. (2008) and Bühler et al. (2011), impaired performance on a Go-No-Go task was 
observed in subgroups of ASD participants who also showed features of ADHD, but not in 
ASD participants without such characteristics. In contrast to autism, ADHD is thought to be 
strongly associated with inhibition impairments (Scheres et al., 2004). Thus is it may be that, 
for at least some of the above cases, examples of problems with inhibition that have been 
observed are actually driven by the performance of individual ASD participants who qualify 
for an alternative diagnosis. 
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Contrasting with these examples of intact inhibition in autism, tasks where attention must be 
selectively allocated between competing stimuli have revealed more consistent differences 
between ASD and control participants. On flanker-style tasks, impaired performance in ASD 
children and adults has been observed regularly (Adams & Jarrold, 2012; Burack, 1994; 
Christ, et al., 2007; Christ, et al., 2011; Geurts, Luman, & Van Meel, 2008).  
For example, Christ et al. (2007) tested 18 ASD children, 23 siblings of ASD children and 25 
typically-developing children on a flanker task that used simple shapes rather than letters as 
the central and distractor stimuli. Compared to the two control groups (who did not differ in 
performance), participants with ASD were significantly slower to respond when incongruent 
flankers were present, suggesting a specific problem with ignoring distractors in the visual 
array (Christ, et al., 2007). Supporting these findings, results from anti-saccade tasks and 
other measures of selective attention have indicated impaired performance in ASD 
participants compared to neurotypical controls (Ciesielski, et al., 1990; Goldberg et al., 2002; 
Luna, et al., 2007; Minshew, et al., 1999; Mosconi et al., 2009). In contrast to the mixed 
pattern of findings for inhibition, very few studies have reported intact ASD performance on 
flanker-style tasks (Iarocci & Burack, 2004; Keehn, Lincoln, Müller, & Townsend, 2010).  
The evidence seems stronger, then, for a more specific problem in ASD with selective 
attention and the basic visual inhibitory processes that this requires, alongside intact skills 
for response inhibition in other contexts, such as providing a specific verbal or motor 
response. One caveat to this conclusion, that needs to be acknowledged before continuing, 
comes from a recent study by Remington, Sweetenham, Campbell and Coleman (2009).  
In an experiment with ASD adults, Remington et al. (2009) reported that ASD participants 
attempting a distractor task required greater load in the perceptual set than control 
participants before their attention focussed on specific stimuli. That is, control participants 
would begin selectively attending to specific stimuli once a certain amount of information 
was present in the perceptual array, but for ASD participants this only happened when a 
greater amount of information was present. As this was observed alongside intact levels of 
speed and accuracy, this was interpreted as indicating “enhanced perceptual capacity” in the 
ASD group (Remington et al., 2009).  
If this is correct, then it may be that the findings of previous studies need to be reassessed in 
terms of group differences in perceptual load; it could be that ASD participants are more 
distracted by flankers, for instance, because they “take more in” in the first place (see Adams 
& Jarrold, 2012, for this kind of argument). Thus far there has not been enough follow-up 
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research to establish the validity of this claim, barring the exception of one very recent 
replication by the same group (Remington, Swettenham, & Lavie, 2012), but it represents an 
important counter-explanation for atypicalities in the attentional performance of people with 
autism.  
Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that if people with ASD have difficulties with attention and 
inhibition processes, they are most likely to be evident in the selective allocation of attention 
– inhibition per se would not appear to be a central issue. Returning to the Twenty Questions 
task, inhibiting certain questions may therefore not be expected to be a problem for ASD 
participants, but an unchanging task array may pose a selective attentional demand which 
could significantly affect performance. If this is the case, it needs to be measured and 
isolated (where possible) from other executive demands. The following chapter presents an 
experiment that sought to test this idea, alongside assessment of the contributions of 





Chapter 2: Testing the contributions of planning and selective attention to Twenty 
Questions performance 
 
An experiment was devised to examine whether difficulties in planning and selective 
attention could explain the problem-solving performance of children with ASD on the 
Twenty Questions Task. Two new measures were devised to investigate the role of planning 
in Twenty Questions performance: a question discrimination task and a plan construction 
task. The tasks were primarily designed to see whether problems in selecting effective 
questions were evident at what might be termed the “planning stage”, that is, in participants’ 
approach prior to playing the task. Evidence of difficulties in question discrimination and 
plan construction would suggest a difference in the way questions are thought through by 
participants with autism, independent of the immediate attentional demands of the game 
itself. To examine difficulties with selective attention, the within-task conditions of the TQT 
were varied to moderate the amount of information that participants were required to ignore. 
  
Assessing planning on the TQT 
The aim of the question discrimination task was to measure whether ASD participants can 
recognise effective questions outside of the game. Participants were given 10 picture arrays 
showing example sets, and were asked in each case which of two questions was the “best 
question to ask first”
 7
. In each case, one of the questions was clearly more effective in 
eliminating a sizeable proportion of the array. In terms of planning, this assessed the extent 
to which participants could think through the potential consequences of two different 
questions. Thus, while the task asked participants to think about potential questions in 
advance – a form of pre-planning- it was also relevant to the on-line forms of planning that 
participants engage in during the TQT, when thinking through possible options for each new 
                                                   
7 The request to choose the “best” question was defined, according to conventional understanding of 
the game, as the question that was guaranteed to eliminate the most items. Questions which eliminate 
close to 50% of the set are guaranteed to substantially subdivide the set. In contrast, “high-risk” 
questions, i.e. those that pick out only a small subset of the available items, may significantly narrow 
the search if answered yes, but will minimally affect the overall set if answered no. If participants 
attempted the question discrimination task thinking that the latter were better questions, this would 
result in a poor score on the task. However, this would also reflect a misunderstanding about the 
quality of questions for the actual Twenty Questions game. That is, if ASD participants were 
answering on the basis of considering high-risk questions to be better, then this reflects something 
important about their approach to the game.  
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question. Primarily, though, the task represented a check on understanding; assessing 
whether participants understood what constitutes a “good” question.   
The second task measured plan construction. Participants were presented with a selection of 
possible questions, printed in black on plain white cards, and asked to select five questions 
that they thought might be useful to use when playing Twenty Questions. They were then 
asked to arrange those questions into an order, according to which question “they think they 
would ask first, which one next, and so on”. In asking for a whole sequence of questions to 
be planned out, this measure was a more specific assessment of pre-planning abilities. 
The key question that both of these tasks were designed to answer was whether there was 
any evidence of a planning difficulty in participants with autism. Based on evidence from 
previous studies on planning in autism, it predicted that ASD participants would struggle 
with the plan construction task in particular, due to the level of pre-planning that it requires.  
A secondary question, related to the first, was whether performing either of these tasks prior 
to attempting the TQT improved performance for ASD participants. To measure this, a 
“baseline” measure of Twenty Questions performance was established, and then participants 
were tested on the TQT for a series of trials after each planning task. If ASD participants 
were actually having a problem with planning, then the specific instructions to plan might be 
expected to have a disproportionately beneficial influence on their subsequent task 
performance. Examining the effects of specific planning activities could also shed light on 
ways in which ASD performance might be facilitated.  
 
Assessing selective attention on the TQT 
As noted above, the prohibition of physical elimination on the Twenty Questions creates a 
complex executive demand. To keep track of where one is in the task (which items have 
been eliminated, which are active, etc), previous questions must be remembered, and the set 
array must be selectively attended to. In order to separate these demands, the TQT procedure 
in the present study was adapted by introducing a “supported” questioning round and 
comparing it to a “baseline” round (where item elimination was permitted) and an 
“unsupported” round (where elimination was prohibited). In the supported round, item 
elimination was prohibited, so participants were required to manage an unchanging 













Figure 5. The “supported” condition. Participants’ questions are recorded and presented alongside 
the set during each trial, although physical elimination of items is prohibited. 
 
 












recording each question they asked and displaying the record of questions alongside the 
game board during the trial. 
In this way, the dual demand of remembering questions and managing the perceptual array 
becomes a single demand. If the difficulty with an unchanging array that ASD participants 
previously displayed related to verbal working memory differences, relatively intact 
performance would be expected in the supported condition. In contrast, if their difficulty was 
with ignoring the irrelevant information in the perceptual array, then this should still be 
evident even when their questions are recorded for them
8
.  Based on the evidence for specific 
problems with selective attention, it was predicted that ASD participants would demonstrate 
difficulty on the Twenty Questions Task across both supported and unsupported conditions. 
 




A mixed clinical group of 22 ASD participants (21 male, 1 female) were recruited from 
families in the local community and a specialist school for children with autism spectrum 
disorders. All had a diagnosis of either autism (n = 21) or Asperger syndrome (n = 1) in 
accordance with ICD-10 research diagnostic criteria (World Health Organisation, 1993).  All 
                                                   
8 A potential confound here is in task difficulty and the role of multiple task demands. As the 
condition label indicates, the supported condition does not just work to minimise verbal working 
memory demands; it provides more help to participants in simplifying the task. In the unsupported 
condition, a dual demand is in place, and so relative decreases in performance on this part of the task 
could reflect general drop-offs with task difficulty and/or specific difficulties with the dual demand. 
Nevertheless, arguably information can be drawn from the relative level of performance in the 
supported condition. If ASD performance in the supported condition is closer to their baseline 
performance, this would suggest that their problems relate more to remembering questions than 
handling the perceptual array. If, instead, their performance is more similar to the unsupported 
condition, this suggests verbal working memory is not primarily at fault and that their difficulties lie 
in selectively attending to parts of the task array.  
 
A full demonstration of what is causing difficulty in this area would ideally include a condition where 
no inhibition or selective attention is required – as in the baseline condition – but verbal working 
memory was still put under pressure. If participants were impaired in this condition, but not the 
supported condition, it would show that their difficulties with the unsupported condition are more 
likely to relate to working memory deficits rather than attentional deficits.  However, if item 
elimination is permitted, the set itself provides a cue to which questions have already been asked, and 
it is not obvious how the task could be adapted to selectively measure verbal working memory 
without interrupting the game itself.  
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participants received their original diagnoses via contact with local clinical services, who use 
the Autism Diagnostic Interview – Revised (ADI-R; Lord, Rutter & Le Couteur, 1994) and 
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000), among other diagnostic 
measures. Nine participants had also had their diagnosis confirmed within the previous two 
years by a trained university researcher using the ADI-R.   
Exclusion criteria for the clinical group included any presence of conditions known to be 
comorbid and similar in symptomatology to ASD (such as Fragile X Syndrome or Rett’s 
Syndrome) or other neurological conditions which may be expected to affect cognitive 
functioning (e.g. Tourette Syndrome). In addition, children with specific and severe 
impairments in language processing separable from ASD symptoms (such as verbal 
dyspraxia, or a hearing difficulty) were not recruited. Although specific screening tools for 
dyslexia and ADHD were not included, no children included in the study were reported to 
have such difficulties by parents or teachers.  
Twenty-one children (19 male, 2 female) were recruited from local mainstream schools for 
an age-matched typically-developing (TD) control group. Participants were matched to 
within 12 months of their clinical counterpart.  
 
Recruitment and settings 
Participants were recruited in two stages. Initially families were contacted in an information 
letter distributed by the local school. The letter invited families to take part in a new study on 
problem-solving in board games. On return of a reply slip and consent form, arrangements 
were made to test consented participants during school time. Following this a second wave 
of participants were recruited by information letters sent directly to families from the local 
ASD community who attended other schools. Families that responded to the letter were 
contacted by phone to further explain the study and provide the opportunity to ask questions, 
after which a testing session was arranged. The majority of testing sessions for second-wave 
participants took place at a laboratory at the university, although a minority were tested in 
participants’ homes (in cases where this was more convenient for families). In total 21 
participants were tested in a school setting (12 ASD, 9 TD); the remaining participants were 
tested at the university or at home. Before testing, parents of participants were asked to 
provide full written consent for study participation and participants were reminded that they 
could withdraw at any time. All study procedures were approved by a university ethics 




Full-scale, verbal and non-verbal IQ profiles were acquired for participants in testing 
sessions at local schools and university settings. IQ scores were estimated using the 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI: Wechsler, 1999). The Verbal IQ 
subscale of the WASI consists of two subtests, Vocabulary and Similarities, while the Non-
Verbal or Performance IQ subscale consists of Block Design and Matrix Reasoning. Full-
scale and Verbal IQ scores for all participants were based on WASI performance.  Full 
WASI data was not available for all participants; for 10/21 TD participants the Similarities 
subtest was not run due to time constraints put in place by the participating school that they 
were recruited from; VIQ estimates in these participants were derived from their Vocabulary 
performance only.  
For four ASD participants non-verbal IQ estimates were already available from a previous 
study using the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children – Third Edition (WISC-III: 
Wechsler, 1991). The non-verbal component of the WISC-III consists of five subtests: 
Picture Completion, Coding, Picture Arrangement, Block Design, Object Assembly, and 
Symbol Search. Non-verbal IQ scores for all remaining participants were calculated based on 
performance on the WASI non-verbal subscale. As non-verbal IQ estimates on the WISC-III 
and WASI have been reported to correlate highly in both clinical (Scott, Austin, & Reid, 
2007) and non-clinical samples (Wechsler, 1999) the scores were treated as functionally 
equivalent. Clinical and control participants were matched to within 10 full-scale IQ points.  
Table 1 shows the mean age and cognitive ability scores for each group. T-tests indicated no 
significant differences between the groups (age: t = 0.665, p = .510; FSIQ: t = -0.512, p = 
.611; VIQ: t = -0.112, p =.911; NVIQ: t = 0.639, p = .526; all df = 41, all Cohen’s d <0.02). 
As a further check on the matching of the groups, the raw scores for IQ subtests were 
converted to age-equivalent scores and averaged to produce estimates of verbal and non-
verbal mental age (VMA and NVMA respectively)
9
. The mean VMA for ASD (M (SD) = 
14.11 (6.40)) and TD (M (SD) = 15.03 (7.44)) participants did not significantly differ (t = -
0.433, df = 41, p = .667, n.s.). Similarly, no difference was observed in mean NVMA for 
ASD (M (SD) = 12.66 (4.60)) and TD (M (SD) = 11.75 (3.29)) participants (t = 0.745, df = 
41, p = .460, n.s.). 
 
                                                   












Table 1. Age and IQ scores for autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and typically-developing (TD) 
participants 
 ASD  TD  
 
 M SD  M SD  Sig. 
Age (y:m) 13:8 1:5  13:4 1:5  n.s. 
Full-scale IQ  94.82 21.49  98.10 20.45  n.s. 
Verbal IQ 95.55 22.23  96.29 20.92  n.s. 




A subset of participants (10 ASD; 9 TD) had taken part in a study using the TQT that was 
run 18 months previously. These participants were marked for later analysis to assess any 
possible advantages of practice, although previous research on the TQT has documented 
minimal learning effects (Marshall & Karow, 2008; Marshall et al., 2003a). 
 
Design 
For practical reasons, each participant could only be tested in a single session. This 
influenced the design of the study, as the measurement of planning and attention skills in  
relation to the TQT could potentially change as a result of the order that participants 
attempted the tasks in. For example, measuring planning also tends to provide participants 
with examples and ideas for new questions, potentially obscuring underlying group 
differences.  
To address this, a mixed 2x3 design was used to compare participant groups (ASD/TD) 
across three TQT variations: baseline, planning and selective attention (see figure 6). In the 
baseline TQT, participants completed two trials of a standard Twenty Questions task. This 
established any existing differences in TQT performance between the groups. In the 
planning variation, participants’ planning skills were assessed by attempting two tasks, 
question discrimination (QD) and plan construction (PC). Following each task, participants 
completed two more standard TQT trials (2 post-QD, 2 post-PC), and this performance was 
compared to the baseline group scores. 
The selective attention variation consisted of two TQT trials where elimination was 
prohibited (referred to as the unsupported condition) and two similar trials where 
participants’ questions were recorded during search (the supported condition). Task 
performance on these variations was compared to the baseline version, where elimination 
was allowed. 
In total participants attempted 10 TQT trials (2 baseline, 4 planning, 4 selective attention). 
Following the baseline condition, the order of variations (planning/selective attention) and 
their subcomponents (question discrimination/plan construction/unsupported/supported) was 
counterbalanced across participants in both groups. Potential order effects were assessed 














Figure 6. Task and condition order for experiment 1. TQT = Twenty Questions Task; QD = 
Question Discrimination; PC = Plan Construction; P1, P2 = Planning conditions 1 & 2; SA1, SA2 = 




Materials & Procedure 
- The Twenty Questions Task (TQT) 
The Twenty Questions set used consisted of 24 everyday items that can be organised into 
roughly equal conventional categories such as animals, plants, vehicles, and household 
objects (Delis et al., 2001; Laine & Butters, 1982; Mosher & Hornsby, 1966). Previous 
studies that have used the Twenty Questions procedure have typically tested participants on 
three to four trials, whereas in the present study a testing session consisted of 10 trials. This 
created the potential for practice effects occurring and the specific possibility of participants 
identifying maximal questions which could be used on every trial. To avoid this, the set 
contents were varied for each condition. Three different sets were devised and rotated across 
the three testing conditions. For example, participant A was presented with sets 1, 2 and 3, 
participant B attempted sets 2, 3 and 1, and participant C completed sets 3, 1 and 2.  
The sets were devised in a way that would retain a roughly conventional structure, as in the 
standard task. To maintain a minimal representation of conventional groupings in each set, 
eight “core” items were selected first, based on their use in previous versions of the Twenty 
Questions procedure (e.g. Delis et al., 2001; Mosher & Hornsby, 1966). The eight core items 
were DOG, COW, CAR, PLANE, KNIFE, FORK, APPLE and ORANGE. In addition to the 
core items, 16 items were then randomly selected from a list of 46 everyday items. The 
additional items in the list of 46 were collected based on their common frequency and, in the 
majority of cases, because they had appeared in at least one version of the Twenty Questions 
procedure in previous research. The make-up of this list was equally apportioned to represent 
living and non-living items, and, within those categories, sub-groupings of animals, plants, 
vehicles and household items. However, the random selection of items from the list would 
not guarantee their equal representation in the three 24-item testing sets, providing each set 
with a subtly unique category structure. Table 2 lists the items used in each set in addition to 
the “core” of those items listed above. 
Three 30cm x 30cm plastic game boards were used for presentation of each set. Each board 
contains 24 hinged frames which can be used to physically eliminate redundant set items 
during search. Each item was displayed in colour printed on white card, with its name 
printed at the bottom of the card in black ink. Coloured plastic tokens were used to keep 
count of the number of questions used by participants and the number of trials they had 
successfully completed. Participants were given 10 question counters at the start of each 




Figure 7. Procedure of visual feedback on game trials. The “random generator” animation was 
deployed alongside the Twenty Questions Task, to avoid participants having to guess what the 
experimenter was thinking of in order to find the answer. 
 
Table 2. Additional items used in each testing set. Sixteen items were added to the eight “core” 
items (dog, cow, car, plane, knife, fork, apple and orange). 

















































2. Question mark displayed as mask 
1. Full array displayed 
3. “Random generator” animation   
(experimenter chooses the item) 
4. Mask reappears (item selected) 
5. Item revealed 




the identity of target items for each trial was determined randomly prior to testing. Within 
each set, the identity of the target items was always the same. (Set 1: CAR, POTATO, 
LORRY, ELEPHANT; Set 2: SHEEP, FORK, PLATE, ORANGES; Set 3: BUS, 
TROUSERS, GLOVES, OVEN). 
Prior to the first trial, the following instructions were given to participants: 
“Today we are going to play a game which involves looking for objects. As you can 
see, all of these cards have a different object on them. I am going to use the 
computer to choose one of them, and your job is to try and find out which one it is. 
You can do this by asking me questions about them, but I can only answer yes or no 
to your questions. Every time I answer a question, you can push down all the ones 
you don’t need on the board, like this. The aim of the game is to find the object in as 




Participant questions were recorded using Audacity, an Open Source sound editing software 
programme (http://audacity.sourceforge.net/). The audio-visual feedback used was the same 
as in Alderson-Day & McGonigle-Chalmers (2011). A 17” Dell Inspiron Laptop running 
Microsoft PowerPoint was used to provide the visual and auditory feedback.  Figure 7 
displays the procedure of visual feedback presented to participants during each trial. This 
included a “random generator” animation, which was run prior to each trial when the 
experimenter was choosing the target item, and a short fanfare, applause or game-show 
organ audio clip following successful trials. Unsuccessful trials were followed by the 
revelation of the item, but without sound.    
 
- Planning task 1: Question Discrimination (QD) 
The question discrimination task consisted of a forced-choice format in which participants 
were presented with two possible questions (e.g. Is it an animal? Is it food?) and an example 
array from the Twenty Questions game. Participants were asked to identify which of the two 
questions would be better to ask first. Each example array was designed so that one question 
                                                   
10 For participants who appeared to have difficulty in understanding the task instructions, a practice 
round was offered. The practice trial consisted of only eight items. If the target was identified by the 
participant in no more than eight questions then the full task was begun. If participants still did not 
appear to understand how to play at this point (if, for example, they had not asked any questions or 
only asked irrelevant questions) then the experimenter would take on the role of participant and model 
an average questioning strategy (i.e. asking questions of medium efficiency). Participants who 
required this step were denoted in later analysis and their responses examined for any apparent 
modelling effects (Denney, 1975). 
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could clearly eliminate more items from the array, irrespective of the answer. Figure 8 
displays an example array and the two question options that would be presented with it. The 
question discrimination task consisted of 10 forced-choice trials, which are listed in table 3. 
Each trial was presented on a white A4 sheet, containing the example array at the top and the 
two question options printed below.  The trials were organised in increasing difficulty, in 
two respects. Firstly, trials 1-5 included arrays of only 12 items, i.e. half the size of arrays 
used in the Twenty Questions task. Trials 6-10 included full-size arrays. Secondly, the 
difference in scope of each question was designed to be large in early trials, but much closer 
in later trials. For example, trial 1, as displayed in figure 8, compared the question “Is it an 
animal?” (referring to six items and being guaranteed to at least eliminate half of the set) 
with the question “Is it a fruit?” (referring to only two items and potentially eliminating only 
two of the 12 items available). In contrast, trial 9 presented a choice between a question 
which potentially only eliminated 5/24 items (“Does it have wheels?”) and a question which 
could only be guaranteed to eliminate 3/24 items (“Is it cutlery?”). Question 10 was of 
specific difficulty as it presented a full category overlap, where one question actually picked 
out a subset of another (“Is it a living thing?” vs “Is it an animal?”). 
The specific instructions given to participants were as follows: 
“Now, before we play the next game we’re going to look at some examples of different 
situations from the game. For each example I’m going to show you two different questions 
that you might ask to find the item. All I want you to do is to tell me which one you think 
would be best to ask first.”  
A point was granted for each correct question selection.  On completion of the discrimination 
task, participants were tested on two trials of the Twenty Questions task (following the 
procedure described above). 
 
 - Planning task 2: Plan Construction (PC) 
The plan construction task was loosely based on a measure deployed by Siegler (1977) 
where participants were encouraged to plan their questions prior to attempting a TQT-style 
task. Participants were presented with an array of 32 common questions and were asked to 
select five of them to use when playing Twenty Questions. (The TQT board was on display, 
showing the distribution of items to be searched). Participants were then asked to put these 
questions in order, creating a rough plan that could be used to search the set. There was no  
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IS IT AN ANIMAL? IS IT A FRUIT? 
 
Figure 8. Example trial from question discrimination task. Participants were asked to pick which 
of the two questions would be best to ask first. 
 
 
Table 3. Trials in the question discrimination task. Questions were designed to increase in 
difficulty. 
1. Animal or Fruit? 6. Living thing or Transport? 
2. Food or Cutlery? 7. Kitchen or Zoo? 
3. Wheels or Fly? 8. Fruit or Manmade? 
4. Living thing or Fly? 9. Wheels or Cutlery? 
5. Swim or Wheels? 10. Living thing or Animal? 
 
 
Elephant Cat Fish 
Car 
Computer Pig Dog 
Apple 
Boat Oranges Cow Spoon 
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time limit for question selection. Questions were presented in size 72 font on white 5cm x 
10cm cards. The following specific instructions were given to participants: 
“Before we play the next game we’re going to look at some different questions. 
Most people ask about five questions when they are playing the game. Here are 
some questions you might use to look for items in this set (testing set indicated). I 
want you to pick five questions that you think might be useful in the next game. 
Once you have got five questions, put them in order (a bit like a plan), so choose 
which one you would ask first, which one next (and so on).” 
Once five questions had been chosen, the experimenter read them out loud back to the 
participant.  
Following completion of the planning task participants attempted two more trials of Twenty 
Questions. Participants were allowed to keep their prepared questions in front of them as a 
guide (as in Siegler, 1977) although they were informed that they “didn’t have to use those 
questions and could ask completely different ones”.   
 
- Selective Attention 
The effect of selective attention abilities was assessed by varying the level of perceptual 
interference facing participants and the level of verbal support given to them during search. 
These variations were named SA1, the unsupported condition, and SA2, the supported 
condition. 
SA1. The unsupported version of the task was like the standard Twenty Questions game in 
all but one respect. During search, participants were not permitted to physically eliminate 
items on the game board. Two trials were run on the Twenty Questions game using this 
format.  
SA2. During the supported version participants were again not permitted to physically 
eliminate items during their search. In this way, the level of perceptual interference present 
in the set was the same as in the previous (unsupported condition). However, participants 
were also given the additional support of a record of their questions being kept by the 
experimenter. Every time a question was asked, the experimenter would note the question 
and place it next to the game board. Questions were written on blank white cards by the 
experimenter during the trial.  Participants completed two trials of Twenty Questions on this 




- Twenty Questions Task 
Performance on the TQT was scored in terms of question efficiency and question types. 
Efficiency on the TQT was primarily assessed via question quality (Alderson-Day & 
McGonigle-Chalmers, 2011). Question quality (QQ) is an efficiency measure indicating the 
proportion of items guaranteed to be eliminated by any question. It is defined as the 
minimum number of items eliminated by a question, divided by the total number of items in 
a set. For example, the question “Is it a fruit?”, when asked about a set containing 3 fruits 
and 7 non-fruits, would receive a score of 0.33 (3 items at least will be eliminated/ 10 items 
available in set = 0.33). As no question can be guaranteed to eliminate more than 50% of the 
available items, a maximum score for any question is 0.5. A minimum score would be 0, if 
the question used referred to none of the items left in the set. However, a more common low 
score response would be a question referring to a single item in the whole set. (For example, 
“Is it the cat?”, in a set of 24 items, could only guarantee the elimination of 1 item.  The QQ 
for this question would be 1/24 = 0.04).    
Measurement of performance using QQ is preferable to other measures because it is 
sufficiently variable across individuals but also robust across task trials. Other measures - 
such as the numbers of trials completed or questions used per trial - can often be skewed by 
lucky guesses and ceiling or floor effects, making them less ideal as outcome measures. 
However, the number of questions per trial (QT) that a participant uses can sometimes be 
sensitive to variations in memory and attention demands (see Alderson-Day & McGonigle-
Chalmers, 2011). To allow for this, QT was also recorded to provide a secondary measure of 
efficiency. Other TQT variables typically measured are the relative frequencies of grouping 
questions and guesses used. To allow for comparisons with previous TQT studies (Minshew, 
et al., 2002; Minshew, et al., 1994), these question types were also noted.  
 
- Planning tasks 
Performance on the question discrimination task was assessed as a score out of 10, reflecting 
the number of good questions correctly identified per participant. Plan construction was 
assessed by assigning an “expected” QQ score to each question selected, based on the 
average number of items they eliminated in the testing sets. For example, the question “Is it a 
vehicle?” would refer to four items from set 1, eight from set 2 and five from set 3. Across 
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the three sets, the mean number of items that this question could be expected to eliminate is 
therefore 5.66 out of 24, producing an expected QQ score of 5.66/24 = 0.24.  For a 5-
question plan, this created a sequence of five expected QQ scores for each participant, 
indicating how many items they would usually eliminate with their first question, next 
question and so on. Plans where the expected QQ progressively reduced with each question 
indicated a narrowing strategy, with more general questions being asked to begin with and 
more specific questions coming later in the plan. 
 
Analysis   
All analyses were conducted using SPSS v16.0 statistical software. Preliminary analysis 
included normality testing for all outcome variables and assumptions testing appropriate for 
analyses of variance and covariance. Mean scores across different set and task combinations 
were assessed for order effects using a MANOVA containing the following dependent 
variables: question quality, percentage of grouping questions, and percentage of guess 
questions. 
TQT performance outcomes were assessed using analyses of covariance, with age and VIQ 
included as covariates, although guessing rates were also analysed non-parametrically 
because of skew. Age and VIQ were included as covariates because they had been 
previously observed to significantly contribute to TQT performance (Alderson-Day & 
McGonigle-Chalmers, 2011). Alongside group matching, the use of these variables as 
covariates provided an additional measure of their influence, and provided information on 
the extent to which they affected each group equally.   
The question discrimination component of the planning tasks was also assessed with an 
ANCOVA. Due to non-normal data, plan construction scores were assessed using Two-





values indicate partial eta squared effect sizes. Unless otherwise noted, 
pairwise comparisons are presented with uncorrected p-values. 
 
Results 
No significant main effects were observed for any of the variations in task or set order (all p 
> .6; all eta
2
p <. 01) so scores across different presentation orders were combined. 
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Comparison of mean QQ scores for participants who had (n = 19) and had not (n = 24) 





Twenty Questions Task (TQT) 
ASD participants recorded significantly lower QQ scores than TD participants on the TQT at 
baseline, F (1, 38) = 7.246, p = .01 (see table 4). This result was supported by the second 
efficiency measure, questions-per-trial (QT). ASD participants took significantly more 
questions to solve their baseline trials than controls (ASDM (SD) = 6.16 (2.07), TDM = 5.29 
(0.90), F (1, 39) = 4.314, p = .044).   The main effect of group was observed despite 
controlling for significant effects of age, F (1, 38) = 7.615, p = .001, and verbal IQ, F (1, 38) 
= 8.571, p = .001, suggesting a significant difference in the questioning efficiency of each 
group
11
. These analyses were also run using VMA as a covariate, which produced very 
similar results (e.g. question quality: VMA F (1, 39) = 8.205, p = .007; group F (1, 39) = 
6.287, p = .001). 
In the analysis of question types, ASD participants asked a significantly lower percentage of 
grouping questions (ASDM (SD) = 43.75% (30.10), TDM = 68.77% (11.44), F (1, 38) = 14.369, 
p = .001) and used guesses more (ASDMEDIAN = 20.19%, TDMEDIAN = 15.38%, Z = 1.334, df = 
42, p = .026). However, these differences did not fully explain the observed group 
differences in efficiency: even when they were using grouping questions, ASD participants 
asked questions that eliminated fewer items (ASDM = 0.22 (0.14), TDM = 0.29 (0.6), F (1, 38) 
= 5.406, p = .026).  
 
Planning 
- Question discrimination 
Performance on the question discrimination task was high in both groups, as indicated in 
table 4. No significant differences were observed between the two groups, F (1, 39) = 0.213,  
                                                   
11 A marginally significant group-by-VIQ interaction effect was also observed, F (1, 38) = 4.236, p = 
.046, indicating that VIQ may have influenced group scores unevenly. As this violated one of the 
assumptions of analysis of covariance (homogeneity of regression slopes), the analysis was rerun with 
VIQ removed, but a significant group effect remained, F (1, 40) = 7.922, p = .008. Uneven influences 












Table 4. Group performance on the Twenty Questions Task, Question Discrimination (QD) and 
Plan Construction (PC) Tasks. QQ = question quality.  
    ASD  TD    
Twenty Questions (QQ) M SD  M SD  Sig. 
Baseline  0.24 0.14  0.32 0.04  0.01* 
Planning  1 (Following QD)  0.24 0.12  0.37 0.05  <.001*** 
 2 (Following PC) 0.25 0.11  0.36 0.06  <.001*** 
Attention 1 (Unsupported) 0.23 0.11  0.32 0.06  <.001*** 
 2 (Supported) 0.25 0.12  0.32 0.06  0.003** 
         
Planning   M SD  M SD  Sig. 
Question Discrimination  (Score/10) 7.27 1.61  7.43 1.78  0.647 
 
Plan Construction (Mean QQ over 5 questions) 0.19 0.07  0.25 0.05  0.006** 
        




p = .647, eta
2
p = .005, suggesting that both groups could identify effective questions. 
Covariate contributions of VIQ, F (1, 39) = 4.982, p = .031, and age, F (1, 39) = 3.057, p = 
.088, were also evident on this outcome, with better question discrimination associated with 
higher VIQ (r = .300) and age (r = .213). 
 
- Plan construction 
Participants’ plans were analysed using separate Friedman’s ANOVAs for each group. 
Whereas TD participants selected questions with significantly different average QQ scores, 
X2 = 11.520, df = 4, N = 21, p = .021, the questions selected by ASD participants did not 
differ in question quality, X2  = 1.630, df = 4, N = 22, p = .803. Figure 9 shows the difference 
in plan construction, with TD participants progressively narrowing the scope of their 
questions and ASD participants asking a more even set of questions. Two-Sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicated that the two groups differed in their average efficiency 
across the whole plan (ASDMEDIAN = 0.19, TDMEDIAN = 0.24, Z = 1.611, p = .006; means are 
presented in table 4).  This difference was most evident on the first three questions selected 
(all Z > 1.121, all p < .072), indicating that TD participants were selecting more general 
questions than ASD participants for the start of their plans.  
  
- Relations of planning to TQT performance 
No significant correlations were observed between scores on the question discrimination task 
and subsequent QQ performance on two trials of the TQT, for each group or both groups 
combined (N = 43, r = .141, p = .367). On the plan construction task, questions scores for 
questions 1 (r  = .415, p = .006) , 2 (r  = .399, p = .008) and 3 (r  = .537, p = .001, all N = 43) 
significantly correlated with QQ scores on the TQT, indicating that better question selection 
during planning was associated with proficiency during Twenty Questions. This was also 
reflected when correlations were calculated separately for each group (questions 1-3: ASD 
ranger = .322-.619; TD ranger = .241-.440).  
Although question selection during planning and TQT performance was related, the act of 
planning did not subsequently improve question quality scores for either group (all F < 
1.158, all p > .3, all eta
2
p < .03). However, ASD participants were more likely to use 









Figure 9. Efficiency of plans constructed by autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and typically-




condition interaction effect for this variable (ASDbaseline = 43.75; ASDP = 47.90, F (2, 76) = 
3.210, p = .046). 
 
Selective Attention 
ASD participants recorded lower QQ scores than TD participants during the selective 
attention variations of the TQT, F (1, 38) = 5.511, p = .024, but no group*condition effects 
were observed on this outcome when scores were compared across conditions. This 
suggested that the group difference in efficiency seen on the baseline trials did not 
significantly change with the variations in attentional load (all F < 1.650, all p > .3, all eta
2
p < 
.05). Main effects of VIQ, F (1, 39) = 17.382, p < .001, and age, F (1, 39) = 13.513, p = .014, 
were also observed across the selective attention conditions. 
A trend was observed for the interaction effect of group* condition in the number of 
questions used per trial (QT), F (2, 78) = 2.787, p = .068, eta
2
p = .067. ASD participants 
tended to require slightly more questions during the unsupported condition in particular 
(ASDchange = +0.95, TDchange = -0.04). Performance on the supported condition, contrastingly, 
was very similar to performance on the standard TQT for ASD participants (Baseline QQ = 
0.24, Supported QQ = 0.25; Baseline QT = 6.16, Supported QT = 6.07). This suggests that, 
where such a difficulty was evident in ASD participants, it was only observable when 
questions were not being recorded, rather than when irrelevant items were present in the 
array. 
 
Post-hoc analysis: reading abilities and VIQ profile 
Both the question discrimination and plan construction tasks required participants to read a 
number of written questions. To check that any group differences were not simply reflecting 
reading abilities, participants were subsequently tested on their reading of the 32 question 
words in a follow-up session. Data from all but six participants (3 ASD, 3 TD) were 
available in this way. No significant differences in reading scores were apparent 
(ASDMEDIAN= 32; TD MEDIAN= 32; Z = 0.480, df = 36, p = .366). Furthermore, reanalysis of 
the planning data using only those participants who scored 32/32 on the reading test (14 
ASD/16 TD) indicated that the differences in planning were still evident between groups: TD 
participants narrowed their questions from general to more specific (QQ1-5MEANS = 0.36, 
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0.29, 0.27, 0.17, 0.20; X2 = 14.214, df = 4, N = 16, p = .007), whereas ASD participants did 
not (QQ1-5MEANS = 0.29, 0.19, 0.20, 0.19, 0.22; X2 = 2.672, df = 4, N = 14, p = .614).  
The functioning range for the ASD sample in the study was also relatively large (VIQrange = 
65-141) and during testing it became apparent that some ASD participants were much more 
able to recognise and select good questions on the planning tasks than others. To investigate 
this further, both groups were divided into two: those above and below the mean VIQ score 
(95.91). This produced a lower-VIQ ASD group (n =12) and a higher-VIQ ASD group (n = 
10) and corresponding lower-VIQ (n = 11) and higher-VIQ (n = 10) TD groups.  
On question discrimination, a 4-way univariate analysis of variance comparing the four 
groups still indicated no significant difference in accuracy (F(1, 38) = 1.220, p = .316, eta
2
p = 
.088, n.s.); suggesting that even lower-VIQ ASD participants were able to identify good 
questions in a forced choice format.  
More noticeable differences were evident, though, on the plan construction task. As figure 
10 shows, the plans of lower-VIQ ASD participants had relatively low efficiency (as 
indicated by their average question quality) and generally did not move from asking more 
general to more specific questions as the plan progressed (ASD-L Mean change from Q1 to 
Q5 = 0.01). In contrast, higher-VIQ ASD participants produced plans that did appear to show 
evidence of narrowing, albeit with slightly less efficient questions than their higher-VIQ TD 
counterparts (ASD-H Mean change from Q1 to Q5 = 0.11).   
A mixed ANOVA comparing groups x questions (1-5) produced a significant group effect (F 
(3, 39) = 3.913, p = .016, eta
2
p = .231), highlighting the overall difference in efficiency 
between the four groups. Subsequent pairwise comparisons indicated that the lower-VIQ 
ASD group recorded significantly lower scores than both TD groups (L-ASD < L-TD, p = 
.028; L-ASD < H-TD, p = .042) but not the higher-VIQ ASD group (L-ASD = H-ASD, p = 
.682, n.s.). This suggests that, although the two ASD groups could be separated in their 




                                                   
12 As a post-hoc set of analyses the comparison of these subgroups suffers to a certain extent from a 
lack of power, having two consequences. First, although a Friedman’s ANOVA was used in the initial 
analysis for this variable, the reduction of power precluded the running of individual Friedman 
analyses within each group. As such, a parametric analysis was run here to provide indicators of 
potential subgroup differences, but it should be interpreted with caution. Second, the pattern of 
pairwise comparisons suggests that higher VIQ ASD participants are still less efficient than their 





Figure 10. Efficiency of plans constructed in lower VIQ (top) and higher VIQ (bottom) groups. 
                                                                                                                                                
(which is being treated effectively as a baseline) – a proper demonstration of this effect would also 




Figure 11. Changes in use of abstract and functional questions following planning in lower VIQ 





The suggestion of important differences between higher and lower VIQ groups was 
supported by a further subgroup analysis of how participants responded to the planning 
activities when subsequently attempting the TQT. As reported above, few significant 
changes in performance were evident on an overall group level, barring some improvement 
in the use of grouping questions in the ASD group. Analysis of the content of participants’ 
questions revealed further changes, but only in specific ASD subgroups. On the Twenty 
Questions Task the content of questions can be coded into queries that refer to abstract 
category names (e.g. “animal”, “vegetable”, “vehicle”), those that refer to function (e.g. “is it 
used to cook things?”) and those that refer to individual perceptual or conceptual features 
(e.g. “Does it have wheels?” or “Does it use electricity”?) (Alderson-Day & McGonigle-
Chalmers, 2011). 
After planning, ASD participants in the lower group asked more abstract questions (F (2, 34) 
= 4.613, p = .017); while ASD participants with higher VIQ asked more questions about 
function (F (1.545, 30) = 4.769, p = .048) as indicated by significant group*round interaction 




The data supported the hypothesis that ASD participants have difficulty planning their 
questions during verbal problem-solving. Although participants in the ASD group showed no 
difficulty in identifying effective questions via the question discrimination task, their 
question selection during planning was less efficient than question selection in the typically-
developing group. Furthermore, this correlated with the questions they used during the task 
itself, especially for the initial questions used in their plan.  
A trend was also observed relating to the attentional demands of the task. The direction of 
the trend suggested that ASD participants were likely to increase the number of questions 
that they used when items could not be physically removed from the set. Although this effect 
was not significant, it was consistent with the observation made by Alderson-Day & 
McGonigle-Chalmers (2011) that ASD participants require more questions when elimination 
is prohibited. There was, however, no evidence for this sort of change if participants were 
provided with a written record of their questions during the task. As the item array did not 
change across these conditions, this suggests that ASD participants did not use more 
questions because of a problem with selectively attending to relevant information in the 
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array. Rather, any difficulty with these particular task conditions appeared to reflect 
problems with tracking one’s own questions without additional support. Such an 
interpretation should be made with caution, given the marginal nature of this difference, but 
if correct it would implicate difficulties with verbal working memory, not selective attention. 
Before discussing how these findings fit with the existing literature on executive functioning 
in autism, a few points must be considered concerning the methodology of the study. 
 
Caveats and Limitations 
First, the participant age range was relatively wide (9:3 – 16:0) and covers a period in which 
problem-solving abilities may change considerably (Drumm & Jackson, 1996; Yurgelun-
Todd, 2007). By age 11, most typically-developing children would be expected to use a 
variety of abstract categories to effectively interrogate a Twenty Questions set (Drumm, 
Jackson, & Magley, 1995; Mosher & Hornsby, 1966). The main effects of age observed in 
the present study point towards its influence on both the TQT and related planning processes. 
However, the specific developmental trajectory of problem-solving skills in autism likely 
requires further examination. The results of some studies have pointed to impairments in 
both concept identification and formation in younger children with autism (Solomon, 
Bauminger, & Rogers, 2010) but only more specific problems with concept use in older 
children and adults (Minshew et al., 2002), suggesting that some components of problem-
solving ability may “catch-up” in ASD individuals while others remain problematic. It may 
be that the difficulties seen on the TQT represent a delay in the development of specific 
abstract skills, or, alternatively, a divergence as the skills of neurotypical children advance. 
To better understand how and when specific problem-solving abilities develop in children 
with ASD, tighter age ranges and comparisons between different age groups would be 
required.  
A second limitation concerns the reading demands of the planning tasks used. In both of the 
planning tasks, participants were required to read a number of different questions. As 
participants were not specifically matched on reading ability or screened for specific 
difficulties with reading, problems in planning could instead reflect poorer reading skills in 
the ASD group. There are good reasons to think this is not the case; the main reason being 
that the majority of category words used in the plan construction task were also used on the 
question discrimination task. If reading was a problem on one planning task, group 
differences should also have been evident on the other. Nevertheless, future research could 
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utilise a more extensive standardised reading measure (such as the WTAR; Glutting & 
Wilkinson, 2005) to clarify the contribution of reading ability to question selection. 
A final point to consider concerns the wider executive profile of the participants who took 
part in the study. As already discussed, executive difficulties in ASD individuals can 
sometimes overlap with those seen in other developmental disorders, particularly ADHD 
(Goldberg, et al., 2005; Sinzig, et al., 2008; Yerys et al., 2009). If any of the participants here 
had additional ADHD-like difficulties, such as a problem with inhibition, then that could 
also have affected their overall performance on the TQT. As the present study did not 
characterise ASD participants in terms of their possible ADHD profile, this cannot be ruled 
out, although two points can be made that begin to answer such a concern. First, very few 
data exists on the TQT profile for ADHD children, but studies on children with hyperactivity 
problems (Tant & Douglas, 1982) and adults with attention and inhibition difficulties (Upton 
& Thompson, 1999) suggest that guessing rates associated with this profile tend to be much 
higher than those observed in the present study. Second, as noted in the participant 
information, no concerns about possible ADHD were raised by parents or teachers in the 
initial recruitment of participants. Thus, though it remains a possibility, it seems unlikely that 
these results can be explained by underlying, ADHD-like difficulties in the ASD group. 
   
Executive dysfunction and problem-solving in ASD 
Despite these caveats, the above findings are broadly consistent with existing understanding 
of executive skills in autism. Although selective attention problems did not appear to 
influence TQT performance, the data here implicated the presence of possible verbal 
working memory difficulties in the ability of ASD participants to track their own questions 
and avoiding repetition. Anecdotally, it is the impression of the author that individuals of all 
ages and participant groups often use explicit verbalising strategies when elimination is 
prohibited. For example, they may say the following when attending to the set: 
 “OK, so it is a living thing, and it is an animal, but it is not a pet...is it the elephant?”  
Although not always observed (Lopez, et al., 2005; D. L. Williams, Goldstein, & Minshew, 
2005), problems with verbal working memory and difficulties using verbal mediation to 
support working memory have been reported in a number of studies with ASD individuals 
(Bennetto, et al., 1996; Joseph, Steele, Meyer, & Tager-Flusberg, 2005; Minshew & 
Goldstein, 2001; D. L. Williams, Goldstein, & Minshew, 2006b). However, difficulties with 
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working memory during search would not directly explain why ASD participants were less 
effective in their use of questions even when elimination on the TQT was allowed. It seems 
more likely that this reflects an additional difficulty related to specific task conditions, rather 
than a factor that underlies their overall problem-solving performance. The presence of 
differences in planning processes, in contrast, may shed further light on the issue.  
 
Problems with planning 
On the question discrimination task, ASD participants did not significantly differ from 
typically-developing participants, suggesting that they were able to choose between more 
and less effective questions and could plan through the immediate consequences for each 
pair of options. On the plan construction task, ASD participants generally selected plans that 
would be less effective than in searching the TQT than the plans of control participants. The 
presence of group differences when constructing plans would seem to indicate difficulties 
during the selection and sequencing of questions. This is consistent with previous research 
on planning skills in children and adults with autism (Bramham, et al., 2009; Ozonoff, et al., 
2004; Verté, et al., 2005) and similar  to problem-solving difficulties seen in people with 
frontal lobe injuries (Klouda & Cooper, 1990; Upton & Thompson, 1999).   
When the ASD group was analysed as a whole, the plans that they constructed tended to be 
less efficient in referring to fewer items. The difficulty with selecting general questions, 
particularly for initial questions on the plan construction task, implicates problems with 
utilising hierarchical sequences, as seen in the TQT performance of people with traumatic 
brain injury (Marshall, et al., 2003b). The construction of a series of questions that 
effectively narrow possibilities requires good understanding of categories and their relations 
to one another: LIVING>ANIMAL>PET works as an effective narrowing sequence because 
the latter two categories are logical subsets of the former, in virtue of their semantic 
properties. 
In the group of lower-VIQ ASD participants, narrowing sequences of this kind were 
generally not observed. The questions that they selected were both less efficient overall 
(reflected roughly by the intercept of their planning graph in figure 10) and failed to move 
from general questions at the start of the plan to more specific questions at the end of the 
plan (as reflected by the gradient of their graph). This was suggestive of a difficulty in pre-
planning a series of questions that effectively searched the set, by narrowing down 
possibilities step by step. Narrowing, however, was not necessarily absent for all ASD 
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participants: those with higher VIQ were able to select plans that consisted of more general 
questions first and more specific questions later. In their case, thinking through a hierarchical 
series of questions in advance did not seem to be a problem. This suggests that difficulties 
with pre-planning may have been specific to the less able ASD participants.  
Where the ASD participants showed a common difficulty was in the general efficiency of 
their plans. Although higher-VIQ participants showed evidence of narrowing, the questions 
that they selected were still lower in efficiency than would be expected for their IQ level, and 
generally only matched the lower-VIQ group of typically-developing participants. That is, 
the “gradient” of their planning was reasonable, but the “intercept” was still too low. Thus, 
although more able ASD participants could move from general to specific questions, their 
questions were still not general enough. This suggests a consistent problem, across the whole 
ASD group, with selecting effective questions in their planning.  
The presence of intact question discrimination in both low and high ability ASD participants 
would seem to suggest a working understanding of the individual categories being used by 
each question. The fact that they are not then used effectively suggests a specific problem 
with their deployment. On the one hand, such a difficulty would seem consistent with 
Minshew et al.’s (2002) concept formation deficit. Defined as an “inability to spontaneously 
form schemata or paradigms that organize information” (p.333), difficulties with selecting 
questions could be taken to reflect a problem with re-organising information from the set 
into categories that will be effective when used in the game.  
On the other hand, Minshew et al.’s definition of this deficit refers to a difficulty with having 
to “spontaneously form schemata”, as if the problem is actually one of generating strategies 
in an unprompted context. This, though, does not seem to apply in the case of the plan 
construction task. When planning, participants did not have to produce questions; only 
choose them from a range of options. They were not being asked to spontaneously deploy 
some form of strategy; the strategies, in the form of questions, were made available to them, 
and yet they still chose options that were too restricted and would not be efficient when 
applied to a TQT set. Arguably, the generative demand placed on ASD participants in this 
context was relatively low. In this sense, their failure to choose effective questions would 
appear to reflect a problem of concept selection, not formation – all the legwork of 





Chasing concepts – an autism-specific problem? 
The question that remains is how accessible semantic concepts - and possibly verbal 
strategies in general - are to ASD individuals. It may be that the concepts used in Twenty 
Questions are present and intact within the autistic mental lexicon, but the strength of their 
associations to a) their exemplars and b) each other is somehow weakened or irregular 
organised. Both could lead to inefficient category deployment in a context of strategic use 
(such as problem-solving) yet intact performance when categories or their exemplars are 
directly cued (as in a concept identification task).  
However, such problems are not necessarily exclusive to autism. It is noteworthy that 
another group, deaf individuals, show a very similar profile to ASD participants on Twenty 
Questions (Marschark & Everhart, 1999) and other cognitive tasks that utilise semantic 
relations (Marschark, 2006; Ottem, 1980). Within deaf research this profile has been 
interpreted as a possible consequence of abnormal language development and experience, 
rather than executive dysfunction or other types of information processing (Marschark, 
Convertino, McEvoy, & Masteller, 2004). In the case of autism, the barriers to language are 
clearly different, but it may be that similarly atypical experiences and atypical development 
of language skills lead to problems with semantic accessibility and verbal strategy use in 
later life. Direct comparison of problem-solving and categorisation skills in deaf and ASD 
participants would further elucidate this possibility.   
 
In summary, experiment 1 tested two candidate deficits, drawn from executive functioning 
research, that could explain inefficient problem-solving by individuals with autism: planning 
and selective attention. As in previous studies, participants with ASD asked questions that 
eliminated fewer items than controls on the TQT. Although a selective attention hypothesis 
was not supported, group differences in planning skills were observed, with ASD 
participants generally constructing less efficient plans than controls. This observation, along 
with the differences in TQT performance, combined to suggest that participants with ASD 
had difficulty not with forming strategic questions, but selecting the right semantic categories 








Chapter 3: Comparing cognitive skills in deafness and autism. 
 
The population of people who are deaf or hard of hearing is highly heterogeneous, varying 
hugely in terms of cause of hearing loss, educational experience, preferred mode of 
communication and cultural identity (Ladd, 2003; Mitchell, 2005)
13
. Nevertheless, the 
performance of deaf individuals on cognitive tasks can arguably be used to inform the 
understanding of cognitive strengths and weaknesses in autism. The respective aetiologies 
and outcomes of deafness and autism differ considerably, but both involve atypical 
experience and development of language. Accordingly, there is a considerable overlap in the 
kinds of tasks deployed and theories tested in experimental research with people from each 
group.  But because this has mostly been done by different researchers, in different fields, 
the explanations that have been given and the conclusions that have been drawn have 
differed and diverged in interesting ways.  
Contrasting autism and deafness on the TQT provides a specific example of this. Marschark 
& Everhart (1999) used a version of the TQT to explore problem-solving skills over two 
experiments in children and adults who are deaf. In the first experiment, a cross-sectional 
sample of 36 children aged 7-8, 10-11 and 13-14 attempted Mosher & Hornsby’s original 
42-item task over three trials (Mosher & Hornsby, 1966). In the second experiment, 14 
graduate students from the National Technical Institute for the Deaf in Rochester, NY 
attempted the same task. In both experiments, deaf students were compared to samples of 
age- and education-matched hearing participants. 
All the children in the first experiment were recruited from a residential school for the deaf. 
Every child had either congenital or early-onset hearing loss and all bar five of the children 
had severe to profound hearing loss in both ears; that is, at least 70dB hearing loss
14
. All the 
children used sign language as their preferred mode of communication and all had hearing 
parents, as is the case for the large majority of children who are deaf (Mitchell & Karchmer, 
2004; NDCS, 2011). As in Mosher & Hornsby (1966), Marschark & Everhart examined 
                                                   
13 With reference to the latter, identification with a specific culture and community associated with 
deafness is typically denoted with a capital d (as in “Deaf culture” or “Deaf individuals”). Here, unless 
otherwise noted, the term “deaf” with a small d will be used to refer generally to people with a hearing 
loss who have taken part in the above studies; no claim is made concerning their specific cultural 
identity.  
14 The remaining five children had only moderate hearing loss (55dB loss) but were not observed to 
perform any differently to other children in the experiment (Marschark & Everhart, 1999). 
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rates of grouping questions and guesses on the task, alongside overall rates of trial 
completion, the number of questions used, and the number of items eliminated per question. 
Compared to hearing children, children from the deaf group completed significantly fewer 
trials than hearing children and required more questions on average to find the target. Deaf 
children were also more likely to make guesses and used very few grouping questions in 
their attempts at the task: only six out of 36 deaf participants used grouping questions at all, 
compared to 19 of the hearing students. While younger participants in both groups were 
more likely to guess than older participants, deaf participants in the middle and older age 
groups were also less efficient in their questioning than their hearing counterparts 
(Marschark & Everhart, 1999). 
This suggested consistent group differences in problem-solving in deaf and hearing 
adolescents, but Marschark and Everhart expected that such differences would largely 
disappear in a group of young adults who were deaf. However, the performance of deaf 
graduates in the second experiment did not show this. Compared to hearing adults, deaf 
adults completed as many trials and used as many questions, but they were still less likely to 
ask grouping questions. Furthermore, the average efficiency of the questions that they asked 
was significantly lower for deaf participants. This suggests that differences between deaf and 
hearing participants in problem-solving performance may persist into adulthood, even in 
very able deaf individuals (Marschark & Everhart, 1999). 
This profile on Twenty Questions – less grouping, more guessing, but also less efficiency 
when grouping - is very similar to that seen for participants with autism in the studies by 
Minshew et al. (1994), Minshew et al. (2002), Alderson-Day & McGonigle-Chalmers (2011) 
and the research reported above. But the interpretation of this pattern of performance, 
developed in the context of deaf research, differs notably from the explanations put forward 
in autism research. 
 
Interpreting deaf performance on Twenty Questions 
Marschark & Everhart (1999) tested and discussed a range of possible explanations for why 
participants who are deaf performed differently from hearing participants on Twenty 
Questions. Two of these, the role of impulsivity and the influence of prior game experience, 
were directly tested within their study design.  
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For a number of years, researchers have suggested that a problem with impulsivity is evident 
in some deaf individuals (e.g. Altshuler, Deming, Vollenweider, Rainer, & Tendler, 1976; 
see R. I. Harris, 1978, for an early review; and Hauser, Lukomski, & Hillman, 2008, for a 
more recent discussion of executive skills in deafness). Children who are impulsive tend to 
be less efficient in their approach to the Twenty Questions Task, as documented in a number 
of early studies (Ault, 1973; Denney, 1973; McKinney, 1975; Zelniker, Renan, Sorer, & 
Shavit, 1977). In particular, problems with impulsivity may lead to increased guessing, as a 
lucky guess might provide a very quick solution to the problem: if Marschark & Everhart’s 
deaf participants were indeed more impulsive than hearing participants, then this may have 
led them to guess at a quick answer, rather than forming a more strategic question. To test 
this explanation, Marschark & Everhart (1999) assessed their younger participants on the 
Porteous Mazes test, a measure of impulsivity-reflectivity (Porteus, 1950). Although 
significant age-related effects were observed, no significant differences between deaf and 
hearing participants were apparent, suggesting that deaf participants were no more impulsive 
than their hearing counterparts (Marschark & Everhart, 1999). 
A second explanation was that participants in the deaf group may have been less familiar 
with the game of Twenty Questions itself, leading to the adoption of different and less 
effective strategies to search for targets. To test this, Marschark & Everhart asked all the 
participants if they had ever played the game before. While there were more hearing 
participants overall who had played the game (11 deaf & 20 hearing across both experiments 
combined), the more important finding was that this appeared to make a specific difference 
to the strategy adopted by deaf children. Whereas deaf children who had prior experience of 
the game asked a majority of grouping questions (51%), inexperienced deaf children did not 
(20%). In contrast, both experienced and inexperienced hearing children asked a large 
proportion of grouping questions (55% & 46% respectively). 
For Marschark & Everhart this result suggested that the experiences of deaf children play an 
important role in their problem-solving performance. In a specific sense, they may have had 
less opportunity to play Twenty Questions or other guessing-based games. In a more general 
sense, this may reflect a broader difference in linguistic experience, both in home and at 
school: 
“At a more general level, lack of experience with games of this sort are consistent 
with the fact that most deaf children have less linguistic interaction with their 
hearing parents and less social interaction with peers than either deaf children with 
deaf parents or hearing children with hearing parents. This lack of access to effective 
language is likely to have a broader impact on social and cognitive development, 
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through restrictions of diversity in meaningful linguistic, social and cognitive 
interactions..... It may turn out that deaf children really do have difficulties in 
problem-solving when tasks require particular kinds of strategies (e.g. hierarchical 
organisation). Alternatively, it may be that younger deaf children have not yet 
acquired the problem-solving strategies exhibited by hearing peers only because 
those peers had a ‘head start’ through effective early communication in the home.” 
(Marschark & Everhart, 1999, pp. 78-79). 
This interpretation is very general, and – as the authors note – requires further specification 
and testing. Before doing that though, it is worth contrasting this kind of explanation with 
those applied to problem-solving in autism. For Minshew and colleagues, difficulties on the 
TQT and similar tasks were evidence of a “inability to spontaneously form schemata or 
paradigms that organize information” (Minshew et al., 2002; p333), arising out of a general 
problem with complex cognitive processing.  Based on previous applications of the TQT, the 
experiments in Alderson-Day & McGonigle-Chalmers (2011) and in the previous chapter 
assessed hypotheses about the specific executive processes that contribute to the autistic 
profile on this task.  
In both cases, the emphasis is on cognitive processes; difficulty or atypical performance on 
the task is interpreted as an indicator of cognitive deficit or bias on the task. And this is done 
with good reason: as with many other cognitive experiments with autistic participants, the 
individuals seen represent the higher-functioning end of the autistic spectrum, with good 
functional language and the general abilities to engage sufficiently with an experimental 
task. With good matching and adequate control for confounding variables, any remaining 
group differences are taken to reflect specific information about cognitive skills in autism.   
But if the participants in Marschark & Everhart’s study did not perform as efficiently as 
controls due to the effect of their atypical linguistic experiences, then a similar explanation 
may apply for the problem-solving skills of people with autism: what may be being observed 
is not a cognitive deficit or impairment per se, but a reflection of their language 
development. The cardinal features of autism spectrum disorders are difficulties with social 
interaction and communication – difficulties that will clearly shape the linguistic experience 
of people on the spectrum, even for very able ASD individuals.  In particular, those 
individuals on the spectrum who show considerable delays in their language development 
may be expected to be affected, given their relatively fewer opportunities to interact 
linguistically with others in early years. If a deaf child in a hearing family misses out on such 
opportunities, then the autistic child who did not speak until their sixth year will have missed 
out too. Such a child may appear to “catch up” in other respects, in terms of structural 
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language skills or academic performance (Boucher, 2012), but still show evidence of subtle 
difficulties in higher cognitive processes that depend on language.     
 
Cognitive overlaps in deafness and high-functioning in autism  
In this sense, the problem-solving profiles seen in autism and deafness could represent an 
overlap arising out of similarly atypical linguistic development. This kind of overlap is not 
without precedent: despite the differences between the two groups, there are a number of 
similarities in the cognitive profile of children who are deaf and children with autism 
(Emmorey, Klima, & Hickok, 1998; Ottem, 1980; Peterson & Siegal, 1999).  
The possibility of similarities between these two groups was in fact explored in some of the 
earliest cognitive research on autism. As part of a programme of research on memory, 
language and reasoning skills, Hermelin and O’Connor often used groups of ASD and deaf 
children to examine how atypical sensory processing affects cognitive development in 
similar ways across different populations (Hermelin & O'Connor, 1970; O'Connor & 
Hermelin, 1978). For example, in one study (O'Connor & Hermelin, 1973) they compared 
groups of ASD children, deaf children, and hearing, typically-developing children on a short-
term memory task, where three-digit sequences had to be recalled by participants. The digits 
were presented visually one at a time, but their spatial position did not correspond to their 
temporal order (for example, the first digit appeared on the right, the second on the left, and 
the third in the middle). O’Connor and Hermelin observed that their hearing-typical group 
tended to recall items in their temporal order, whereas deaf and autistic participants were 
more likely to recall them in their spatial order, from left to right. This was interpreted as an 
example of deaf and autistic children relying more on spatial representations to support their 
recall, in contrast to hearing-typical participants, who used temporally-ordered, language-
based strategies (O'Connor & Hermelin, 1973).      
Since then few studies have directly compared groups of ASD and deaf participants, but 
separate studies have highlighted common areas of strength and weakness. As in studies on 
autism (Bennetto, et al., 1996; Landa & Goldberg, 2005; D. L. Williams, et al., 2006b), 
research has documented problems with working memory (WM) in people who are deaf 
(Krakow & Hanson, 1985; Lichtenstein, 1985). Similarly, groups of deaf and ASD 
participants have shown advantages in visuo-spatial skills in comparison to hearing 
counterparts (Emmorey, et al., 1998; Emmorey & Kosslyn, 1996; Neville & Lawson, 1987; 
Todman & Cowdy, 1993; M. Wilson, Bettger, Niculae, & Klima, 1997). Theory-of-mind 
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skills, at one time proposed to be the cognitive deficit that explains autism, are often delayed 
in many children who are deaf (Courtin & Melot, 1998; Peterson & Siegal, 1995, 1999). 
Most pertinently for Twenty Questions, there are a number of similarities in the 
categorisation performance of children who are deaf and children with autism (Ormel et al., 
2010; Shulman, et al., 1995). 
When examined more closely, some of these similarities actually mask subtly different 
profiles. For example, while working memory difficulties have been reported in both groups, 
the specific WM components affected in deafness and autism would appear to differ. In 
deafness, participants tend to perform worse than controls for serial recall of language-based 
stimuli (speech or sign) and those tasks requiring use of the phonological loop (Conrad, 
1972, cited in Luftig, 1983; M. Harris & Moreno, 2004; Logan, Maybery, & Fletcher, 1996; 
M. Wilson, et al., 1997). In contrast, verbal working memory difficulties have been reported 
in studies on autism (e.g. Bennetto, et al., 1996), but the most consistent WM impairments 
documented have tended to be drawn from studies on spatial working memory (Landa & 
Goldberg, 2005; D. L. Williams, et al., 2006b).  
In other aspects of visuo-spatial skill (such as mental rotation), strengths are apparent in both 
groups but the cause of such skills appears to differ. In deafness, such skills seem to be 
closely related to signing proficiency and experience of using signed languages (Emmorey, 
et al., 1998), rather than some form of compensation for auditory deprivation or a “lack” of 
spoken language (Marschark & Hauser, 2008; Mayberry, 2002).  In autism the source of 
such skills is arguably still unclear. They could reflect some form of innate ability, cognitive 
style or a compensatory response to abnormal language development (Baron-Cohen, 2002; 
Happé & Frith, 2006; Mottron, Dawson, Soulieres, Hubert, & Burack, 2006). What is more 
certain, though, is that such skills are probably not the product of using sign language, as 
signed forms of communication are not used with anywhere near the same prevalence and 
extent by people with autism, as compared to the deaf community.  
 
Theory of mind research with deaf children 
A more significant overlap in skills has been observed in research on theory-of-mind. As 
discussed in the introductory chapter, the difficulties that children with autism show in 
Theory-of-Mind (ToM) performance are well documented (e.g. Baron-Cohen, et al., 1985). 
In deaf research, studies by Candida Peterson and colleagues (Peterson, 2004, 2009; Peterson 
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& Siegal, 1995, 1999, 2000; Peterson & Wellman, 2009; Peterson, Wellman, & Liu, 2005) 
have provided consistent evidence of delays in ToM development.  
Specifically, signing deaf children of hearing parents have been observed to perform less 
well than hearing children on the false-belief measure used by Baron-Cohen, Leslie and 
Frith, the Sally-Anne task (Peterson & Siegal, 1995). Deaf children have also been reported 
to struggle on other false-belief tasks, such as the Smarties test (Perner, Frith, Leslie, & 
Leekam, 1989), in which participants are shown that a tube of sweets has unexpected 
contents (e.g. pencils), and are asked to indicate what another person will think is in the tube  
(Peterson & Siegal, 1999).  
In Peterson and Siegal’s initial research,  oral deaf children – who are assumed to have more 
opportunity to communicate with hearing parents – also performed much better than signing 
children (Peterson & Siegal, 1999). However, subsequent data suggests that they too exhibit 
delays in performance compared to hearing counterparts, albeit to a lesser degree (de 
Villiers, Hosler, Miller, Whalen, & Wong, 1997, cited by Peterson & Siegal, 2000; Peterson, 
2004). The only group who have consistently shown equal abilities in ToM performance are 
deaf children who are native signers, either by having deaf parents who sign or another 
significant relative in the home who is fluent in signing (Courtin, 2000; Jackson, 2001; 
Peterson, 2004; Peterson & Siegal, 1999). For Peterson and colleagues, this strongly 
suggests that deafness per se is not the cause of ToM difficulties. Rather, having limited 
opportunities to interact linguistically with others and specifically engage in talk about 
mental states, leads to later delays in socio-cognitive skills (Garfield, Peterson, & Perry, 
2001; for evidence for this relation see Moeller & Schick, 2006, for example).  
Although a continuing matter of debate, a prevailing assumption within autism research is 
that ToM difficulties reflect a modular deficit, which is in some way central and innately 
specified in autism. Research on ToM development in deaf children, on the other hand, has 
prompted attempts to explain both the autistic and deaf profiles as a consequence of their 
language environments (e.g. Garfield, et al., 2001), alongside other theories that have 
emphasised a contributory role for language in the acquisition of ToM skills (de Villiers, 
2005; Tager Flusberg & Joseph, 2005). A similar, older idea within autism research is that 
those individuals on the spectrum with more typical language histories, such as children with 
Asperger Syndrome, can “hack” standard theory-of-mind tasks by drawing on their relatively 
good structural language skills (see Happé, 1995, for a discussion of this issue).  
86 
 
Subsequent research has not always supported the idea of a common, language-mediated 
overlap in ToM abilities in deafness and autism. For example, a recent paper by Peterson’s 
own research group (Peterson, Wellman, & Slaughter, 2012) compared performance on six 
tasks of Theory-of-Mind ability in deaf children, hearing children, children with autism and 
children with Asperger Syndrome (AS) aged 3-12. If early language interactions serve to 
scaffold the development of Theory-of Mind abilities, then children with Asperger 
Syndrome, who have more typical language histories than children with autism, should 
perform much more like typically-developing children on ToM tasks.  However, in Peterson 
et al. (2012) children in the AS group were no better than deaf or autistic participants in their 
performance on the ToM tasks, and significantly worse than typically-developing, hearing 
children. In addition, the six tasks were designed to be passed in a certain order, depending 
on their difficulty and the developmental stage of the child. The order in which AS and 
autistic participants were able to complete the tasks differed from that of deaf and hearing 
children, suggesting a qualitative difference in the theory-of-mind development of ASD 
participants in general (Peterson, et al., 2012).   
Thus in the case of theory-of-mind, though deafness and autism may appear to share certain 
aspects of performance, it is unlikely that the cause of their ToM difficulties is the same. 
And this might not be considered surprising – after all, problems with social interaction are 
by definition central to autism, but in the case of deafness only secondary to problems with 
hearing loss.  
Where the example of ToM research is useful, though, is in highlighting a mechanism that 
could in theory affect the experience and development of both deaf and autistic children in 
similar ways; namely, reduced opportunity to engage in parent-child communication in early 
years. This is useful for understanding problem-solving because of its potential impact upon 
category learning and semantic development. If parents and children engage in less talk 
about mental states, then the link with later understanding of mental states would seem 
straightforward, at least in deaf children (although see Jackson, 2001, for a discussion of 
complicating factors). But if parents and children have less opportunity in general to engage 
in these sorts of interactions, then typical processes of semantic category learning and 
concept acquisition may also be affected. If this is the case, then similarities in the 





Categorisation research in deaf children 
As referred to in prior chapters, children with autism have been shown to perform well on 
perceptual or basic categorisation tasks (Tager-Flusberg, 1985a; Ungerer & Sigman, 1987), 
appear to struggle on tasks that require manipulation of more complex or abstract categories 
(Shulman, et al., 1995), and they may not spontaneously use categories to organise 
information in the same way as typically-developing children (Ropar & Peebles, 2007). The 
following section reviews what corresponding findings there are from research with deaf 
individuals.  
A common assumption made by many deaf researchers in the early to mid- 20
th
 century was 
that all conceptual and abstract thought must be impaired in deaf individuals, as a necessary 
consequence of their auditory deprivation (Marschark, 2003). For example, Oléron (1953) 
begins his paper with the following claim: 
“Studies by psychologists, as well as observations by educators, indicate that deaf 
people are inferior to those with normal hearing, particularly in the domain of abstract 
mental activities.” (Oléron, 1953, p. 304) 
Along the same lines, Youniss & Furth (1966), in their summary of work by Oléron and 
others, refer to deaf participants being “dominated by obvious perceptual cues” (p.75), while 
Blanton and Nunnally (1964) considered the possibility that their results can be explained by 
“the greater concreteness of the deaf” (p. 401) in a discussion of categorisation skills. 
It is likely that early psychological theories and experiments on deafness underestimated 
both the spoken language demands of the task deployed and the conceptual abilities of deaf 
participants:   subsequent research that deployed primarily non-verbal measures of 
categorisation did not support the idea of a general conceptual impairment. For example, in a 
series of card-sorting experiments, Furth (1964) reported equivalent levels of performance in 
age- and IQ-matched deaf and hearing adults when categorising according to different colour 
and shape combinations. Similarly, Kates et al. (1961) observed no differences between a 
group of deaf adolescents and two groups of hearing high-school students in successful 
categorisation performance on the Goldstein-Scheerer Object Sorting Test (K. Goldstein & 
Scheerer, 1941). While there were group differences in the extent to which deaf participants 
could provide verbal labels for different category groupings, these differences disappeared 
once academic achievement was controlled for (Kates, Kates, Michael, & Walsh, 1961; see 
also Rosenstein, 1960).   For Furth - a researcher known for claiming that deaf cognition 
fundamentally lacked language (Furth, 1966) - findings such as these indicated that concept 
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processing abilities were intact in people who are deaf, and clearly separable from any 
difficulties with language (see Vernon, 1967, for a similar conclusion)
15
.  
For more semantic forms of categorisation the division between conceptual ability and 
language skill is a lot less clear. Basic semantic categories such as “DOG” or “TREE” may 
be based primarily on perceptual similarities, but understanding of their extension and 
reference will inherently require linguistic knowledge (e.g. what counts as a dog, as opposed 
to a wolf?). Superordinate groupings, where the perceptual similarities across exemplars may 
be few and far between, likely rely heavily on language skill, both in initial acquisition and 
use (Horton & Markman, 1980). Accordingly, the profile of semantic categorisation skills in 
deafness is much less straightforward than that seen for perceptual categorisation. 
A number of studies have investigated semantic categorisation skills in deaf participants, 
usually utilising picture-based paradigms in order to avoid the confounding effects of 
language ability (D'Hondt & Leybaert, 2003; Farjardo, Arfé, Benedetti, & Altoé, 2008; 
Friedman, 1985; Furth & Milgram, 1965; Ormel, et al., 2010; Pettifor, 1968; Silverman, 
1967; Yi et al., 2011). Pettifor (1968) compared deaf and hearing school-children (age range 
5-14) on a card sorting task where pictures could be classified according to their visual 
characteristics (e.g. size) or semantic associations (child and adult). While hearing children 
performed better overall, difficulties in sorting accuracy in the deaf group were most 
prominent when semantic categorisation was required, as shown by a significant group-by-
categorisation interaction effect. For Pettifor, this reflected the dependence on language skill 
of more conceptual forms of categorisation (Pettifor, 1968).   
Relatively more intact categorisation abilities have been reported in studies with deaf 
participants conducted by Friedman (1985), Furth & Milgram (1965), Silverman (1968) and 
D’Hondt & Leybaert (2003). On a sorting paradigm contrasting perceptual, basic and 
superordinate categories, Friedman (1985) reported equal performance for perceptual and 
                                                   
15 Another idea that has been proposed based on early categorisation research in deafness is that 
categorising according to a conjunctive or two-part rule may be impaired. Ottem (1980), in a review 
of largely French and German studies, highlighted that deaf participants have tended to struggle on 
tasks that require sorting according to two principles simultaneously (e.g. shape and colour). Early 
studies by Höfler (1927, 1934), Oléron (1951) and Vincent (1957) reported intact sorting in deaf 
participants for single sorting principles, but reduced performance for simultaneous sorting, or when 
sorting rules must be switched at different points during the task (Ottem, 1980). Even in Furth’s 
(1964) study, where deaf and hearing participants performed seven different categorisation tasks at 
equal levels, Ottem (1980) notes that an eighth task involving simultaneous sorting produced 
significant group differences. This idea has been taken up by Marschark (2006) with the suggestion 
that relational processing in general may be atypical in deafness. It also has a counterpart in research 
on autism: Shulman et al. (1995) report on specific problems with sorting according to two criteria 




basic sorting rules in a sample of deaf and hearing schoolchildren. For sorting according to 
superordinate criteria, deaf participants were less successful than hearing participants on 
their initial attempts at sorting, but improved to a typical level of performance following a 
single, scaffolded trial where the experimenter illustrated the sorting rule (Friedman, 1985). 
Similarly intact identification of basic semantic stimuli were also reported in a study by 
Furth & Milgram (1965), while Silverman (1967) reported a greater tendency towards 
thematic over taxonomic forms of sorting in deaf schoolchildren compared to hearing 
children, but equivalent levels of accuracy for superordinate associations. On a word-based 
semantic decision task, where participants were asked to judge whether different basic 
exemplars were part of the same superordinate category, deaf adolescents have also been 
reported to be as fast and as accurate as controls (D'Hondt & Leybaert, 2003).  
In contrast to earlier findings, three recent studies have reported less successful 
categorisation performance in deaf participants (Farjardo, et al., 2008; Ormel, et al., 2010; 
Yi, et al., 2011). Ormel et al. (2010) compared categorisation skills in a sample of deaf and 
hearing children (mean age = 9.5 years). Across two experiments that compared basic and 
superordinate categorisation skills – the former in both words and pictures – deaf children 
were less accurate and slower to categorise semantic stimuli than hearing controls. As in 
Pettifor (1968) and Friedman (1985), differences in deaf and hearing performance were most 
prominent for superordinate stimuli (although as these stimuli were only presented verbally, 
this may have confounded participants’ difficulties in response). 
Farjardo et al. (2008) compared deaf and hearing high-school students (mean age 17.9 years) 
on a forced-choice semantic decision task where participants had to judge whether an item 
was an example of a superordinate category. Items were either presented as pictures or 
words, and categories were either similar (fruit and vegetable) or dissimilar (fruit or animal) 
in their perceptual qualities. While deaf and hearing participants did not differ in terms of 
accuracy, hearing participants were significantly faster overall and showed more of a benefit 
in accuracy for word-based categorisations.  
Finally, Yi et al. (2011) compared groups of deaf and hearing teenagers (mean age = 13.0) 
on a forced choice categorisation task where items could either be grouped according to a 
theme (e.g. chalk and a blackboard) or a taxonomic relation (e.g. chicken and ostrich). Items 
were presented either as words or pictures. As in Farjardo et al. (2008), accuracy rates were 
high and did not significantly differ between deaf and hearing participants. However, 
reaction times were longer for deaf participants than hearing participants, irrespective of 
stimulus type (Yi et al., 2011).    
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Differences in semantic skills have also been evident when participants need to utilise 
categories to support strategic cognitive processes, such as memory. In research on recall 
processes in deaf people, normal encoding of semantic categories (Hoemann, Andrews, & 
DeRosa, 1974) and typical use of semantic clustering strategies (Liben, 1979, 1985) has been 
documented. However, the efficiency and success of such strategies has not always matched 
that of hearing participants (Liben, 1985). For example, Koh, Vernon and Bailey (1971) 
tested young (13-14) and older (18-20) deaf adolescents on their free recall of words from 
the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (L. Dunn, 1965). Overall, recall rates in the deaf 
participants were lower than hearing participants of the same age. In addition, a range of 
measures of subjective organisation (the amount of semantic grouping within each recall 
string) indicated that deaf adolescents utilised less grouping than their hearing counterparts 
(Koh, et al., 1971). 
Methodologically the above studies vary in a number of ways, making it hard to draw clear 
conclusions. Most notably, relatively little is known about the language histories or current 
language skills of the deaf participants included in these studies. In contrast to the ToM 
research literature, none of the above categorisation studies prior to 1985 report any 
information on the hearing status of parents or the language used at home (Furth, 1964; 
Kates et al., 1961; Koh et al., 1971; Liben, 1979; Pettifor, 1968; Silverman, 1967). Given the 
large numbers of deaf people who come from hearing families (Mitchell & Karchmer, 2004), 
it is probably fair to assume that this was also the case for most of the participants in the 
above studies. Indeed, in studies that have collected this information, they either report “no 
use of signing in [participants’] homes” (Friedman, 1985, p70; D’Hondt & Leybaert, 2003) 
or indicate that only a small minority of their participants came from deaf families (Ormel et 
al., 2010; Yi et al., 2011). Nevertheless, no study to date has systematically compared groups 
of deaf participants with different language backgrounds in the same way that this has been 
done from ToM research, so the possible effects of linguistic experience remain unclear. 
Information on the preferred or primary method of communication for deaf participants in 
the above studies is more readily available. Reflecting the educational practises of the time, 
participants in early studies were either reported to be attending oral-based schools (Kates et 
al., 1961; Rosenstein, 1960) or were provided with their task instructions orally (Pettifor, 
1968). In some cases references were made to use of sign, gesture or pantomime where it 
was needed (Furth, 1964; Silverman, 1967) but the implication given is that deaf participants 
were expected to understand and attempt the task via Spoken English. Subsequent studies 
mention use of sign (e.g. Koh et al., 1971) and tailoring of spoken, signed or combined 
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methods of instruction depending on the skills of each participant (Liben, 1979), but only 
recent studies have characterised their participants in any detail, either as users of cued 
speech (D'Hondt & Leybaert, 2003),  sign-language users (Farjardo, et al., 2008), or 
bilingual users of speech and sign (Ormel, et al., 2010; Yi, et al., 2011). 
In addition to language differences, the above studies vary considerably in the level of 
matching between deaf and hearing participants. Almost all have deployed some form of age 
matching and most have attempted some form of non-verbal IQ matching (Friedman, 1985; 
Furth, 1964; Ormel, et al., 2010; Pettifor, 1968; Yi, et al., 2011), but only one study has 
reported matching for both VIQ and NVIQ abilities on standardised measures (Kates, et al., 
1961). Other studies, where it is reported, have assumed participants to all be within the 
normal IQ range via their grade level and inclusion in mainstream classes (Liben, 1979; 
Silverman, 1967), or have deployed other matching measures, such as reading ability 
(D'Hondt & Leybaert, 2003).  
The lack of verbal IQ matching reflects the difficulties with measuring such abilities fairly in 
deaf individuals, given the level of spoken language that typical VIQ measures both a) 
assume for their administration, and b) require for successful completion (Braden, 1994). 
This means that it is not at all clear that deaf and hearing participants in the above studies 
had comparable levels of general, verbal-cognitive skills (and in fact this would seem 
unlikely) – although it should be noted that more recent studies have also measured levels of 
signing ability, for example, in order to gauge the contribution of such skills (Ormel, et al., 
2010). The lack of consistent NVIQ matching is more puzzling, as a number of measures can 
be used with appropriate administration (Hill-Briggs, Dial, Morere, & Joyce, 2007). It could 
be that in some studies this reflects differences in research practice: whereas in autism 
research close age- and IQ-matching is assumed to be the norm, this does not appear to be 
the case for studies on deafness in general. 
Despite these caveats, a number of parallels with categorisation skills in autism are arguably 
apparent. As in the autism literature, perceptual and basic categorisation skills appear intact, 
but more complex and semantically abstract forms of categorisation appear problematic for 
some deaf participants. In addition, deaf and autistic participants show atypicalities in how 
effectively they can use categories to support other cognitive processes, such as memory. 
Without exception, the above studies have interpreted the deaf categorisation profile as a 
product of their linguistic (or, rather non-linguistic) development, whereas in autism 
categorisation differences are often taken to reflect fundamental differences in information 
processing (e.g. Gastgeb, et al., 2006). But if both groups experience delays in their language 
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development and reduced opportunity to engage communicatively with others, then their 
initial learning and subsequent use of categories seems likely be affected in similar or 
overlapping ways.  
 
Two hypotheses concerning problem-solving in autism and deafness 
Returning to Twenty Questions, it seems there is at least a prima facie argument to be made 
that problem-solving which relies on the flexible use of semantic categories may be impaired 
in both deafness and autism as a result of atypical language development.  
A “strong” form of this argument would be to propose a specific causal chain, linking  
1) commonly delayed language development in autism and deafness,  
2) atypical acquisition and organisation of semantic categories in both groups, and 
3) inefficiencies in verbal problem-solving tasks such as the TQT.  
That is, difficulties in verbal problem-solving in autism and deafness are proposed be a long-
term consequence of early language development, because of the impact that language 
delays have on semantic organisation. Abnormal early language experiences (1) lead to 
atypical semantic organisation (2), making it harder for semantic categories to be used 
efficiently when they are required on verbal problem-solving tasks (3). The cause and 
developmental pathway of this profile is proposed to not only be similar, but the same across 
both groups. Figure 12 provides an illustration of this argument. 
A “weak” form of the argument is to propose the following: if problems with semantic 
categorisation and problem-solving can occur in deafness, apparently as a product of their 
language development, then an analogous process could also occur in autism. In contrast to 
the “strong” argument outlined above, the following causal story is proposed:  
1) commonly delayed language development in autism and deafness, leading to  
2) atypical semantic organisation in deafness; an unspecified process in autism, 
resulting in  
3) inefficiencies in verbal problem-solving tasks such as the TQT.  
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For both groups, the original source of their problem-solving difficulties is in their early 
language development (1). But the route by which this happens is not necessarily the same: 
in deafness it could follow the path of atypical semantic organisation (2), while in autism this 
could be some other form of intermediary process, or combination of processes associated 
with their wider psychopathology.  
For example, a lack of early language in autism could lead to problems with how language-
related regions of the brain communicate with areas linked to other cognitive processes. The 
development of structural connections between different brain regions is thought to be 
abnormal in autism  - Courchesne and Pierce (2005), for example, refer to the frontal cortex 
“talking to itself”  (p. 225) – and it could be that a failure to use typical language areas and 
networks by ASD children leads to atypical connectivity patterns at later ages. On a task like 
Twenty Questions, executive skills have to be applied in concert with semantic knowledge, 
likely requiring effective communication between frontal (executive) and temporal 
(semantic) regions in the brain. Disruption to such a process could lead to inefficient 
performance when using semantic strategies to solve a problem.      
This represents just one possible alternative to the “semantic route” specified in the strong 
argument, and there may be other good candidates for the link between language 
development and problem-solving in autism. The important point about the weak argument 
is that it is not committed to a specific intermediary process: it simply proposes that 
problem-solving atypicalities in this group are ultimately a product of early linguistic 
development, as opposed to an explanation that only refers to cognitive skills or information 
processing.  
To argue for either of these hypotheses, however, would require a firm empirical basis, and a 
confidence that Marschark and Everhart (1999) were correct in interpreting their data as they 
did. To date, no other researchers have attempted to replicate Marschark & Everhart’s 
findings on the TQT or similar measures: their result could be a one-off. It could be that the 
differences observed between deaf and hearing participants in their study were produced by 
other cognitive discrepancies not measured by their paradigm. Or, alternatively, such 




Figure 12. Causal models for the strong and weak arguments. The strong argument (a) differs 
from the weak argument (b) in specifying a common causal route for problem-solving difficulties in 
autism and deafness. 
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attempted the task. To establish whether either (or neither) of the strong or weak arguments 
can be endorsed, these alternative explanations must first be eliminated. 
 
Alternative explanations 
A first point to make about Marschark & Everhart’s (1999) study is that the deaf and hearing 
participants were not explicitly matched on general cognitive ability. In experiment 1, the 
sample of children who were deaf were reported to be “within the range of normal 
intelligence according to school authorities” (p69), and the sample of hearing children was 
recruited from local public schools. In experiment 2, both deaf and hearing participants were 
recruited from Rochester Institute of Technology and assumed to possibly have 
“exceptional” problem-solving skills based on their acceptance to courses at the college. 
Nevertheless, in neither experiment did deaf or hearing participants attempt a standardised 
test of intelligence, such as one of the Wechsler batteries (e.g. Wechsler, 1999).  As such, 
any major group differences in problem-solving performance may reflect underlying group 
differences in general cognitive ability. 
Generalised cognitive differences between deaf and hearing populations are a matter of 
considerable debate. A full discussion of all the findings and issues in relation to this area is 
beyond the scope of this project (for a review, see Braden, 1994), but some brief, general 
points can be made.  
First, there is a great lack of standardised cognitive tasks that are suitable for administration 
with deaf individuals (Haug & Mann, 2008).  Most non-verbal or performance IQ subtests of 
cognitive batteries yield normal range scores for deaf individuals (Vernon, 2005) and can be 
used as long as they are administered with a suitable interpreter (Hill-Briggs, et al., 2007), 
but there are no appropriate verbal IQ measures that currently exist. This is because verbal 
IQ measures primarily measure cognitive skills via knowledge of spoken language, which 
for many deaf individuals may not be their preferred mode of communication. For example, 
in the WASI (Wechsler, 1999), the Vocabulary subtest requests definitions of words and the 
Similarities subtest requires category names for pairs of words: both tests require knowledge 
of Spoken English. In some cases, translation into a signed language such as British Sign 
Language (BSL) or American Sign Language (ASL) may be possible, but for some words a 
signed counterpart will not exist, or the iconicity of the sign for the word will illustrate its 
meaning in some way. For example, the sign for “mountain” resembles the sloped, triangle 
shape of a mountain (Brien & Brennan, 1992). If verbal IQ as a concept is understood as a 
96 
 
measure of language-based cognitive abilities, rather than knowledge of a specific language, 
this suggests verbal IQ per se is not being measured in these cases.  Or, alternatively, it is 
being measured, but only in a piecemeal and indirect fashion.   
Of course, for a sizeable proportion of deaf individuals spoken language may be actually 
their preferred mode of communication; many people who are deaf are taught orally, 
learning to lip-read and attending schools that encourage speech. However, the use of spoken 
language VIQ measures even in this population is still problematic, because acquisition of 
speech, lexical knowledge and speech comprehension will often show considerable age 
delays (see Geers, 2006; Mayberry, 2002; Quigley & Paul, 1984, for reviews). This means 
that VIQ measures again are not neutral measures of language-based cognitive abilities, 
reflecting a person’s “general level”, but specific measures of difficulty in the test language. 
Thus, when VIQ measures have been deployed, samples of deaf participants have shown 
notably uneven VIQ-NVIQ profiles, with verbal skills lagging behind non-verbal skills 
(Braden, 1992, 1994). For problem-solving, this means that poorer performance on a 
language-heavy task may only be the result of poorer language skills, not a specific difficulty 
or divergence in cognitive skills. 
A second factor that could potentially influence problem-solving performance concerns the 
actual modality of response that Marschark & Everhart’s (1999) participants used. As noted 
above, the children and adults in the study all used ASL as their preferred mode of 
communication. This could have affected the kind of questions they deployed, as the 
linguistics of signed languages differs considerably from spoken languages (Stokoe, 
1960/2005; Sutton-Spence & Woll, 1999).  One difference relevant to Twenty Questions is 
that some superordinate categories are not represented in signed languages (a point noted in 
categorisation research on deafness; Wolff, 1985). Depending on the language, a signing 
dictionary may contain a few thousand signs (e.g. Brien & Brennan, 1992), while 
dictionaries of spoken language contain hundreds of thousands (e.g. Soanes, Stevenson, 
Pearsall, & Hanks, 2005). Many abstract words are not represented at all in sign language, 
including superordinate terms: for example, there are no specific signs for reptile or weapon 
in British Sign Language (Brien & Brennan, 1992). For games like Twenty Questions, 
grouping questions often rely on superordinates to collect more basic items together – if a 
specific superordinate sign does not exist, that grouping may not be as available for 
participants who sign. 
A related - but more contentious – suggestion is that sign language is less abstract than 
spoken language in general. If it were the case that there was less abstractness in signed 
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languages, then this could affect how likely participants would be to use more abstract or 
general category terms. Whether this is the case is a matter of longstanding debate, and one 
which cannot be fully addressed here (compare, for example, the views in Taub, 2001, and 
Greene, 1975). It is also important to note that, while certain terms may not have a 
corresponding sign in BSL or ASL, there are also concepts in sign that are not easy to 
express in English. It would be a considerable mistake to assume that one language is 
necessarily less rich or less flexible than another. Despite this, the possibility remains that 
the way in which sign is commonly used to refer and represent may be different from spoken 
language in subtle ways, emphasising the tangible over the vague, or exemplars over 
categories, for example. This, in turn, may impact on how concepts are used in a setting like 
Twenty Questions – above and beyond the more concrete question of whether specific terms 
have an equivalent in each language
16
. 
In fact, there is evidence - albeit tentative – to suggest that communication method could be 
an important factor to consider in Twenty Questions performance. In the only other study to 
apply a TQT-type paradigm to a deaf sample, Remine, Care, and Brown (2008) assessed the 
problem-solving performance of a group of deaf adolescents (AgeM = 14.02) whose first 
language was Spoken English, and who attempted the task using speech. As the study was 
focussed on identifying linguistic and executive predictors of problem-solving in deafness 
specifically, no comparison group of hearing students was tested. Nevertheless, when 
compared to hearing norms from the DKEFS testing battery (Delis, et al., 2001), Remine and 
colleagues observed that all their deaf participants performed within the normal range of 
scores for their age group. Furthermore, their raw scores would seem to indicate greater use 
                                                   
16 A contrasting example of the role language differences might play is provided by the work of 
Courtin (1997, 2000) on native deaf signers using French Sign Language (LSF). Courtin (1997) 
argues that some aspects of LSF may actually facilitate more advanced abstract categorisation skills in 
deaf children, based on the iconic structure of certain basic-level signs and their exemplars. For 
example, in the case of different flowers or trees, Courtin notes that the FSL sign for “flower” or 
“tree” is always signed before specifying the particular variety. This kind of general sign provides 
information about the nature of the category that the specific exemplar (e.g. an oak, or a larch) belongs 
to: 
“The generic sign TREE, for example, sometimes refers to the prototypical element of the 
category... But it also refers to the intensional properties of the category in that it encompasses 
some of its characteristic properties (e.g., the trunk and branches) that cannot be taken away 
from the sign, the category, without "destroying" it. For these two reasons, categorization may 
be easier for a deaf child who is a native FSL signer than it would be for a hearing one.” 
(Courtin, 1997, p. 162). 
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of grouping questions than that seen in Marschark & Everhart’s (1999) first experiment 
(Remine et al., 2008).  
Remine et al.’s (2008) findings are hard to interpret without comparing performance with a 
control group, but at the very least they add support to the idea that the language deaf 
participants use may be important to their problem-solving. This, combined with the issues 
about category signs discussed above, raises the possibility that problem-solving on the TQT 
may require signing participants to use strategies (i.e. semantic category terms) that are not a 
usual part of the everyday language use. A reduced lexicon of such terms in signed 
languages would not seem to be as much of a problem: while some category terms may not 
exist in signed languages, the typical grouping terms on a TQT such as ANIMAL, 
TRANSPORT, HOUSE, FRUIT do tend to have corresponding signs. But if there is a 
tendency in signed languages to use superordinate terms less in general, then this may lead to 
less efficient use of such terms on a task like the TQT.  
In summary, there are two explanations, one concerning cognitive skills, the other language 
differences, which may account for Marschark and Everhart’s findings. If they can be tested 
and rejected, then deaf performance on Twenty Questions would not be directly explained by 
general differences in cognitive ability or language use. This would then leave open the 
possibility that similarities in problem-solving and categorisation in deafness and autism 








The second experiment aimed to replicate Marschark & Everhart’s (1999) findings for deaf 
performance on the TQT, while testing some of the alternative explanations for why deaf and 
hearing problem-solving may differ. For feasibility reasons, and to rule out other 
confounding factors (such as developmental delays), this was done in the first instance by 
comparing TQT performance in a pilot group consisting of nine deaf adults and 27 hearing 
adults.  
The first explanation to test was that general cognitive ability differences may have driven 
the group differences observed, As discussed in the previous chapter, there are a number of  
methodological difficulties with assessing IQ accurately and reliably in deaf populations – 
but that does not mean that it is impossible to establish some level of general ability. This is 
definitely possible with an appropriate NVIQ task, such as the Matrix Reasoning task from 
the WASI (Wechsler, 1999). In matrix reasoning, participants must complete a series of 
pattern-based sequences. Success depends on recognising the logic behind such sequences, 
but this is not thought to rely on language-based skills. Provided that task instructions are 
provided in a format accessible for deaf participants or with the assistance of a suitable 
interpreter, such tasks can provide fair assessments of non-verbal reasoning skill (Braden, 
1992). 
The measurement of verbal abilities is more problematic: at the time of writing, no 
standardised indices of sign language vocabulary knowledge or ability were available, 
although some were in development (Mann, personal communication). In the absence of 
such a measure, the Similarities task of the WASI was deployed as a rough index of Spoken 
English category knowledge, rather than general VIQ. On the Similarities task, the 
experimenter reads out a pair of words (such as COW and BEAR) and the participant must 
respond with a word or description that indicates in what way they are alike (e.g. 
ANIMALS). The test was chosen instead of the Vocabulary subtest of the WASI because of 
the greater expressive demands of the latter. For vocabulary, participants must define the 
meaning of different terms and sometimes describe a context in which that word is used. The 
Similarities test, in contrast, can largely be answered with single-word responses such as 
animal, clothes, etc. (Wechsler, 1999). 
                                                   
17 Findings from this chapter and the one that follows were presented as a poster at the International 
Meeting for Autism Research 2012 in Toronto, Canada. (“Verbal problem-solving in deafness and 
autism spectrum disorders”. B. Alderson-Day, IMFAR, May 17th-19th, 2012). 
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Based on the assumption that Marschark & Everhart (1999) were correct in considering their 
groups of participants to be equal in general abilities, it was hypothesised that deaf 
participants would ask less efficient questions on the TQT even when controlling for the 
influence of NVIQ level (on the Matrix Reasoning task) and Spoken English knowledge (on 
the Similarities task).      
The second explanation to test was whether differences in problem-solving performance 
were attributable to differences in category use in signed languages. A way to examine this is 
to measure the use of basic and superordinate category terms in ordinary descriptions of 
scenes, in a similar manner to neuropsychological measures of descriptive abilities, such as 
the Boston Naming Test (Kaplan, Goodglass, & Weintraub, 1976). If superordinate category 
terms are used less in signed languages in general, then this may be expected to be evident in 
how users of sign language go about describing such scenes, in contrast to users of Spoken 
English.   
To assess this, a novel picture description task was designed. The task consisted of a range of 
illustrated common scenes that could be either described in terms of the superordinate 
groupings present, or in terms of more basic-level categories. For example, a farmyard scene 
may contain animals, plants, vegetables and vehicles. Alternatively, the same scene could be 
described as containing horses, cows, trees, flowers, carrots and so on. On the task, 
participants were asked to either a) generally describe what was happening in each scene, or 
b) identify the main differences between two very similar scenes containing subtle 
differences. Both a) general descriptions and b) specific differences were used, in order to 
provide two potential ways of eliciting the use of category terms. Based on the differences in 
superordinate use and frequency in signed languages, it was hypothesised that deaf 
participants may utilise superordinate terms less than hearing participants in their 
descriptions of scenes. In addition, it was predicted that the use of such terms on the 
descriptions task would be significantly related to their use in questions on the TQT.   
 
Experiment 2: Cognitive and linguistic differences in deaf and hearing problem-solving 
Method 
Participants 
A group of nine adults who are deaf (DA henceforth) were recruited from the Bristol area to 
take part in the study (6M, 3F). All participants had a hearing loss of some sort since the age 
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of 5 or younger. Eight of the nine participants were moderately to profoundly deaf; one 
participant referred to herself as “severely hard-of-hearing”
18
.  The causes of hearing loss 
varied considerably across the group and were in some cases unknown (see Appendix 1 for a 
full breakdown). All were users of British Sign Language, although three participants stated 
that they were happy using BSL or speech. The DA group were compared with a larger 
group of hearing adult (HA) participants recruited from undergraduates and postgraduates at 
the University of Edinburgh (n = 27; 14 M/13 F). Age and education data for the two groups 
are shown in table 5. No significant differences were observed between the groups for age or 
years of education. 
 
Recruitment and settings 
All participants in the DA group were recruited via contact with a local community centre 
and with the assistance of a British Sign Language interpreter with links to the Deaf 
community in Bristol. Potential participants were provided with study information prior to 
consent and had the study explained by the interpreter. Following this, written consent was 
sought prior to participation. All testing with DA participants took place at the community 
centre. For HA participants, consenting and testing took place in a quiet room at the 
Psychology Department in Edinburgh. (All study procedures were approved by the 
Psychology Ethics committee at the University of Edinburgh). 
 
Cognitive profile 
Table 5 displays group statistics on the cognitive profile of DA and HA participants based on 
the Similarities and Matrix Reasoning subtests of the WASI (Wechsler, 1999). The groups 
significantly differed in their T-scores for Similarities (HA>DA) and a trend was observable 
in the same direction for matrix reasoning T-scores (HA>DA). Age-equivalent (i.e. mental 
age) scores were not an appropriate check on matching in this instance, due to the age of 
participants, so raw subtest scores were used instead
19
. As for the T-scores, the groups 
                                                   
18 This participant’s data were marked for later analysis and excluded from the remaining group data 
where they notably differed.  
19 Age-equivalent scores in the WASI are generally only available for child and adolescent samples 
(Wechsler, 1999). Scores over a certain cut-off are given an “adult level” age, but this does not 
continue to be adjusted for older participants. For example, a raw score of 35 or over is given an age-
equivalent score of 27.5 years. In a high-scoring, adult sample, scores over 35 will be common, and 
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significantly differed in Similarities raw score. (DAM(SD) = 33.89 (4.43), HAM(SD) = 38.44 
(3.86); t = -2.988, df = 34, p = .005). The groups also differed in Matrix Reasoning raw 
score, albeit to a lesser degree (DAM(SD) = 26.44 (1.88), HAM(SD)  = 29.30 (3.43); t = -2.365, 
df = 34, p = .024).   
 
Design 
A between-groups design was used to compare deaf and hearing participants on the Twenty 
Questions Task and a short battery of control tasks. 
 
Materials & Procedure 
- The Twenty Questions Task (TQT)  
The materials and procedure deployed in this experiment were broadly similar to the baseline 
condition in experiment 1: participants viewed an array of everyday items and were 
permitted 10 questions per trial to identify a selected target. Key ways in which the 
procedure differed were as follows.  
First, DA participants were permitted to attempt the task using their preferred mode of 
communication, with an interpreter present to translate task instructions and participant 
questions. Second, to avoid ceiling effects in testing an adult sample, the task array for all 
participants was doubled from the 24-item set used in the preceding experiment,  to a 48-
item set. (This also made the set size more similar to the 42-item set used by Marschark & 
Everhart, 1999). Finally, all participants completed three TQT trials; two allowing 
elimination followed by one were it was prohibited. (A non-elimination condition was 
included as an indicator of changes in the profile as a result of executive load).  
In addition, participants were asked to rate their level of familiarity with Twenty Questions, 
on a scale from 1 (Very Familiar) to 5 (Very Unfamiliar) before attempting the task. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
result in most participants receiving the same age-equivalent score (27.5). For this reason, raw scores 
are preferable to age-equivalents in older groups.   
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- Picture Descriptions 
The picture descriptions task was devised specifically for the present experiment. To test 
basic and superordinate label use, a set of five images were selected that showed various 
everyday objects and scenes in cartoon form. Scenes showing a banquet, the inside of a 
greenhouse, a farmyard, a busy street and a desert were chosen from a children’s picture 
book (Brocklehurst, Doherty, & Milbourne, 2002). An example scene is displayed in figure 
13. 
Two methods were used to elicit verbal descriptions of the scenes. First, participants were 
asked to “give a brief description of what’s happening in the scene” and their responses were 
scored for use of basic and superordinate terms. Descriptions were scored for all the 
participants’ utterances or signs up until they stopped describing the scene (usually no longer 
than one or two sentences). Second, each scene was displayed next to a counterpart scene 
which was identical with the exception of specific details (See figure 14). In the twin scene 
some collections of items (e.g. all the tools, or all the animals) were moved or changed in  
orientation, and participants were asked to describe three main differences between the 
scenes. This “spot the difference” paradigm was used in addition to the general descriptions 
to create contexts where it made sense to describe certain pictures in basic terms and others 
in superordinate terms
20
.   
 
- Plan Construction 
To allow for comparisons with the data from experiment 1, the plan construction task was 
also deployed after the three TQT trials. As participants were no longer planning a set of 
questions to use on a subsequent TQT trial, participants were asked to construct a plan based 
on the premise of what they would do if they were about to play the game again. Participants 
were also allowed to view the test array from the previous TQT. 
 
 
                                                   
20 Pictures for the task were piloted with a sample of psychology class undergraduates (n=47) to 




Figure 13. Example stimulus for the general description on the picture descriptions task. 
 
 
Table 5. Age and cognitive characteristics for deaf and hearing adults 
 
Deaf adults (DA)   Hearing adults (HA) 
   M SD   M SD Sig. 
Age 26.00 2.18 
 
25.26 4.33 0.628 
VIQ: Similarities (T-score) 47.67 7.73 
 
55.44 6.51 0.005** 
NVIQ: Matrix Reasoning (T-score) 52.67 3.97 
 
58.00 8.05 0.066 
Years of Education  16.63 4.21   17.59 2.50 0.552 
** p<.01  
105 
 
                                     
 
Figure 14. Example stimuli for picture differences on the picture descriptions task. 
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Also scored was the number of questions used per trial (QT) and the types of  questions used 
(grouping and guessing). No hypotheses were made as to the content of participants’ 
questions, so this was not analysed. Analysis of variance, analysis of covariance and 
unpaired t-tests were used to compare performance in the two groups.   
 
- Picture Descriptions 
Picture descriptions were scored as frequency counts of basic and superordinate category 
terms used within each condition (general description vs picture differences). Counts for 
basic and superordinate terms were compared in each condition for each group using a 
multivariate analysis of variance, while regression analysis was used to assess the 
relationship of each of these variables to TQT performance.   
 
- Plan Construction 
The scoring for plan construction also followed experiment 1, with expected QQ scores 
being assigned to each question selected in each plan. As the TQT array was larger for the 
adult study, expected QQ scores were assigned that reflected the 48-item array. (As QQ 
reflects a proportion of information eliminated this still provided scores on the same scale as 




Twenty Questions Task 
As would be expected for an adult sample, participants in both groups performed the task 
with relative ease, with no participant failing to identify the target within 10 questions on any 
trial. An unpaired t-test indicated that the two groups had comparable levels of game 
experience (DAM(SD) = 2.22 (0.97), HA M(SD) = 2.67 (1.54); t = -1.01, p = .323, n.s.). Table 6 
shows the mean group scores for TQT performance. An analysis of variance indicated that 
the mean differences between the groups were observable for question quality (F (1,34) = 
4.437, p = .0436, etap
2 
= .115) with participants in the HA group asking slightly more 









Table 6. Task scores for deaf and hearing adults on Twenty Questions , Picture Descriptions and 
Plan Construction tasks. 
 
Deaf adults (DA)   Hearing adults (HA) 
   M SD   M SD Sig. 
TQT 
      QQ 0.33 0.04 
 
0.37 0.04 .044* 
QT 5.89 0.87 
 
6.22 0.91 .341 
Grouping (%) 75.35 4.55 
 
75.79 9.63 .895 
Guessing (%) 18.96 7.68 
 
14.67 12.34 .336 
       PD 
      General: Basic 8.33 4.98 
 
10.11 4.76 .336 
General: Superordinate 4.56 1.24 
 
5.26 2.03 .344 
Difference: Basic 11.89 2.37 
 
11.56 2.78 .252 
Difference Superordinate 2.22 0.97 
 
2.85 1.51 .749 
       PC 
      QQ1 0.37 0.13 
 
0.44 0.11 .092 
QQ2 0.24 0.14 
 
0.22 0.11 .655 
QQ3 0.24 0.16 
 
0.19 0.12 .307 
QQ4 0.22 0.13 
 
0.14 0.09 .045* 
QQ5 0.19 0.15 
 
0.15 0.09 .308 
* significant at p<.05  
TQT = Twenty Questions Task, PD = Picture Descriptions, PC = Plan Construction, QQ = Question 
Quality, QT = Questions Taken. 
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Two methods were deployed to take into account the contribution of cognitive ability scores 
to question quality scores. First, analyses of covariance were deployed using a) the T-scores 
from the Matrix Reasoning and Similarities tests and b) the raw scores from those same tests 
as covariates. Second, subsets of deaf and hearing participants were matched for WASI 
scores on each measure (to within 5 points), and then compared using t-tests. 
With the inclusion of reasoning scores as a covariate in an ANCOVA model,  a trend 
towards a main effect of group was observed (F (1,33) = 3.126, p = .086, etap
2 
= .087), 
suggesting that deaf and hearing participants may have differed in their efficiency even when 
NVIQ was taken into account. Almost exactly the same trend was evident when raw scores 
for matrix reasoning were included instead (group main effect: F (1,33) = 3.137, p = .086, 
etap
2 
= .087).  With the inclusion of Similarities T-scores,  this trend was no longer evident 
(F (1,33) = 2.191, p = .148, etap
2 
= .062), and this was also the case when raw scores were 




. In each of the models, the observed 
covariate effects were never as strong as the group contrast: for matrix reasoning T-scores 
the partial eta squared effect size was 0.015 (F (1,33) = 0.505, p = .482), while for 
similarities it was 0.022 (F (1,33) = 0.740, p = .396). This implied that neither covariate was 
as effective a predictor of question quality as group membership (and may simply have been 
reducing power with their inclusion in the model). Nevertheless, group differences in mean 
QQ could not be clearly demonstrated once all of the relevant IQ covariates were taken into 
account, especially for VIQ
 22
. 
Comparisons using matched subsets added to this picture. A t-test comparing the 9 DA 
participants with 19 HA participants who were matched for NVIQ (DAM(SD) = 52.67 (3.97), 
HA M(SD) = 54.11(5.99), n.s.) showed a significant mean difference in question quality 
(DAM(SD) = 0.334 (0.042), HAM(SD) = 0.369 (0.040), t(26) = -2.075, p = .048, d = -0.83)
23
. A 
sample of 11 HA participants matched to the DA group for VIQ (DAM(SD) = 47.67 (7.72), HA 
M(SD) = 49.55(4.41), n.s.) also scored higher for question efficiency, at a level approaching 
significance (DAM(SD) = 0.334 (0.042), HAM(SD) = 0.371 (0.036), t(18) = -2.052, p = .055, d = -
                                                   
21 As per the assumptions underlying analysis of covariance, group*covariate interaction effects were 
also tested to check for homogeneity of regression slopes. For both covariates no significant 
interactions with group were observed. 
22 An ANCOVA model including both NVIQ and VIQ covariates was also run to assess for their 
combined contribution, although for parsimony this is not reported here. With both covariates 
included, the observed effect size for Group was similar to that seen for the Similarities only model 
(etap
2 = 0.62) and again greater than the contribution of either of the covariates, or their combination. 
23 The groups were also comparable for matrix reasoning raw score: (DAM(SD) = 26.44(1.88), HA M(SD) 





.  Thus, group differences in question quality were apparent when matching subgroups 
of participants (in contrast to using ANCOVA), but such differences were still not  
consistently separable from the influence of verbal IQ. 
No group differences were evident on the number of questions used per trial (p = .341, etap
2 
= .027, n.s.), suggesting that deaf and hearing participants largely used the same number of 
questions to reach the target on each trial. As table 6 indicates, the percentages of grouping 
and guess questions used by each group were also very similar: both DA and HA participants 
utilised grouping for about 75% of their questions, and no significant differences were 




- Within-group differences 
Changes across the three TQT trials in each group were assessed using a mixed 2x3 ANOVA 
(group x trial). In particular, the difference between the first two trials, where elimination 
was allowed, and the third trial, where it was prohibited, were of interest. For question 





.113), although as figure 15 shows, this reflected a widening difference in QQ 
between the groups across the three trials. There was no evidence of a specific problem with 
the third, non-elimination trial in deaf participants, as QQ in both groups dropped for this 
trial 
25
. No significant group*trial interaction effects were observed for the number of 
questions used per trial, or the respective rates of grouping or guessing (all p > .700, all etap
2 
< .005). This strongly suggested that deaf and hearing participants were largely unaffected 
by not being able to eliminate items from the TQT set.    
 
Picture Descriptions 
A multivariate mixed analysis of variance was used to compare frequencies of basic and 
superordinate category use in both groups across both forms of the picture descriptions task 
(general descriptions, and describing differences).  No significant differences were observed  
                                                   
24 No significant difference was evident in raw scores between these groups (DAM(SD) = 33.89(4.43), 
HA M(SD) = 35.09(2.43), n.s.). T-tests comparing  age, years of education and game experience were 
also run for each pair of subsets, but no significant differences were evident. 
25 As with the analysis of mean QQ, these analyses were also run with VIQ and NVIQ covariates, 
producing similar results to the overall mean effect. Importantly neither covariate interacted 


















Figure 16. Use of basic and superordinate category terms in general descriptions made by deaf 
and hearing adults.
 
Figure 17. Use of basic and superordinate category terms in picture differences described by 




between the groups  (all p > .250, all etap
2 
< .04; see table 6). As figures 16 and 17 show, the 
general descriptions elicited more superordinate terms (F(1, 34.000) = 33.381, p = .0001, 
etap
2
  =.495) whereas picture differences prompted increased use of basic categories (F(1, 
34.000) = 6.285, p = .017, etap
2
  =.156). This suggested that there was no evidence of 
reduced superordinate use in the deaf participants, nor was this use irregularly modulated by 
task demands: DA and HA participants used similar rates of basic and superordinate 
categories, across two different conditions. 
To assess for the relation of picture description performance to TQT performance, the counts 
for basic and superordinate category use in each condition where entered into a backwards 
regression model with QQ as the dependent variable (using all participants combined) . No 
significant model was returned, indicating that none of the picture description scores 
significantly predicted TQT performance either individually or in combination (N = 36, all 
stan. betas < .270, all p > .149). The lack of group differences in picture descriptions and 
lack of any predictive relations between picture description scores and TQT scores suggested 
that the use of basic and superordinate category terms could not explain group differences in 
questioning efficiency.  
 
Plan Construction 
On the planning task both groups showed evidence of selecting a hierarchical sequence of 
questions (see figure 18). The running of Friedman’s ANOVAs within each group indicated 
significant differences between questions for both DA (X
2
 = 9.216, df = 4, p = .049) and HA 
(X
2
 = 53.529, df = 4, p < .001) participants. Comparisons between groups indicated no 
significant difference in the mean efficiency of participant plans (DAM(SD) = 0.253 (0.067), 
HAM(SD) = 0.230 (0.060); F (1, 34) = 1.017, p = .320, etap
2
  = .029, n.s.)
26
, nor for most of the 
individual questions in each plan.   
However, differences approaching significance for questions 1 (HA>DA) and 4 (DA>HA) 
suggested some differences in the mean gradient of participants’ plans, with hearing 
participants starting with more general questions but narrowing more than deaf  
 
                                                   
26 Participants’ question scores for individual questions in plans were non-normally distributed (as in 
experiment  1), necessitating the use of non-parametric tests. The mean question quality of a plan, 
being an average across questions selected, was normally distributed however. For this outcome and 
















. A post-hoc comparison of plan gradient (simply defined as the difference 
between question 1 and question 5) confirmed this impression: HA participants were quicker 
to move from general to specific questions in their plans than DA participants (DAM(SD) = 
0.174 (0.182), HAM(SD) = 0.292 (0.118); F (1,34) = 5.085, p = .031, etap
2
  = .130), an effect 
that was evident even when controlling for WASI performance (F (1,32) = 5.140, p = .030, 
etap
2
  = .138)
28
. Furthermore, this measure correlated strongly with mean question quality on 
the TQT itself (r = .468, n = 36, p = .004), indicating that greater plan gradient was 
associated with more efficient question use during problem-solving
29




In experiment 2, deaf adult participants appeared to ask less efficient questions than hearing 
adult participants on the Twenty Questions Task. There were no differences between the 
groups in age, years of education or game experience, suggesting that they did not play a 
significant role in explaining group differences. In contrast, there were differences in verbal 
and non-verbal IQ scores between the two groups, whether measured as T-scores or raw 
subtest scores. Using two different methods to take into account the influence of these 
factors, trends were apparent to suggest that deaf adults asked less significant questions than 
hearing counterparts with similar levels of verbal and non-verbal ability.  Nevertheless, 
group differences in this kind of problem-solving could not be clearly separated from effects 
of category knowledge (Similarities) and non-verbal reasoning (Matrix Reasoning) in this 
sample.  
Notwithstanding these caveats, the pattern of results seen here across different task measures 
is in line with previous findings. The presence of  potential group differences in questioning 
efficiency, but not other other measures (such as guessing rates)  is consistent with the 
results of the second experiment conducted by Marschark & Everhart (1999), that is, their 
follow-up experiment with deaf college students. As in that study, the deaf adults tested here 
were not more likely to require more questions on the task, but the amount of information 
they eliminated with each question was generally smaller than hearing participants. The 
present data add to this picture by suggesting that this is not just the product of gross 
                                                   
27 As table 6 shows, the p-value for question 4 was in fact 0.045, but this is only approaching 
significance once the alpha value is corrected for multiple comparisons. 
28  This difference was also evident when raw scores for Similarities and Matrix Reasoning were used 
as covariates. 
29 These correlations were also run for each group separately, yielding consistent results for both. 
115 
 
differences in general cognitive ability, but it is important to note that they do no 
demonstrate a completely independent effect of hearing status.   
There were some dissimilarities between these data and Marschark & Everhart’s that need to 
be noted. It appears that the participants in this study performed at a higher level on the task 
than the deaf college students. No differences in grouping were evident here, with both deaf 
and hearing participants using such questions about 75% of the time. In contrast, the deaf 
adults in Marschark & Everhart’s study used grouping questions only 50% of the time, 
which was significantly lower than the questioning rate observed in the hearing group. Why 
exactly this is the case is unclear without further information: as college students it is quite 
possible that Marschark’s  participants were on average younger than those tested here 
(AgeM = 26), although no specific age data were provided in the original paper. Another 
possibility is that the participants in the present study were more familiar with the game; of 
the nine participants tested here, only one described themselves as in any way unfamiliar 
with the game, whereas in Marschark & Everhart (1999) only five of the 14 deaf participants 
tested had previous game experience (compared to 12/14 hearing students).  Finally, 
Marschark’s study appeared to follow Mosher & Hornsby’s (1966) paradigm in not allowing 
elimination of items during search, whereas two of the three trials deployed here did allow 
removal of eliminated items. As such, it may be that this form of the TQT was easier for 
participants, although it is not clear why this would make them use grouping questions more.  
Before discussing some of the potential explanations of this profile, it needs to be 
acknowledged also that these data are drawn from a small sample of deaf adults. Rather than 
suggest that these data are truly representative of the wider population of deaf individuals, it 
should be treated as it was intended – as a pilot sample, where some preliminary concerns 
about Marschark & Everhart’s findings could be explored.  
   
Basic and superordinate category use in picture descriptions 
The picture description task was designed to elicit use of basic and superordinate category 
terms, and compare their use in deaf and hearing participants. Some differences were evident 
between conditions on the task: when participants were asked to provide brief descriptions 
they were more likely to use superordinate terms, and when asked to describe differences 
they used more basic terms. It is possible that the picture differences paradigm encourages a 
focus on local details, rather than more general groupings (being essentially a game of “Spot 
the Difference”). For example, on the former condition a typical response was “It’s a 
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greenhouse of some sort, there’s some fruit, and some tools, the tools are on the table”. In 
contrast, picture differences prompted descriptions like “The tomatoes are on the floor, the 
rakes are on the table, and the strawberries have moved”.   
Importantly, though, no group differences were evident on any outcome or condition of this 
task. It is possible that the task, being custom designed for the present study, was not 
sufficiently powerful to elicit differences in superordinate use between deaf and hearing 
participants and it may be that more obscure category terms (e.g. mammal) would be 
required to do so. But all of the category terms used on the picture description task, while 
common and familiar, were terms that would be required on the TQT. As such there is at 
least an ecological validity in focussing on the use of those terms specifically in picture 
descriptions. Furthermore, these descriptions did not predict performance on the TQT task to 
a significant degree. This fact, combined with the lack of group differences in basic and 
superordinate use, suggests that differences in general category use cannot explain the group 
differences observed on Twenty Questions. 
  
How similar are these data to the ASD Twenty Questions profile? 
Direct comparison of these data with those reported for ASD participants in the previous 
experiment and in prior studies is tricky because of differences in the age of participants 
tested and the use of a larger task array for deaf adult participants. As with the comparison 
with Marschark & Everhart’s participants, the deaf participants in this study appeared to use 
fewer questions overall and more grouping than ASD participants, and this could be due to 
age differences. Nevertheless there are some key similarities and differences that can be 
observed.  
The obvious similarity with the ASD profile seen previously (Alderson-Day, 2011; 
Alderson-Day & McGonigle-Chalmers, 2011) is the suggestion of reduced question quality 
in deaf participants compared to hearing participants. The presence of this, despite otherwise 
competent performance, is similar to the most able ASD participants described in the 
previous chapter, suggesting a common or analogous difficulty with selecting effective 
category questions in both groups. 
Differences between the groups were evident in the within-task variations of the TQT, and in 
the responses to plan construction. Within the task, the deaf participants differed from ASD 
participants in their responses to elimination: whereas ASD participants specifically required 
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more questions to reach the target when elimination was prohibited, deaf adult participants 
showed no specific drop in their performance (on any outcome) in relation to this change.  
On the planning task, deaf participants produced plans that narrowed items hierarchically in 
a way that was not typical of the whole ASD group. The most able ASD participants could 
produce “narrowing” plans, but the efficiency of their plans was still lower than the most 
able typically-developing controls. Deaf participants did not create less efficient plans in 
general, but the gradient of their plans was significantly different from controls. As a post-
hoc measure this should be interpreted with caution, but its relation to question quality rates 
during Twenty Questions arguably lends it a certain amount of validity: participants who 
narrowed their plans to a greater degree also performed more efficiently on the problem-
solving task.  
To a certain extent, this pattern of similarities and differences between deaf and ASD 
participants is not surprising. If differences with questioning efficiency are indicative of 
differences in concept and category processing, then this is exactly what ASD and deaf 
participants would be proposed to possibly share. In contrast, being able to handle an 
unchanging TQT array effectively, or plan a series of narrowing questions, is an executive 
capability (as argued above). Given that executive dysfunction is strongly associated with 
ASD, but not with deafness, it would be surprising if the two groups did resemble each other 
in this way as well. 
However, what is important to establish is whether this profile is similar across deaf and 
autistic participants of a similar age, on the same task. The apparent presence of this profile 
in deaf adults highlights a similarity, and serves to rule out some alternative hypotheses 
about problem-solving differences, but it does not show that the development of such skills 
is the same in both deaf and ASD individuals. It is also worth reiterating that the data here do 
not show that such differences can be clearly separated from IQ factors in the case of 
deafness. Testing this question again in a sample of deaf children would serve to clarify this 
issue further.   
In addition, it is also important to consider the next question: if deaf and ASD participants 
were to exhibit a similar profile on the TQT, specifically in the efficiency of the questions 
they select, the why does this occur? That is, what is it about the processing of semantic 




Semantic organisation in deaf individuals  
Marschark & Everhart’s (1999) original interpretation of deaf problem-solving performance 
was that it reflected how the early language experiences of deaf children may differ from 
those of hearing children. Specifically, they suggested that games like Twenty Questions 
provide “informal educational experiences” that involve learning about important social and 
cognitive rules; experiences that the deaf children of hearing parents will have less access to 
than hearing children with hearing parents (Marschark & Everhart, 1999, p. 79). In essence, 
deaf children are likely to have less experience of such language games, and this leaves them 
at a disadvantage when attempting such tasks at a later age. 
Following the study by Marschark & Everhart (1999), research conducted by McEvoy, 
Marschark & Nelson  (1999) and Marschark et al. (2004) added to this hypothesis. In 
McEvoy et al. (1999), 136 deaf undergraduate students and a corresponding group of hearing 
college students were assessed on a written semantic association task designed to examine 
the “mental lexicon” of deaf and hearing individuals. Participants were presented with lists 
of common words (e.g. AIRPLANE, CLOCK, PARROT), and next to each word asked to 
write “the first word that came to mind that was related to the printed word” (p. 314). 
Participants’ responses in each group were then assessed for their level of frequency and 
agreement, within and between deaf and hearing groups.  
The main finding of the study was that, contrary to expectation, the semantic associations of 
deaf and hearing participants were largely similar: 59 of the 79 of stimulus words used 
produced high agreement (r = >.7) between the two groups. However, there were also subtle 
differences evident between the groups. First, deaf participants were more variable in their 
responses within group: whereas hearing participants produced 13 unique association words 
on average for each stimulus, deaf participants produced 15 (a statistically significant 
difference). Second, some individual words (e.g. BARN) produced very little agreement 
between groups, when there was no prima facie reason  to believe that that should be the 
case. Finally, deaf students were also significantly more likely to leave some responses 
blank, and offer no association word. McEvoy and colleagues argued that these subtle 
differences between the groups indicate higher variability in deaf lexical knowledge and 
lower accessibility of certain semantic concepts
30
.  
                                                   
30 For earlier evidence of  semantic association differences in deaf individuals see also Green & 




The suggestion of subtle differences in the lexicons of deaf and hearing students was 
supported in a follow-up study by Marschark et al. (2004). In this study, another large 
sample of deaf college students attempted a semantic association task, but this time the 
stimulus words were deliberately varied based on their category level. Twenty words 
provided a superordinate level cue (e.g. ANIMAL) where the most common response was a 
basic level word (e.g. DOG) and twenty words provided the reverse, i.e. a basic category 
word that would be followed by a superordinate (most common responses were based on the 
USF set of norms; Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1998). The responses from deaf students 
were then compared with existing norm data from a sample of hearing students. 
As in McEvoy et al. (1999), the responses of deaf participants largely agreed with those seen 
in the hearing norms, but the level of agreement among the sample of deaf participants was 
significantly lower than in the hearing sample; that is, deaf participants were more 
heterogeneous in their responses. In addition, the contrast between superordinate and basic 
level cues revealed further anomalies. The strength of associations between basic and 
superordinate categories did not vary between deaf and hearing students, but the direction of 
the association modulated responses in deaf individuals specifically. Deaf students were 
more likely to respond to a basic exemplar with a superordinate category name than they 
were to respond to a superordinate with a basic exemplar, suggesting an asymmetry in their 
category relations that was not evident in the data from hearing students. Among the deaf 
students, those with the best reading abilities were also those whose responses resembled 
hearing students’ the closest (Marschark, et al., 2004). 
The presence of such an asymmetry, alongside relatively intact and similar lexicons to 
hearing students, could then provide a basis for the apparent problems with concept selection 
seen in deaf problem-solving. To further investigate this notion, in a second experiment 
Marschark et al. (2004) tested a subset of their deaf sample (n = 18) on a verbal analogies 
task where participants had to complete a series of category-based analogies, e.g. “mouse: 
animal; poison ivy: ?” where a suitable answer would be “plant”. The relations that the 
analogies relied on were varied to test directions of association; superordinate (animal > cat), 
co-ordinate (helicopter > plane) and subordinate (dog – Labrador) analogies were included, 





Compared to hearing participants (n = 21), deaf participants made significantly more errors 
overall, and again demonstrated differences in the association of directions:  
“hearing students solved significantly more analogies in which they had to provide 
superordinate terms (mouse : animal :: poison ivy : plant) than ones in which they had 
to provide subordinate terms (book : dictionary :: tool : screwdriver)....whereas deaf 
students solved significantly more subordinate than superordinate analogies” 
(Marschark, et al., 2004, p. 57) 
Thus, whether making semantic associations or using them in reasoning, deaf participants 
showed asymmetries in their semantic relations that were not the same as those seen in 
hearing students. The importance of the direction of asymmetry is not clear, as on the one 
hand deaf participants were more likely to respond to basic exemplars with superordinates 
than the reverse (experiment 1), but then in analogous reasoning struggled to produce 
superordinate terms (experiment 2). Nevertheless, such asymmetries imply genuine issues 
with semantic organisation rather than the strength of relations per se. If a relation was weak 
between a basic level term and its corresponding superordinate, then producing either would 
arguably be a problem. But if going in one direction of association is difficult, depending on 
the task (superordinate to basic in experiment 1, basic to superordinate in experiment 2), this 
suggests a qualitative difference in the way in which basic and superordinate concepts are 
linked; that is, a difference in semantic organisation. 
It could be that these differences underlie how accessible concepts are when they are 
required in problem-solving; how easy it is to select one category over another when 
searching the set. If so, it should be the case that levels of asymmetry are related to TQT 
performance; that is, more asymmetry – insofar as it can be taken as an indicator of semantic 
organisation – should be associated with greater inefficiency in problem-solving. If this 
association can be demonstrated, then this would support the strong form of argument 
outlined above: similarities in deaf and autistic problem-solving arise out of atypical early 




Chapter 5:Problem-solving  in deaf children 
 
The aim of the following experiment was two-fold. First, TQT problem-solving in a sample 
of deaf children was investigated, to assess whether they show the same problems with 
question quality as seen in a) deaf adults and b) children with autism spectrum disorder. 
Second, the relation between semantic organisation and TQT performance was investigated, 
to establish whether measures of semantic association could explain possible inefficiencies 
in problem-solving for deaf participants. 
To attempt the latter analysis, a semantic decision task was devised. In McEvoy et al. (1999) 
and Marschark et al. (2004) the method of measuring semantic associations was based on 
written responses from participants and level of agreement across individuals. For example, 
a response of DOG would receive a score based on how many individuals in that group 
responded with DOG, and how that compares to the number of overall responses. 
There are two problems with this sort of procedure. The first is practical: whereas the college 
students who took part in the above studies would be expected to have writing skills that are 
sufficient to attempt the task, it may be trickier for younger deaf children, who often still 
have problems with their written language as a consequence of language delay (Antia, Reed, 
& Kreimeyer, 2005). As such, a paradigm that did not require written language responses is 
preferable for studying semantic associations in this group. 
The second issue is that this method arguably does not provide a direct metric of an 
individual’s semantic associations. In scoring participants’ responses based on their 
frequency across a group, the measures deployed by Marschark and colleagues only really 
reflect group agreement, or how typical an individual is of his or her group. What they do not 
do is provide a measure of how strong any given semantic relation is for any given 
individual.  
For example, if 10 out of 12 participants in a group produced DOG in response to ANIMAL, 
still unknown is the strength of relation between category (ANIMAL) and exemplar (DOG) 
for each of those participants. Within the 10 who provided that response, the strength of their 
ANIMAL>DOG associations may still vary considerably. Providing a sensitive measure of 
such relations, within each participant, is important because it allows for more accurate 
assessment of how semantic decision performance relates to performance on other tasks. 
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One way of achieving this it to measure reaction times. A number of classic models of 
semantic memory, such as Collins and Loftus’ (1975) spreading activation model, use 
reaction times on semantic tasks to indicate the strength and nature of relations between 
categories and exemplars. In such models, conceptual knowledge is typically organised as a 
series of nodes that are linked to one another based on their conceptual relations. Activation 
of a specific concept node, such as CAR, will raise the activation level of other nodes that 
are closely linked to it, either via subordinate relations (different types of car), co-ordinate 
relations to similar exemplars of the same category (BUS or CART) or superordinate 
relations (VEHICLE or TRANSPORT). The strength of links between nodes is determined 
by the frequency and use of the particular relation, such that the most common associations 
will have the strongest links in the network (such as CAR and VEHICLE) and prompt the 
fastest reaction times. The activation of a basic concepts will “prime” their common 
superordinates, and vice versa (Collins & Loftus, 1975).  
The data from Marschark and colleagues’ research pointed to asymmetries in written word 
associations for deaf students when prompted by basic or superordinate categories – 
asymmetries that were not seen in norms based on hearing populations (Marschark et al., 
2004). For reaction times, asymmetries are in fact often seen in hearing participants for the 
naming of pictures, with superordinate terms prompting longer responses than basic terms 
(Jolicoeur, Gluck, & Kosslyn, 1984; Tanaka & Taylor, 1991). This is thought to reflect the 
perceptual and conceptual primacy of basic category terms – showing a picture of a dog will 
prompt the basic category of DOG before it prompts the more general superordinate category 
of ANIMAL. 
On semantic decision tasks, however, the mutual priming of basic and superordinate terms 
can produce fairly equal reaction times, provided that there is a sufficiently frequent level of 
association. For example, Loftus (1973) compared reaction times on a categorisation task 
where participants were primed with either a  superordinate category word or a basic 
exemplar. The categories and exemplars used were varied in terms of how strongly they 
evoked one another: some were associated with a high-frequency (e.g. tree-oak), some with a 
low frequency (e.g. cloth-orlon) while others only offered a frequent association in one 
direction. For instance, in the pair “butterfly-insect”, the exemplar prompted the category 
with  high-frequency (butterfly>insect), but the category term evoked the exemplar with a 
low frequency (insect>butterfly). Loftus observed that reaction times to category and 
exemplar primes varied according to frequency of association: for both kinds of primes the 
fastest responses were for high-frequency pairs of words. Following this, reaction times were 
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fastest if the prime (category or exemplar) prompted a high-frequency association; that is, 
butterfly prompted a fast response to insect, but not vice versa. This suggested that the 
strength of association, rather than the category level of the prime, largely determined the 
speed of response (Loftus, 1973) 
It should be possible, then, to use common or high-frequency pairs of basic and 
superordinate terms to examine the nature and direction of semantic relations,  via 
measurement of differences in reaction times. To attempt this, a reaction time paradigm was 
devised following a method used by Gaffrey et al. (2007) to study semantic abilities in ASD 
individuals. The task displayed basic and superordinate category words consecutively, and 
participants were asked to indicate which “go together”. In one condition, participants were 
required to respond to items that went with a superordinate category term, e.g. “Does it go 
with ANIMAL?” followed by “DOG” (yes), “CAR”  (no), and so on. In the other condition, 
the direction of the association was reversed, such that superordinate terms followed a basic 
category, e.g., “Does it go with DOG?” followed by “ANIMAL” (yes), “FRUIT” (no), 
“TRANSPORT” (no), “PET” (yes), and so on. Reaction times for accurate responses in each 
of the conditions were then compared, controlling for word length and word frequency.  
Because high frequency pairings were used, it was assumed that typical reaction times for 
either direction of association should be reasonably equal
31
. If the directions of semantic 
relations are asymmetrical in deaf participants, then it would be expected that reaction times 
in the two conditions would significantly differ (although without a direct contrast to a 
hearing control group, this would not demonstrate atypicality per se).  More important than 
such a difference, though, is the relation that any such difference would have with TQT 
performance. If semantic organisation underpins problem-solving inefficiencies, then the 
amount of asymmetry between different directions of association should correlate with task 
measures on the TQT. 
A further point to note is that the word association data from Marschark and colleagues did 
not clearly predict a direction of asymmetry. As explained above, the deaf students in 
Marschark et al. (2004)  were more likely to respond to a basic exemplar with a 
superordinate category than the reverse case.  That is, they may readily supply ANIMAL 
when prompted with DOG, but not respond as readily with DOG when prompted with 
ANIMAL. If this is true for individual category relations, measured with reaction times, then 
                                                   
31 This was supported in a pilot of the task with a small group of hearing adults (n = 5). No significant 
differences in reaction times for basic-to-superordinate and superordinate-to-basic semantic decisions 
were observed (p = .503). Full details of this analysis can be found in Appendix 2. 
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responses to the former condition, “DOES IT GO WITH (superordinate)?”, should be slower 
than responses in the latter condition, “DOES IT GO WITH (basic)?”.      
However, the responses on the verbal analogies task deployed by Marschark et al. (2004) 
suggested that deaf participants also struggled to provide superordinate responses when 
prompted with a basic category, e.g. “hammer > tool; dog >.......?”.  Furthermore, in Twenty 
Questions the player is faced with basic exemplars, not superordinates – the challenge is to 
select the appropriate superordinate to use in a question. As such, the opposite direction of 
asymmetry, moving from basic to superordinate, may be expected to be more important in 
reasoning and problem-solving. 
For these reasons, it was hypothesised that deaf participants would  show an asymmetry in 
their reaction times to the two conditions, and that this would predict efficiency performance 
on the TQT. The specific direction of the asymmetry was not hypothesised, however, as 
there was no strong case to argue that either direction was more significant than the other. 
Instead, the presence of any asymmetry was taken as an indicator of  the nature of semantic 
organisation in this group.  
 
Experiment 3: Twenty Questions and Semantic Decision performance in children who 




For this experiment 16 deaf children aged 11-16  (AgeM = 13:8) were initially recruited from 
specialist schools and language units for deaf schoolchildren based in North Yorkshire (n = 
4), Edinburgh and the  Lothians (n = 6) and Bristol (n = 6) . All children (11 M: 5 F)  
recruited were moderately to profoundly deaf and had been since before the age of 5 years. 
As in the wider population, the causes of deafness and presence of additional support needs 
varied considerably in this group, particularly in relation to language skills (see Appendix 1  
for a breakdown of individual profiles). To allow for valid comparisons with the ASD 
profile, no deaf children with a diagnosis of autism or severe learning disability were 
included. To maximise the number of possible participants, the presence of other additional 
difficulties was not in the first instance used to exclude participants. However, in the course 
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of testing three participants were excluded as they were unable to complete the 
Similarities/VIQ test, because of its language demands. This resulted in a group of 13 
participants being used in the study (10M:3F; AgeM = 14:5, range = 13-16). Those with other 
additional diagnoses in the resulting group were marked for supplementary analysis, just in 
case their task profile differed.   
Table 7 displays age and IQ information for the group of deaf children (DC). Compared to 
the participants in experiment 1, this group ended up being significantly older than hearing, 
typically-developing participants, but not ASD participants (DC>HC, t (32) = 2.158, p = 
.039, all other age comparisons n.s.).  
Although not significant, differences approaching significance were also apparent in NVIQ 
and VIQ scores for deaf and hearing participants, with the DC group generally matching the 
lower half of the TD and ASD groups (DC<HC, NVIQ:  t (32) = 1.874, p = .070; VIQ: t (32) 
= 1.896, p = .067)
32
. No pairwise differences were evident in verbal or non-verbal mental age 
(DC: VMAM(SD) = 12.04(4.72),  NVMAM(SD) = 10.68 (2.52); HC: VMAM(SD) = 15.03 (7.44), 
NVMAM(SD) = 11.75 (3.29); ASD: VMAM(SD) = 14.11 (6.40),  NVMAM(SD) = 12.66 (4.60); all 
p > .10).   
A variety of communication methods were preferred by participants: seven used speech, 
while six used some form of sign (either BSL or Signed Supported English). This mixture of 
preferred communication methods (as opposed to the mostly BSL group of adults 
participants in experiment 2) is common among deaf children and young people. When 
asked, all of the participants said that they were familiar with the game, either through 
playing the game before or seeing someone else play it. 
 
Design 
A mixed design was used, consisting of  
a) a between-groups analysis comparing problem-solving performance in deaf children (DC) 
and existing data for hearing, typically-developing children (HC) and autism spectrum 
disorder children (ASD) acquired in experiment 1, and  
                                                   
32 To allow with comparison with the data from experiment 1, the WASI scores for deaf participants 
were converted into their VIQ/NVIQ equivalents. As in the previous experiment, however, these are 















Table 7. Age and IQ scores for deaf children (experiment 3), compared to autism spectrum 
disorder and hearing, typically-developing children (experiment 1, shown in grey). 
 
DC (n=13) HC (n=21) ASD (n=22) 
  M SD M SD M SD Sig. 
Age 14.40 1.07 13.40 1.44 13.69 1.45 DC>HC* 
VIQ estimate 84.00 13.03 96.29 20.92 95.55 22.23 n.s. 
NVIQ estimate 84.69 17.71 98.29 22.08 94.23 19.50 n.s. 
* p < .05. DC= deaf children, HC = hearing children, ASD = autism spectrum disorder children.
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b) a within-groups, repeated measures analysis of deaf children’s performance on the 
semantic decision task. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
- Twenty Questions Task, Question Discrimination & Plan Construction 
As in the above studies, all participants attempted a battery of tasks centring on the TQT. 
Participants began by completing three trials of the TQT on a 24-item board, followed by the 
question discrimination (QD) and plan construction (PC) tasks from experiment 1. The 
question discrimination task was used here (but not in experiment 2) because it was 
important to check the level of understanding that this younger group of participants had.  
Because both of the planning tasks require vocabulary knowledge and reading ability for a 
range of category words, the 32 question words were displayed prior to starting the task and 
participants were asked to a) read them to a teaching assistant/ interpreter and b) indicate if 
they were unsure as to the meaning of any words. If there were words that had not been seen 
before or were not understood, they were explained by the experimenter.  
In addition to the above tasks, participants completed the Matrix Reasoning and Similarities 
subtests  of the WASI, and a new measure of semantic decision.  
 
- Semantic Decision Task 
The new task was a reaction time-based measure divided into three conditions:  
1) word recognition 
2) superordinate>basic decisions, and  
3) basic>superordinate decisions.  
The basic format of the task consisted of a series of words presented on a computer screen, 
to which participants were required to respond YES or NO (as indicated via a button press 
on a laptop keyboard). In the first condition, this simply consisted of responding YES when 
specific words were shown (such as LOOT) and NO if a different word was observed. In 
conditions 2 and 3, participants responded with YES or NO depending on whether the 
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presented word was associated with a designated category. Each condition consisted of 30 
trials divided into three blocks of 10. The order of conditions 2 and 3 were counterbalanced 
across participants. All stimuli were presented in E-Prime (Schneider, Eschman, & 
Zuccolotto, 2002).  
Condition 1. The aim of the word recognition condition was to establish a baseline for 
response times to words of differing length and complexity. Participants were required to 
recognise words of four, six and eight letters across three consecutive trial blocks. In the first 
trial block the target was LOOT, with other 4-letter words with similar letters being used as 
non-targets (LOTS, LOST, etc). This was followed by similar trial blocks with CAMERA (6 
letters) and BATHROOM (8 letters). Feedback on participants’ responses was provided on 
each trial with either a screen displaying either “Correct!” or “Incorrect”. Performance was 
measured via accuracy of responses and reaction times for each word presentation. The first 
set of trials (LOOT) was designated as a practice round, to ensure that participants were 
acquainted with the controls. 
Condition 2.The second condition examined superordinate>basic category associations. 
Instead of indicating the presence of words, participants were asked “which words go 
together” for a superordinate term (TRANSPORT, ANIMAL, TOOL) followed by basic 
exemplars (e.g. CAR, DOG, HAMMER; see figure 19). In the first trial block, participants 
were asked “Does it go with TRANSPORT?” and then shown ten words containing 
exemplars and non-exemplars in a random order (e.g. CAR, DOG, BUS, TRAIN, TREE, 
SOFA, PLANE,TRUCK, FORK, ORANGE ). Each time, participants were required to 
indicate YES or NO to indicate category membership. This was followed by the feedback 
screen (correct or incorrect), a reminder screen displaying the name of the category again 
“TRANSPORT?”, and then the next exemplar. Trial blocks followed with the superordinates 
ANIMAL and TOOL.  
Condition 3. In the final condition the order of associations was reversed, so that participants 
would first be primed with a basic-level exemplar and required to respond to superordinate 
categories.  For example, in the first trial block they were asked “Does it go with APPLE?” 
and then shown a series of words including superordinates such as FOOD, FRUIT, PLANT, 
ANIMAL, MAMMAL, PET, CUTLERY, TOOL, and so on. This was followed by similar 












Figure 19. Example of presentation order for condition 2 of the Semantic Decision Task 
(superordinate>basic). The first screen (1) displayed the category for the trial block. This was 
followed by the first exemplar (2), to which participants responded “yes” or “no”, and then a feedback 




Scoring & Analysis 
Measurement of performance on the TQT, QD and PC tasks was identical to the deployment 
of these tasks in the studies presented earlier. Efficiency (question quality, questions used per 
trial) and question types (grouping, guessing) were measured on the TQT; total correct 
answers were noted for the QD task, and the expected question quality scores for the five- 
question plans were recorded for the plan construction task. Univariate ANCOVAs were 
used to compare the three groups,  with the inclusion of age and IQ estimates as covariates.  
Because comparisons between ASD and TD participants had already been conducted (in 
experiment 1), only those pairwise contrasts involving deaf participants were focussed on. 
As such, for the main TQT outcomes (especially question quality), the pairwise contrasts 
presented here are not corrected for multiple comparisons. However, for tasks involving 
multiple data points - such as the plan construction task - correction via techniques such as 
the Bonferroni method was still deemed necessary.    
For the semantic decision task, though accuracy scores were recorded, the primary outcome 
measure across all three conditions was reaction time for accurate responses. Reaction times 
for inaccurate responses were not used as they may simply reflect a lack of knowledge about 
a category term, rather than a weaker association between a category and an exemplar. To 
address outliers, responses in the bottom and top 5% of distributions were trimmed for each 
individual within each condition. Then, parametric statistics (univariate analyses of variance) 
were run comparing the reaction times in the three conditions after a log10 transform 
(conducted to normalise the response distribution). For ease of interpretation, raw scores for 
reaction time are presented in the results section. 
Comparing inter-task correlations (SDT – TQT performance) on a group level, a standard 
practice would be to use medians as a measure of central tendency for each individual’s RTs. 
However, as medians can be unreliable indicators of reaction time if the number of trials 
differs across conditions (Miller, 1988), trimmed means were used as an indicator of each 
individual’s average reaction time. The differences between participants’ mean reaction 
times for conditions 2 and 3 were then used as an index of any asymmetry in their category 







Twenty Questions Task 
All participants managed to attempt three trials of the Twenty Questions Task and all 
successfully completed at least one trial (i.e. identified the target in ten questions or less). 
Within the DC group, no significant changes were observed for any of the main task 
outcomes across the three trials (all p > .250, all eta
2
p <.1), suggesting that performance was 
relatively stable in the group. Therefore, analysis proceeded by just examining the mean 
TQT scores for deaf participants, averaged across the three trials.   
Table 8 shows the mean values for question quality (QQ), questions used per trial (QT), 
grouping and guessing for the DC group, as compared to the data from experiment 1. Like 
ASD participants, the questions that DC participants asked were on average lower in 
question quality, less likely to be grouping questions and more likely to be guesses than for 
hearing participants. As in the previous experiment, covariate analysis and subgroup 
matching were used to address the contribution of existing group differences.  
First, a univariate analysis of covariance (containing age VIQ and NVIQ estimates as 
covariates) was used to compare mean question quality in the three groups
 33
. This analysis 
produced a significant main effect of group (F (2,50) = 7.592, p = .001,  eta
2
p =  .233), 
alongside significant contributions of age (F (1,50) = 4.727, p = .034,  eta
2
p =  .086) and VIQ 
(F (1,50) = 5.559, p = .022,  eta
2
p =  .100) and an effect approaching significance for NVIQ 
(F (1,50) = 3.840, p = .056,  eta
2
p =  .071). Pairwise comparisons indicated that the DC group 
were significantly less efficient in their questioning than HC participants (p = .048), but not 
ASD participants (p = .244, uncorrected)
34
.   
Analysis of the mean number of questions used per trial (QT) revealed a main effect of 
group (F (2,45) = 6.708, p =.003,  eta
2
p =  .212). However, pairwise comparisons on this 
variable indicated that this mainly reflected the performance of ASD participants, who took 
more questions on average  than DC (p = .005) and HC participants (p = .003). A Kruskal-
Wallis test comparing mean rates of grouping questions also indicated a significant group 
                                                   
33 This analysis was run based on the mean QQ scores from each experiment. This, however, 
represents differing numbers of trials, due to the extended nature of the TQT paradigm in experiment 
1. To check the effect of this, the analysis was run with baseline QQ scores from the prior study 
instead: this reveals very similar results, suggesting that any apparent group differences were not just a 
function of the number of trials tested.  
34 This analysis was also run using VMA and NVMA as alternative covariates. This yielded largely 
similar results (group effect: F (2,50) = 8.724, p = .001,  eta2p =  .259) although the pairwise contrast 










Table 8. Twenty Questions and Planning Performance in in deaf, ASD and HC children. 
 
 DC HC ASD 
  M SD M SD M SD Sig. 









QQ 0.26 0.10 0.33 0.05 0.24 0.11 HC>DC,ASD* 
QT 5.45 1.44 5.36 0.72 6.34 1.19 HC,DC<ASD* 
Grouping (mean %) 48.84 24.73 66.73 8.36 45.69 24.25 HC>DC,ASD* 
Guessing (mean %) 32.71 33.93 13.54 7.64 30.55 33.75 n.s. 




QD 6.69 1.55 7.43 1.78 7.27 1.61 n.s. 











QQ1 0.33 0.19 0.33 0.16 0.24 0.18 HC>ASD* 
QQ2 0.21 0.16 0.26 0.16 0.18 0.11 HC>DC* 
QQ3 0.17 0.14 0.26 0.12 0.18 0.14 HC>DC*, HC>ASD* 
QQ4 0.13 0.08 0.19 0.10 0.18 0.12 HC>DC* 
QQ5 0.14 0.09 0.20 0.15 0.18 0.10  
Mean QQ 0.20 0.06 0.25 0.05 0.19 0.70 HC>ASD* 




* p <.05    † (DC n=12)  
DC = deaf children, HC = hearing children, ASD = autism spectrum disorder, TQT = Twenty 
Questions Task, QQ = question quality, QT = questions per trial, QD = question discrimination, PC = 





(2)=  12.438,  p = .002), which non-parametric pairwise comparisons 
indicated to be based in the higher rates of grouping used by HC participants (HC>DC: U = 
67.50, N = 34, p = .013; HC>ASD: U = 92.50, N = 34, p = .001). In contrast, no significant 
group difference was evident on the Kruskal-Wallis test for rates of guessing (X
2 
(2)=  1.878,  
p = .391).  
Following this, the DC group was compared to IQ-matched subgroups of HC and ASD 
children, representing the bottom 13 participants for VIQ (HC-13 VIQM(SD) = 83.00 (11.75); 
ASD-13 VIQM(SD) = 80.23 (10.39), all DC/HC/ASD pairwise comparisons p >.420). Along 
with matching for VIQ, the groups did not significantly differ for NVIQ (HC-13 NVIQM(SD) = 
88.92 (21.83); ASD-13 VIQM(SD) = 81.92 (14.83), all pairwise comparisons p >.337)
35
. 
Differences in age were evident between deaf and hearing participants (HC-13 Age M(SD) = 
13:7 (0:11), t(24) = 1.856, p = .076, DC>HC) albeit at a level approaching significance. The 
ASD subgroup did not differ from either of the other groups in terms of age (ASD-13 Age 
M(SD) = 13:9 (0:9), all pairwise comparisons p >.110). 
Because of potential age influences, an ANCOVA was again deployed in the comparison of 
mean question quality across the three groups, including age as a covariate. However, age 
was observed to make a negligible contribution to this comparison (F(1,35) = 0.076, p = 
.784, eta
2
p =  .002). A group main effect was observed (F(2,35) = 5.478, p = .009, eta
2
p =  
.238), which pairwise comparisons indicated to reflect ASD<HC differences (p = .002) and a 
trend towards a difference between DC and HC participants (p = .093). As in the whole-
group comparison, the subgroup of HC participants (QQ M(SD) = 0.316 (0.042)) asked 
questions that eliminated more alternatives than ASD participants  (QQ M(SD) = 0.199 (0.107)) 
and DC participants (QQ M(SD) = 0.255 (0.103), as above)
36
. Thus, whether accounting for 
VIQ and NVIQ influences via ANCOVA, or matching subgroups on IQ abilities, a mean 





                                                   
35 The subgroups also showed similar levels of VMA (DC VMA M(SD) = 12.04 (4.72), HC-13 
VMAM(SD) = 11.92 (5.64); ASD-13 VMAM(SD) = 10.20 (1.29), all pairwise comparisons p >.10) and 
NVMA (DC NVMA M(SD) = 10.68 (2.52), HC-13 NVMAM(SD) = 10.43 (3.08); ASD-13 NVMAM(SD) = 
10.10 (2.38), all p> .10). 
36 Given the lack of a significant age effect, either planned comparisons in ANOVA or simple t-tests 
would also have been valid in comparing the DC and HC-13 data. On an unpaired t-test, the groups 




Although the mean score for question discrimination was slightly lower in the DC group (see 
table 8), an ANCOVA including age, VIQ and NVIQ indicated no significant group 
differences on the task (group effect F(2,50) = 0.551, p = .580, eta
2
p  = .022, all pairwise 
comparisons p > .300). Covariate contributions, though generally greater than that of group, 
were also non-significant. (The highest contribution was age: F(1,50) = 1.676, p = .201, eta
2
p  
= .032). This suggested that the groups were comparable for their ability to discriminate less 
and more effective questions.   
 
Plan Construction 
One of the DC participants could not complete the PC task because of problems with reading 
the question cards; this left a group of 12 deaf participants with complete data on this 
measure. (Plan Construction is the only task where a large number of words are presented 
simultaneously to participants). In experiment 1, ASD participants were less likely to select 
plans that narrowed down possibilities, whereas the questions selected by hearing, typically-
developing participants gradually narrowed in expected question quality. Using the same 
method as in that analysis, DC participants did not show a significant change across their 




= 6.996, N = 12, p = .136).  
However, this could have been attributable to a lack of power, as the deaf group was smaller 
than the two other groups. As only one question (Q3) actually failed the Shapiro-Wilk test 
for normality of data in the deaf group, a repeated measures ANOVA was also run to assess 
change in QQ across their plans. This revealed a significant linear trend (F (1,11) = 13.100, p 
= .004, eta
2
p = .544) with questions at the start of plans eliminating a greater number of items 
than questions towards the end of plans (see table 8). This suggested that DC participants did 
not in general have a difficulty with constructing a plan that narrowed possibilities. 
Group differences in the efficiency of plans was assessed across the average of five 
questions (parametrically) and between individual questions (non-parametrically). Analysis 
of covariance (including age, VIQ and NVIQ) indicated a significant group main effect for 
mean question quality across the plan (F (2,49) = 5.902, p = .005, eta
2
p = .194). Pairwise 
comparisons showed that this group difference again reflected greater efficiency in the HC 










Figure 20. Mean efficiency of plans constructed by deaf , ASD and HC participants. DC = deaf 
children, ASD = autism spectrum disorder children, HC = hearing, typically-developing children. 
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table 8 for group means)
37
. Pairwise comparisons for individual questions in the plan 
indicated no differences between deaf and ASD participants (all p > .120), but greater 
efficiency for questions 2,3 and 4 in the plans of HC participants (p-range = .004-.047, 
Mann-Whitney tests used). It should be noted, however, that only one of these comparisons 
(question 3) would survive a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons.  
As in experiment 2, plan gradient was also calculated, but this time no significant difference 





. As figure 20 displays, this suggested that the plans of DC participants were 
similar to their HC counterparts in a) the presence of narrowing and b) the gradients of their 
plans, but dissimilar in their overall efficiency. 
 
Semantic Decision Task 
The 13 DC participants who completed the TQT and IQ procedures also completed the 
semantic decision task. Accuracy rates were high across the three conditions. On average, 
participants were slightly less accurate in the third condition (basic>super, median = 25/30) 
than for condition 1 (word identification, median = 27/30) or condition 2 (super>basic 
median = 28/30), but the application of a Friedman’s ANOVA to accuracy rates indicated no 
significant differences between the conditions (X
2
(2) = 4.571, N = 13, p = .098, n.s.). Thus, 
despite a slight advantage in condition 2, accuracy rates were largely comparable throughout 
the task.   
Analysis of reaction times in the three conditions was first conducted across all participants 
combined, to assess for any asymmetry in the association of basic and superordinate terms, 
and whether this was still evident when accounting for other factors, such as condition order, 
word length or word frequency. Second, mean scores on each condition and the differences 
between them were assessed for their relation to performance on the TQT.  Only correct 
responses were used in the RT analysis. 
                                                   
37 Although not fully reported here for parsimony, analysis of this variable using the same matched 
subgroups as the preceding TQT analysis yielded similar results: HC-13 participants constructed more 
efficient plans than DC participants (p = .052) and ASD participants (p = .047). Similarly, the analysis 
was run using VMA and NVMA as alternative covariates, producing almost identical results. 
38 The effect size here was suggestive of an underlying group difference in the gradients of plans 
selected: pairwise comparisons indicated steeper gradients in deaf participants compared to ASD 
participants, although only at a level approaching significance (p = .062). 
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As figure 21 shows, reaction times tended to be shortest for identification of words 
(condition 1) and longest for the identification of superordinates from a basic prompt 
(condition 3). A 3 (condition) x 13 (participant) multiple ANOVA was conducted on the log-
transformed reaction times for each trial attempted 
39
. (Participants were included as a 
separate factor to test for any differences or interactions in responses for particular children) 
A significant main effect of condition was evident (F (2,830) = 120.318, p < .001, etap
2
 = 
.225): RTs were on average lowest in the first condition (M(SD)  = 715.96ms (334.71ms)) 
followed by responses in conditions 2  (M(SD)  = 890.14ms (400.86ms)) and 3 (M(SD)  = 
1041.64ms (585.16ms); all pairwise comparisons p <.001).   
However, significant effects of participant (F (12,830) = 66.592, p < .001, etap
2
 = .491) and 
an interaction between conditions and participants (F (24,830) = 5.522, p < .001, etap
2
 = 
.138) were also observed, reflecting variation within the group. When the data were analysed 
on an individual basis, six out of 13 participants showed evidence of consistent differences 
between conditions 2 and 3 (RT2<RT3; p-value range = .0001-.054, etap
2
range =.077- .239). 
As these were always in the direction of condition 3 reaction times being longer (and not the 
reverse), this suggested a specific slowing of responses for basic-to-superordinate category 
decisions, albeit one that was not consistently evident across participants.  
One possible confound was the order in which conditions 2 and 3 were attempted. To control 
for this, the order of conditions had been counterbalanced during testing, with 7/13 
participants attempting condition 2 then 3, and the other six the reverse. However, inclusion 
of condition order as a term in an ANOVA comparing RTs for conditions 2 and 3 did not 
reveal a significant effect (F (1,635) = 1.473, p =.225, etap
2
 = .002), suggesting that the order 
in which participants completed the task did not influence their reaction times.  
Other potentially confounding factors were word length and word frequency . The average 
word length differed in the two conditions, with longer words (i.e. superordinates) appearing 
in condition 3 more often (No. of letters, C2: M (SD) = 4.80 (1.61); C3 M (SD) = 6.17 
(1.86); t (58) = -3.048 , p =.003). When word length was included as a covariate in analysis 
of the response times no significant contribution was observed  (F(1, 634) = 2.702, p = .101,  
  
                                                   
39 A standard ANOVA was chosen over a repeated measures ANOVA because of the unequal 









Figure 21. Mean reaction times across conditions for the Semantic Decision Task. 1 = Word 






 = .004), suggesting that length did not explain any of the variance accounted for by the 




. Word frequency rates 
did not differ between the conditions (C2: M (SD) = 58.33 (68.25); C3 M (SD) = 55.50 
(54.72); t (58) = 0.177 , p =.860, n.s.), but an ANCOVA was run anyway to check for any 
possible influence of frequency on RT rates. As with word length, no significant contribution 
of frequency was observed (F(1, 634) = 1.207, p = .272, etap
2
 = .002) , suggesting that it 
could not explain the difference in RTs between conditions 2 and 3. 
 
- Relations to TQT performance 
To compare with performance on the Twenty Questions Task, semantic difference scores 
were calculated for each participant by subtracting the mean reaction time for condition 2 
from condition 3. These scores were then included in individual regression models for each 
of the TQT performance outcomes: question quality, questions taken, use of grouping and 
use of guessing. Age, VIQ and NVIQ scores were also included in each of the models to 
control for their influence. 
 
Semantic difference scores were not found to significantly predict question quality (stan. 
beta = .014, p = .960). For the prediction of QQ a model was retained that only included 
NVIQ (R
2 
= .429, F(1,11) = 8.267, stan. beta = .655, p = .015), with greater non-verbal IQ 
being associated with greater question quality. No significant associations were observed for 
age or VIQ (stan. beta range = .177-.381, p-value range= .138-.539). 
 
In contrast, an association was observed between semantic difference scores and the mean 
number of questions used per trial (QT; see figure 22). For predicting QT only semantic 
difference score was retained in the model (R
2 
= .584, F(2,10) = 7.014, stan. beta = .601, p = 
.012), with greater difference scores being associated with taking more questions to find the 
target (see figure 22). That is, participants with a greater difference between conditions 2 and 
3 also had to take more questions to find the target on the TQT.  NVIQ was also retained in 
                                                   
40 Correlational analysis did in fact show a small but significant relation between reaction times and 
word lengths (as might be expected), but this was insufficient to explain the difference between 
conditions (r = .097, N = 639, p = .014). 
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To explore this association further, the predictive power of semantic difference scores was 
compared with mean reaction times in each of the task conditions. None of the individual 
conditions showed a greater association with questions used on the TQT than the 
discrepancy between conditions (stan. beta range = .148- .200, p-value range= .533-.545). 
This supported the significance of differences in reaction time between different semantic 
conditions, rather than speed of response in any particular condition. That is, problem-
solving was specifically associated with the level of asymmetry or inequality in responses for 
basic-to-superordinate and superordinate-to-basic decisions. 
 
In models for grouping and guessing rates, only VIQ was retained as a significant predictor 
(grouping model: R
2 
= .358, F(1,11) = 6.131, VIQ stan. beta = .598, p = .031; guessing 
model: R
2 
= .487, F(1,11) = 10.443, VIQ stan. beta = -.232, p = .008). Higher VIQ was 
associated with increased rates of grouping and decreased rates of guessing: no other 
predictors were significant (all p-values >.120). 
 
Post-hoc analysis: handling heterogeneity 
In order to check for the influence of additional support needs or diagnoses that could have 
affected TQT performance, a “leave one out” procedure was followed where individual DC 
participants were excluded from the analysis one at a time. This included one participant 
with CHARGE syndrome, one with ADHD and one with possible hyperactivity problems 
who scored very low on mean QQ (0.05). Despite the loss of power associated with reducing 
the sample size in this way, comparisons between DC and HC participants were still evident 
either significantly or at a level approaching significance (deaf mean QQ range = 0.253-
0.272; p-value range = .043-.061, d- range = 0.65-0.77). Thus, despite the presence of such 
diagnoses, it did not appear to be the case that specific participants were disproportionately 
affecting the overall group results. 
 
Assessment of other ways in which DC participants differed was hampered by the small 
numbers involved, but some descriptive analysis was possible. As figure 23 shows, DC 
participants who used speech appeared to score higher for mean QQ than users of BSL or  
                                                   
41 Because of skew in the TQT outcome variable, this analysis was also run using a log10 transform of 
the number of questions taken. This, however, produced identical results, so for clarity only the model 





Figure 22. The relationship between differences in reaction time on the Semantic Decision task 
and the number of question used per trial on the Twenty Questions Task (TQT). The level of 
asymmetry between different directions of category judgement predicted efficient question use on 
during problem-solving.   
 
Figure 23. Mean question quality in deaf children with different preferred modes of 
communication. BSL = British Sign Language, SSE = Sign-Supported English. 
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SSE. However, this should be interpreted with caution, as these groups also differed 
considerably in mean IQ scores (Sims/VIQ: SpeechM = 92.85, BSLM  = 73.67; MR/NVIQ: 
SpeechM = 93.57, BSLM  = 74.33).  
 
Eight of the DC participants had at least one cochlear implant, compared to five who either 
used hearing aids or nothing at all. Those who had an implant on average scored lower on 
QQ (CochlearM = 0.23; No implant M = 0.29) but were also more variable in their scores 
(CochlearSD = 0.12; No implantSD  = 0.07). As such, it is not clear that there were any 




The main finding of experiment 3 was that deaf children also exhibit inefficiency in their 
problem-solving on the TQT. Like ASD participants, deaf participants appeared to be less 
efficient in the questions that they ask on the Twenty Questions Task, and the types of 
questions that they asked were different from hearing, typically-developing participants. 
Specifically, deaf participants scored low on question quality (like ASD participants) and 
were less likely to use grouping questions. This effect, evident when accounting as much as 
possible for influences of age, verbal and non-verbal IQ, is the first direct demonstration of 
similarities in the problem-solving profile of deaf and ASD children. 
In addition, exploration of semantic decision skills in deaf children highlighted a potential 
mechanism underlying problem-solving differences. Namely, deaf children, on average, took 
longer to make judgements about superordinates following a basic category cue, than when 
doing the reverse (i.e. judging which basic exemplars fit a superordinate cue). This 
asymmetry within their own category associations was related to the number of questions 
deaf participants used on the TQT, independent of age and IQ abilities.  
 
Caveats and limitations 
Before discussing how exactly the TQT and SDT data fit together, some limitations of the 
present experiment must be acknowledged. First, as in experiment 2, what conclusions can 
be drawn from these data are limited by the size of the target group. The initial recruitment 
of 16 participants, over a period of 12 months, represented the combined efforts of contact 
with three specialist deaf schools (in Bristol, North Yorkshire and the Lothians) and one 
mainstream Edinburgh school with a dedicated language unit. A number of other schools 
(special and mainstream) and deaf charities (Deaf Action and the National Deaf Children’s 
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Society) were also contacted, including over 20 of the secondary schools in the Edinburgh 
area. Among those families that were approached (once exclusion criteria were taken into 
account), roughly 50% of parents consented to their children participating. It is not 
immediately clear why recruitment was so difficult. In the case of less able children, very 
often the presence of significant additional needs precluded their recruitment. In contrast, it 
is the impression of the author that the families of more able children, including those in 
mainstream education, seemed in general to have less engagement and possibly less interest 
in deaf research (certainly compared to the families of children with autism).  
 
A second, related limitation is the heterogeneity present in the sample of deaf children seen. 
Although heterogeneity is the norm for samples of deaf participants, the presence of such a 
mixture of children obviously makes drawing  reliable, group-level conclusions much more 
challenging. It is important to acknowledge that the individuals seen in this group differed in 
their preferred methods of communication, their use of hearing devices and the presence of 
additional difficulties.  
 
In terms of communication, those who used speech appeared to perform better on the TQT 
than those who signed. This is consistent with the contrast in performance between signing 
children in Marschark & Everhart (1999) and speaking children in Remine et al. (2008),  but 
the difference observed here cannot be clearly separated from differences in IQ between 
participants. There were also potential differences in question quality between those with and 
without a cochlear implant – although contrary to what might be expected, those who had 
such a device appeared to perform slightly worse on the TQT than those who did not. For 
both of these factors (communication and device use), such differences at most provide 
pointers for future research.  Without bigger, ability-matched groups of participants, 
however, genuine differences in problem-solving performance cannot be established with 
any certainty.  
 
The presence of additional difficulties in some individuals in the sample introduces a 
potential confound in the data – namely, that particular participants with additional diagnoses 
may have unduly influenced the overall group result. This was a concern throughout the 
study, and care was taken to gather as much information as possible in order to monitor the 
influence of other diagnoses. Arguably, this factor did not clearly bias the sample: while the 
participants with ADHD-like difficulties were among the poorer performers, the participant 
with CHARGE syndrome was one of the best within the group. Moreover, systematic 
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removal of these individuals from the sample did not clearly change the overall group result. 
Nevertheless, a replication of the paradigm in a sample of highly able deaf children without 
any additional support needs is clearly needed.   
 
A final limitation concerns the suitability of the stimuli used in the tasks. Analysis was 
constrained to only consider those participants who were able to attempt the majority of the 
tasks, and, in the case of the semantic decision task, reaction times were not used if 
participants could not accurately respond to certain words. Thus, any words that participants 
were not familiar with should have been largely filtered out of the analysis.  It is still 
possible, though, that the language demands were quite high for an experiment with deaf 
children. The plan construction task in particular seemed to be challenging due to the 
simultaneous presentation of a large amount of text (over 30 question cards), and only 12 of 
the 13 participants were able to attempt this measure. With hindsight, this and some of the 
other tasks would have benefitted with further piloting with young deaf participants. As 
explained above, in this instance this was not possible (the recruitment of the experimental 
group itself was challenging enough), but future work would certainly benefit from a more 
extensive stage of piloting.  
 
Similarities in profile for deaf and ASD children 
Despite these considerations, there are some some tentative conclusions that can be drawn 
out of the data from above sample. First, the question quality scores seen for the group of 
deaf children are a) consistent with the data from more able deaf adults and b) apparently 
similar to those recorded by ASD participants. The deaf children in this group did not appear 
to ask questions that efficiently eliminated information at a level that would be expected for 
their age and cognitive ability. This was not clearly a result of experience with the task, or 
lack of knowledge about effective questions: deaf children were as able to identify good 
questions as hearing and ASD participants. Compared to hearing participants, the deaf 
participants in experiment 3 were also less likely to use grouping questions, consistent with 
the performance of deaf participants in Marschark & Everhart (1999) and autistic 
participants in Minshew et al. (1994), Alderson-Day & McGonigle-Chalmers (2011) and 
Alderson-Day (2011). 
 
It is worth noting too that there were also some differences between the deaf and ASD 
profiles on the TQT. Unlike ASD participants, deaf participants were not likely to require 
more questions to identify the target, despite the lower quality of their questions. In addition, 
145 
 
the performance of deaf children did not significantly change across the three trials they 
attempted, suggesting that they did not have any particular difficulty in handling an 
unchanging array, or having to remember their questions. 
The data from the plan construction task pointed to similarities and differences between the 
deaf and ASD profiles. Like deaf adults, the deaf children here did not appear to have any 
problem with constructing a narrowing plan. This contrasted with the less able ASD 
participants in experiment 1, but was consistent with the more able participants in that group.  
However, like all of the ASD children, the mean efficiency of their plans was lower than that 
of hearing, typically-developing children.  Thus, whether using questions (on the TQT) or 
planning questions, ASD and deaf children tended to select semantic categories that formed 
a less efficient basis for searching the set.  
 
Relations with semantic organisation 
On the semantic decision task,  basic-to-superordinate category associations took longer for 
deaf participants to make than superordinate-to-basic category associations. Without further 
testing of hearing children, the presence of a such an asymmetry does not necessarily 
indicate atypicality of semantic organisation: it should be thought of as a within-subjects 
effect only.  Put another way, there is nothing necessarily abnormal about this pattern of 
reaction times, however asymmetric they may appear to be: hearing children may be just as 
likely to react slower when making basic-to-superordinate associations compared to the 
opposite type of association. 
 
Nevertheless, the regression analysis of SDT and TQT performance suggested that the more 
asymmetrical participants’ category responses were, the more questions they required on 
average to solve TQT trials – a relation that was not explained by age or IQ factors. This is at 
least suggestive of a relationship between category organisation and problem-solving within 
this sample of deaf children. 
 
In interpreting the difference between conditions on the semantic decision task, an important 
thing to notice is that the direction of difficulty observed here is the opposite of that reported 
by Marschark et al. (2004). On their measure of semantic organisation, deaf adults were 
observed to be less likely to respond to a superordinate category name with a basic exemplar, 
whereas here participants were slower to respond to a basic exemplar with a superordinate 




One possible explanation for this is that it reflects an actual asymmetry in category 
structures. There simply are many more exemplars than superordinates for any given 
category. That is, ANIMAL includes many cases, whereas DOG has only a few common 
superordinates, such as animal, pet, or mammal. It is possible to add to those, but to do so is 
to quickly decrease the frequency and specificity of terms used (one could add living 
creature, vertebrate, earth-based etc). Furthermore, even relatively common superordinates 
stand in unequal relation to one another: the superordinate of DOG is most commonly 
ANIMAL, or possibly PET, whereas MAMMAL is much less likely to be used. As such, 
each condition on the semantic decision task is asking a slightly different kind of question. 
To go from superordinate to basic exemplars is necessarily to ask about the many contents of 
a given set, to go from one to many. In contrast, to go from a basic exemplar to multiple 
superordinates is to take one exemplar, and ask for many possible category names where 
usually only one or two would frequently be used. Thus, while the frequencies of individual 
words may be similar in each condition, the frequency of relations between category and 
exemplar may differ. When asking “Does it go with ANIMAL?”, a number of items with 
frequent relations to that word will be available (dog, cow, horse). In the converse “Does it 
go with DOG?”, there may be only one or two frequent associations.       
 
While inconsistent with their first experiment, these data are consistent with the results of the 
analogical reasoning task in Marschark et al.’s (2004) second experiment, where deaf 
participants were less likely to produce superordinate terms when primed with a basic 
exemplar. They also, as argued in the the hypotheses for this experiment, fit with what is 
being asked of participants on the TQT itself: participants are being faced with exemplars, 
from which they need to produce appropriate superordinates. In this sense, inefficiency in 
questioning may be related to semantic organisation in that atypical or infrequent 
associations with superordinates could be somehow weaker or less accessible for deaf 
participants. Without such access, the range of potential category terms that come to mind 
when deciding what question to ask may be limited, even when knowledge of such terms is 
present when specifically prompted or tested. When this is contrasted with stronger 
associations in the other direction, towards basic exemplars, this may create a tendency to 
ask about a more restricted category; to focus on the particular over the general.  
 
For this to be correct though, deaf participants would have to demonstrate an asymmetry on 
the semantic decision task when hearing participants do not. Or, if hearing participants 
showed such an asymmetry as well, one would predict a greater level of discrepancy within 
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the deaf group. The presence of intertask correlations suggests that these possibilities are 
plausible,  but without a control group the present experiment cannot demonstrate that either 
of these scenarios are in fact the case.  
 
A final caveat here is that the correlation with TQT did not involve question quality. The 
correlation between response asymmetry on the SDT and the number of questions used per 
trial (QT) indicates a relation between semantic skills and efficiency, but this is not the 
measure of efficiency that consistently discriminates deaf and hearing participants, or ASD 
and typically-developing participants. As discussed above, questions-per-trial offers a rough 
measure of efficiency. On the one hand, it usually correlates negatively with question 
quality, but on the other hand it can randomly fluctuate due to lucky guesses made by 
participants. As such it is not clear why this would correlate with semantic performance 
while QQ would not. In this case, it may by chance have a produced a more continuous 
distribution of data across the deaf group than that seen for QQ. It may be that with more 
data (and a better spread of data for QQ) significant relations would be seen for both 
efficiency measures.  
 
At the very least, the relation observed between SDT and TQT performance raises the 
question as to whether a similar effect can be observed in ASD participants. Returning to the 
“strong” and “weak”  arguments introduced in chapter 3, the relation with semantic skills 
observed here lends support to one part of the strong argument outlined earlier: deaf and 
autistic problem-solving profiles overlap because of similar effects of atypical language 
development, via semantic organisation. If the same relation can be observed in a group of 
ASD participants, the strong argument would be bolstered further.  
 
If, alternatively, ASD participants do not show this relation, then this proposed “semantic 
route” to problem-solving differences may be one that is specific to deaf individuals. Such a 
scenario, though, would still be consistent with the weak form of the argument, if it could be 
shown that ASD performance is moderated by differences in language development. This 
would demonstrate that the comparison with deaf individuals is still a useful one; that if deaf 
participants attempt the TQT in a different way because of their language history, then a 
similar kind of process may occur in people with ASD.  
 
A way to examine this is to compare performance in children with autism and Asperger 
Syndrome. Diagnostically, children with autism exhibit delays in early language 
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development. Children with Asperger Syndrome do not. If language development is relevant 
to understanding problem-solving in ASD, a point that both the strong and weak forms of the 
argument rely upon, then participants with Asperger Syndrome should be relatively 
unimpaired in their performance on the TQT. 
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Chapter 6:Similarities and differences between Asperger Syndrome and autism. 
 
If delays in language development have an effect on semantic organisation, and by extension 
verbal problem-solving, then this should be reflected within the autism spectrum itself. 
While a diagnosis of autism typically includes parental report of delayed language in the first 
three years of life, the diagnosis for Asperger Syndrome does not (APA, 1994). Individuals 
with Asperger Syndrome show all the social, communicative and repetitive characteristics of 
autism, but may have relatively intact language skills and intellectual abilities within the 
normal range (Frith, 2004). Therefore, individuals with Asperger Syndrome may be expected 
to be more successful in their problem-solving on a task like the TQT.  
Because some individuals diagnosed with autism will also go on to develop good linguistic 
and cognitive skills despite a history of language delay (Boucher, 2012), there has always 
been considerable debate as to whether or not the three-year cut off represents a real 
distinction in autistic symptomatology and outcome (see, for example, Ghaziuddin, 2010; 
Mayes & Calhoun, 2001; Schopler, 1996). A large body of research has examined potential 
differences in the long term cognitive and linguistic profiles of Asperger Syndrome (AS) and 
high-functioning autism (HFA), in an attempt to clarify their separation. This debate has 
culminated in the recent decision to remove Asperger Syndrome from the forthcoming 
DSM-V (due in 2013), in favour of treating autism, AS and other conditions on the spectrum 
as examples of a dimensional “autism spectrum disorder” (APA, 2012). Under the DSM-V, 
Asperger Syndrome is simply taken as another example of high-functioning autism, rather 
than a distinct disorder of its own.  
However, the proposed changes for DSM-V do not entail that there are no cognitive 
differences between those with a diagnosis of either autism or Asperger Syndrome. The 
decision primarily concerns the validity of a clinical distinction between the two diagnoses, 
and in this instance, the judgement made is that a) they do not differ in terms of core autistic 
symptomatology, and that b) any differences in cognition or language that have been seen 
are not significant enough to warrant diagnostic separation. The question of whether or not 
autism and Asperger Syndrome differ from each other in a clinically significant way is a 
separate one, though, from the question asked here; namely, do differences in early language 
development within the autistic spectrum have consequences for specific higher cognitive 
skills in later life?    
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The following sections summarise the main cognitive and linguistic differences that have 
been proposed to exist between Asperger Syndrome and autism. First, the original clinical 
descriptions of AS are outlined. Second, research on general cognitive abilities and cognitive 
profile is reviewed.  Finally, studies looking at language skills and executive functions are 
examined. The aim of doing so is to establish what differences may support a distinction in 
verbal problem-solving skills between autism and AS, and what differences  may need to be 
controlled for in a comparison between the two groups. 
 
Clinical descriptions: Asperger, Wing  and “Autistic Psychopathy” 
The key characteristics of Asperger Syndrome are derived from the original case series of 
four children described by Hans Asperger (1944) in his paper “Die ‘Autistichen 
Psychopathen’ im Kindesalter” [Autistic Psychopathy in Childhood]. As in Kanner’s case 
reports, the central problem observed by Asperger was one of social interaction. Asperger 
(1944/1991) introduced his case reports as follows: 
“The children I will present all have in common a fundamental disturbance which 
manifests itself in their physical appearance, expressive functions and, indeed, their 
whole behaviour. This disturbance results in severe and characteristic difficulties of 
social integration.” (p. 37) 
These difficulties were not, according to Asperger, due to a lack of feeling for others, but 
some form of disconnect in their affective processing: 
“...the children cannot be understood simply in terms of the concept “poverty of 
emotion”, used in a quantitative sense. Rather, what characterises these children is a 
qualitative difference, a disharmony in emotion and disposition.” (p. 83) 
Also in accordance with Kanner’s reports were a number of typically autistic behaviours and 
characteristics: repetitive behaviours (p. 43) , an insistence on sameness (p. 61)  and irregular 
play or use of toys (p. 66). 
Asperger’s cases largely differed from Kanner’s in their linguistic abilities. All four of 
Asperger’s cases showed precocious language skills: Fritz V. “quickly learned to express 
himself in sentences and soon talked ‘like an adult’” (p.39), while Harro L. “ had an 
“unusually mature and adult manner of expressing himself” (p.52). Even in the cases of 
Ernst K. and Hellmuth L., where a degree of delayed speech within the second year is 
referred to, both were described as speaking “like an adult” in their clinical presentation at 7 
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and a half and 11 years old,  respectively. Good skills in reading (Harro L.) and spelling 
(Hellmuth K.) were also noted by Asperger. 
Some, but not all, of Asperger’s cases also demonstrated strong cognitive skills in other 
domains. Fritz V. was reported as possessing precocious abilities in digit span (p.44) and 
arithmetic (p. 45), while Harro L. was described by Asperger as a “bright boy” with a 
“mastery of numbers”, (p. 56). In contrast, Ernst K. apparently showed no such skills, and 
Hellmuth L. was reported as having “very uneven” school knowledge and “very poor” 
arithmetic (p. 66). Thus, though the most able individuals described by Asperger had no 
equivalent in Kanner’s case reports, this did not mean that all of Asperger’s cases had very 
high intellectual ability (Frith, 2004).  
Although writing at the same time as Kanner, Asperger’s reports were little used in English-
language research and practice until the early 1980’s (following the work of Lorna Wing and 
colleagues), and were not published in English until their translation by Uta Frith in 1991 
(Frith, 1991).  The label of  “Asperger’s Syndrome” (now simply Asperger Syndrome) 
comes from Wing (1981), who chose the term in preference to “autistic psychopathy” in 
order to avoid overt associations with sociopathic behaviour (p. 115). 
In her 1981 paper, Wing presented  34 cases of children and adults that she considered to be 
affected by similar difficulties to those that Asperger described. Nineteen cases exhibited a 
“typical” history of AS and 15 showed AS-like behaviour at the age of presentation, but 
without the characteristics of precocious early development described by Asperger. 
Describing the group in general, Wing states that “the child usually begins to speak at the 
age expected in normal children, whereas walking may be delayed” (p. 116).  
Again, some good language skills were described, such as strengths in vocabulary and 
grammar, although Wing departed from Asperger in the extent to which she interpreted this 
as evidence of genuine language ability: 
“ Despite the eventual good use of grammar and a large vocabulary, careful 
observation over a large enough period of time discloses that the content of speech is 
impoverished and much of it is copied inappropriately from other people or books.” 
(p.116) 
Moreover, Wing argued that the presence or absence of language delay was not necessarily 
significant to the kind of difficulties seen by her AS cases at the age of presentation.  The 15 
cases with an atypical AS history were those who had early problems with language, but 
nevertheless ended up with an Asperger-like profile in later years. 
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Further descriptions followed from researchers in Sweden (e.g. C. Gillberg, 1985) and 
Canada (e.g. Szatmari, Bartolucci, Finlayson, & Krames, 1986), and by the early 1990s 
Asperger Syndrome came to be codified in the official diagnostic criteria for ICD-10 (WHO, 
1993) and DSM-IV (APA, 1994). Despite Wing’s more nuanced view of language in AS, the 
definitions of the syndrome set by both bodies stated that there must be no “clinically 
significant” delay in structural language development, defined as the presence of single 
words by age 2, and phrases by age 3. Subsequent application of the diagnosis has been 
inconsistent, and there has been continuous debate as to the relevance of  the language delay 
criterion, but this has continued to be the most “workable distinction” (Frith, 2004, p. 674) 




Research comparing AS and autism 
Since the initial clinical accounts of Asperger and Wing many studies have attempted to 
assess the similarities and differences between AS and autism in behaviour and cognitive 
skills. Aside from studies on social cognition (which will not be discussed here), much of 
this work concerns the general cognitive profiles of each group, their language skills, and 
executive functioning abilities.   
 
General abilities and cognitive profile 
Higher levels of general cognitive ability in AS, particularly for verbal IQ, have been a 
commonly reported finding in the literature. After the the DSM-IV codification, one of the 
first studies to compare the cognitive profiles of AS and HFA was conducted by Szatmari, 
Archer, Fisman, Streiner, & Wilson (1995), who examined the behavioural and cognitive 
characteristics of 21 children with Asperger Syndrome and 47 children with autism aged 4-6.  
The children with autism, though all within the high-functioning range, scored significantly 
lower than the AS children on the Leiter International Performance Scales, a measure of non-
                                                   
42 It is important to acknowledge that further differences in social interaction style and motor 
development have also been proposed to exist between AS and autism. Asperger’s original accounts 
suggested relatively intact language development in contrast to delayed or clumsy motor development 
(Asperger, 1944), while Wing (1981) suggested that her AS cases displayed an active but odd social 
interaction style in contrast to the more “aloof” interaction of individuals with autism. The validity 
and consistency of these differences are not discussed here, not because they lack importance, but 
because they would not appear to directly relate to cognitive skills specifically.  
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verbal reasoning (Levine, 1982), and the verbal reasoning subtest of the Stanford Binet 
(Thorndike, Hagen, & Sattler, 1986).  
These findings supported earlier work by the same research group that reported significant 
differences between individuals with AS and autism for all of the WAIS and WISC subtests 
except digit span (Szatmari, Tuff, Finlayson, & Bartolucci, 1990). Interpretation of this 
earlier study is tricky as it precedes the DSM-IV, and the criteria used for AS did not include 
a specific requirement of intact early language. The later study, however, did require AS 
participants to be speaking in phrases by 36 months, in line with DSM-IV criteria (Szatmari, 
et al., 1995).  
Further studies of the AS cognitive profile supported Szatmari et al.’s (1995) findings of 
general IQ differences between AS and autism (Ehlers et al., 1997; Manjiovana & Prior, 
1999; see Kugler, 1998, for a review of early studies). Ehlers et al. (1997) reported greater 
scores on all subtests of the WISC-R except Block Design and Object Assembly in a sample 
of 5-15 year-old AS children (n = 40) compared to children with autism, while Manjiovana 
& Prior (1999) reported significant differences in overall WISC estimates of FSIQ, VIQ and 
NVIQ in a similarly-sized sample of children with AS and autism.  
Clinical reports by Klin et al. (1995) and Eisenmajer et al. (1996) supported Szatmari et al.’s 
(1995) findings for verbal intelligence, although they did not always observe advantages in 
other areas . Compared to a group of children and young people with autism (AgeM = 16:0), 
Klin et al. (1995) reported greater VIQ abilities and a greater VIQ-NVIQ discrepancy in a 
sample of 21 adolescents with AS. In contrast, performance (i.e. non-verbal) IQ was reported 
to be higher in the autistic participant group, and there were no differences in overall full-
scale IQ (Klin et al., 1995). Similarly, Eisenmajer et al. (1996)  reported higher scores for 
verbal mental age in children diagnosed with AS than children with autism (AgeM = 10:0) , 
as measured on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test - Revised (L. Dunn, 1981) and the 
British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; L. Dunn, Whetton, & Pintilie, 1982), but no 
advantage in other areas.  
One problem with the above studies, however, is variation  in the definition of AS used. 
Similar to Szatmari et al.’s (1995) use of the DSM-IV, Klin et al. (1995) followed the ICD-
10 research diagnostic criteria in requiring that their AS participants showed no delay in 
language. Ehlers et al. (1997) followed earlier criteria set by Gillberg & Gillberg (1989), but 
stated that at least  32/40 of their AS group qualified met the ICD-10 criterion of intact 
language development.  
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In contrast, Manjiovana & Prior (1999) based their diagnostic groups on clinical expert 
opinion, but also ran a secondary analysis that split their participants according to the 
presence or absence of language delay. When this was done, the differences in overall 
cognitive ability between groups were in fact less prominent, with discrepancies in VIQ (p = 
.052) and FSIQ (p = .070) only approaching significance. Similarly, Eisenmajer et al. (1996) 
did not select their groups based on language delay, but analysed the features that 
discriminated those given an AS or an autism diagnosis by clinicians prior to the DSM-IV 
criteria being created. They reported significantly higher rates of language delay in the 
autism group (as would be expected), but also evidence of language delay in over 40% of the 
AS group. Furthermore, though language delays roughly discriminated the two groups, 
Eisenmajer et al. argued that all of the AS group actually qualified for a diagnosis of autism 
by demonstrating communication impairments in the first three years of life (Eisenmajer et 
al., 1996).  
These findings highlight two important issues. First, individuals with AS may, on average, 
appear more high-functioning than those with autism, but the possession of an AS diagnosis 
does not necessarily reflect fully intact language development in the early years. In some 
cases, individuals with an AS diagnosis may have been diagnosed based on their current 
level of functioning, and not their early development profile.  
The danger of this practice is that it does not necessarily pick out separable differences that 
are indicators of an etiologically distinct syndrome. In this scenario, those who are more 
intellectually able get a diagnosis of Asperger Syndrome, while those with a lower level of 
functioning  get a diagnosis of autism. But this means that AS as a label is just acting as a 
by-word for “high-functioning”, and experimental comparisons between the two groups 
become circular; those with AS will necessarily end up doing better on cognitive tasks by 
virtue of their diagnosis (Macintosh & Dissanayake, 2004; Ozonoff, South, & Miller, 2000). 
A second issue, highlighted by Eisenmajer et al. (1996), is that individuals with AS may in 
many cases actually  qualify for a diagnosis of autism under the DSM-IV codification. This 
is because the criteria are, to a certain extent, contradictory. The criteria for AS may require 
intact structural language development prior to three years of age, but the criteria for autism 
only requires problems in at least one of  a) social interaction, b) language as used in social 
communication or c) symbolic or imaginative play, prior to three years. If these are met, the 
diagnosis of autism is supposed to take priority - but most AS children will indeed meet 
these criteria, as even those with good expressive language skills will have problems with a) 
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and c), and are likely to use language in an atypical way for b). This observation has been 
made a number of times in reports on AS, leading some to suggest it is actually impossible to 
receive an AS diagnosis under the DSM-IV criteria (Mayes, Calhoun, & Crites, 2001; Tryon, 
Mayes, Rhodes, & Waldo, 2006). As an apparent flaw in the diagnostic criteria, it has 
inevitably contributed to the decision to change guidelines in DSM-V.             
Subsequent studies have either sought to adhere much more closely to the DSM-IV 
requirements of language delay, and only deploy an AS diagnosis where no problems are 
seen prior to three years, or they have used the presence of phrase speech by three years as a 
specific discriminator of the two groups, while still counting those with pragmatic language 
problems as AS 
43
. Using these criteria, researchers have investigated any general ability 
differences that still remain when a language cut-off is used, or any underlying differences in 
VIQ-NVIQ profile or IQ subtests that may exist between the groups.  
An example of using the three-year cut off is seen in Ghaziuddin & Mountain-Kimchi 
(2004), who compared 22 children and young people with AS and 12 children with HFA 
(AgeM = 12.3) on the WISC and WAIS test batteries. No significant differences were 
observed for  non-verbal IQ, but the groups differed significantly in overall VIQ (p =.001) 
and more marginally in FSIQ (p = .06). Underlying the overall differences, specific 
advantages for AS participants were observed in the verbal subtests for Information and 
Vocabulary, and the non-verbal Arithmetic subtest. In addition, 18/22 of the AS participants 
scored higher for VIQ than NVIQ (10 of whom showed a discrepancy of 10 points or over), 
compared to six of the 12 HFA participants (three of those with a 10 point difference). Thus, 
even with the age 3 cut off, participants with AS showed differences in general abilities, 
specific IQ subtests, and cognitive profile. 
In an earlier study that strictly followed the DSM-IV criteria, Ozonoff, South and Miller 
(2000) compared cognitive profile and early language development reports of 12 children 
with AS and 23 HFA children who were matched for age and gender. On the WISC-III 
(Wechsler & Corporation, 1991) the two groups only significantly differed in their scores for 
the Verbal Comprehension subtest, with HFA participants scoring lower than AS 
participants. For Ozonoff et al. (2000), the two groups differed in level of autistic severity, 
but little else.  
                                                   
43 This is essentially the same as the autism/AS distinction drawn in ICD 10 (WHO, 1993): children 
with intact structural language skills prior to three years of age who also have problems with 
pragmatics are still diagnosed with AS rather than autism. 
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Similarly, a study by Mayes & Calhoun (2001) reported no significant differences at all in 
general levels of ability for groups of ASD children with (n=23) and without (n=24) 
language delay. Using a mixture of IQ measures (the Stanford-Binet and WISC, 
specifically), their study observed no differences in full-scale, verbal or non-verbal IQ, or 
any IQ profile differences, between those who would and would not qualify for a diagnosis 
of AS based on the 3-year cut off . 
A slightly more nuanced picture was suggested by Spek et al. (2009), who compared AS and 
HFA adults on the WAIS-III (Wechsler & Corporation, 1997).  No significant differences in 
VIQ, NVIQ, or  VIQ-NVIQ discrepancy were observed between the two groups, who were 
differentiated based on the DSM-IV definitions alongside additional questions from ICD-10.  
However, the authors suggested that relative peaks and troughs across IQ subtests still 
distinguished the two groups. For example, AS participants showed difficulties in digit span 
but a strength in comprehension (as indicated by significant within-subjects contrasts), while 
HFA participants were poor on digit symbol coding, and strong on matrix reasoning (Spek et 
al., 2008). Thus, though ability levels and overall profile did not differ, adults in the two 
groups appeared to present with different strengths and weaknesses. 
In summary, while earlier studies supported the general notion that individuals with AS will 
show greater general ability levels than those with autism, particularly for verbal IQ, drawing 
clear conclusions has been difficult due to variation in diagnostic criteria and practice. 
Where groups have been diagnosed strictly according to DSM-IV criteria, or just on the 
presence of language delay before 3, general differences in IQ level or cognitive profile have 
not always been found. There may be some differences in language –related IQ subtests 
(Vocabulary, Comprehension and Information specifically) and relatively different strengths 
and weaknesses between AS and autism, but the evidence does not suggest considerable 
cognitive ability differences between the two groups. 
 
Language skills in AS and autism 
As may be expected, early studies on language skills tended to report greater ability levels in 
AS individuals compared to those with autism, both in early and later childhood
44
. For 
example, in Szatmari et al. (1995) over a third of the 4-6 year olds with autism studied still 
                                                   
44 There is a vast literature on language abilities in autism spectrum disorders; see Boucher (2012) and 
Groen et al. (2008) for recent reviews on the topic. For the purposes of this chapter, only those studies 
that have explicitly compared language skills in groups of AS and HFA participants are discussed. 
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had no functional language, whereas all of the AS group did. Scores for receptive language  
(Reynell & Huntley, 1987), grammatical understanding (Newcomer & Hammill, 1988) and 
vocabulary (McCarthy, 1972) were all higher in the AS group,  who also demonstrated better 
social and communicative scores on the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales (Sparrow, Balla, 
Cicchetti, & Doll, 1984). These differences were observed even when IQ was controlled for 
and only those with functional language in the autism group were analysed (Szatmari, et al., 
1995). Similarly, in Klin et al. (1995), where no overall differences in full-scale IQ were 
evident, teenagers with AS participants rated higher on scores of vocabulary, verbal output 
and articulation than HFA counterparts. 
As for cognitive ability, though, subsequent studies have not always supported the presence 
of general language differences between the two groups. This seems especially to be the case 
when IQ levels are more comparable, and where differences in language skills have been 
seen, they have tended to be more specific than general. For example, in the study by 
Ozonoff, South & Miller (2000), where groups of AS and HFA adolescents did not differ in 
FSIQ, AS participants scored higher on expressive language scores on the CELF-III (Semel, 
Wiig, & Secord, 1995),  but not receptive scores. 
In a similar vein, Verté et al. (2006) reported significant differences (AS>HFA) specifically 
for  speech output, syntax and coherence subscales of the Children’s Communication 
Checklist  (Bishop, 1998) in a comparison of two large groups of AS (n = 47) and HFA (n = 
57) children who were matched for age and IQ. No other differences, however, were 
observed in CCC subscales or overall composite score.  
Sometimes, barely any differences in language skill are observed between AS and autistic 
participants. As in their analysis of cognitive ability differences, Mayes & Calhoun (2001) 
reported no differences at all in language abilities between ASD children with and without 
language delay. (Language abilities were assessed using a composite measure of expressive 
skills including VIQ and rates of specific language characteristics). Likewise, in a study of 
ASD adolescents and adults, Seung (2007) observed no differences between HFA and AS 
participants on a general measure of language skill (the Test of Language Competence, Wiig 
& Secord, 1989). Scores for language construction on a narrative task were also very similar, 
with AS participants only scoring marginally higher than HFA participants for some 
grammatical constructions (Seung, 2007).   
Finally, in a comparison of adults with AS (n = 42) and autism (n = 34) matched for age and 
non-verbal IQ, Howlin (2003) reported marginally higher scores for AS participants on 
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expressive ratings for the Expressive One Word Picture Vocabulary Test (EOWPVT; 
Gardner, 1983) but no difference in age equivalent scores on the same task. On a similar 
measure, the BPVS, no group differences were observed in expressive ratings or age 
equivalent scores (Howlin, 2003). Based on these data,  Howlin argued that language 
differences between AS and autism, while evident in childhood and adolescence, actually 
recede in adulthood.  
Crucially, in each of the above studies AS participants were distinguished from HFA 
participants based on the presence of language delay
45
.  When this happens, and groups are 
clearly comparable for other intellectual abilities, overall language scores do not necessarily 
show up significant differences between those with Asperger Syndrome and those with 
autism.  
Subtler differences may be present, however, in the ways in which language is used to 
support cognitive processes in both groups. For example, two early studies reported greater 
verbal memory performance in AS individuals, even when matching or controlling for FSIQ 
(Klin et al., 1995) or verbal IQ (Ozonoff, Rogers, & Pennington, 1991). Similarly, Iwanaga, 
Kawasaki, & Tsuchida (2000), in a FSIQ-matched comparison of 4-7 year olds with AS or 
autism, reported significant differences (AS>HFA) on two verbal subtests (Following 
Directions and Sentence Repetition) of the Japanese Miller Assessment for Preschoolers (J-
MAP; Tsuchida, Sato, Yamada, & Matsushita, 1989). HFA participants have also been 
reported to be less sensitive to semantic lures in false memory processes (Kamio & Toichi, 
2007), and produce less imaginative features in their story-telling (Craig & Baron-Cohen, 
2000) than AS participants matched for age and IQ. Thus, the apparent “catching up” of 
autistic participants, following language delay, does not appear to preclude the existence of 
persistent atypicalities in language processing – atypicalities that are not necessarily seen in 
AS. 
 
Before moving on to discuss executive functioning skills, a final issue to consider is the 
possibility of there being other early language indicators that may be relevant to 
understanding AS and autism. If the three year cut-off does not always reliably discriminate 
outcomes within the spectrum,  that does not necessarily mean that there are not other 
                                                   
45 In the study by Verté et al. (2006) no specific mention of language delay is made in the outline of 
how participants were diagnosed: all participants are described as being diagnosed by a 
multidisciplinary panel with diagnoses being validated with use of the ADI-R (Lord, Rutter & Le 
Couteur, 1994). However, as the authors note for the subscales of the ADI-R, the ADI-R and DSM-IV 
largely overlap in their distinction of AS and autism. 
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indicators in early to mid-childhood that may be better predictors of outcome for ASD 
individuals.  
A study conducted by Bennett et al. (2008) highlighted this issue very well, in one of the few 
projects to examine the effects of language delay on ASD longitudinally. Rather than 
comparing groups of ASD participants with and without a history of language delay prior to 
age 3, Bennett and colleagues assessed the language skills of 19 children with AS and 45 
children with HFA every two years from the age of 4-6, up until 15-17. Group diagnosis and 
presence of specific language impairment (SLI) at either time 1 (4-6 years) or time 2 (6-8 
years) were then analysed for their predictive value for later outcomes in autistic 
symptomatology and adaptive skills. The authors found that the presence of language 
difficulties at time 2 - defined here specifically as problems with grammar and syntax - 
predicted later skills more reliably than either the original diagnosis, or time 1 scores. This 
was especially the case for predicting outcomes in late adolescence (13-17 years). That is, 




Bennett et al.’s (2008) findings are limited to specific aspects of structural language skill (i.e. 
syntax) that do not immediately relate to the kinds of skills that one might expect to be 
important on a task like the TQT (i.e. semantics). But they are at least suggestive that a 
categorical approach to early language delay may not be the most useful discriminator of 
early language differences, and that there might be other time-points for early language skills 
that are important to measure also. 
 
 
Executive functioning in AS and autism 
Few differences have been observed between AS and HFA individuals in executive 
functioning skills. In an early study  contrasting AS and HFA adolescents, Ozonoff, Rogers, 
and Pennington (1991) compared  composite data on executive functioning abilities based on 
performance on the Tower of Hanoi  and Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Heaton, 
1993). No group differences were observed on either the composite measure or any of the 
individual outcome metrics from each of the tasks, while both groups performed worse than 
matched typically-developing controls. This finding was broadly consistent with the results 
                                                   
46 See also Eisenmajer et al. (1998) for a similar finding concerning the short term predictive value of 
early language indicators,  c.f. Szatmari, Bryson, Boyle, Streiner, & Duku (2003).  
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of Szatmari et al. (1990), who observed some small differences in perseveration and errors 
committed on the WCST (with AS outperforming HFA) but not enough to reliably 
discriminate the two groups. This suggested that the presence of executive impairments was 
evident in both autism and AS (Ozonoff, Rogers, et al., 1991). 
Subsequent studies on planning and cognitive flexibility have largely supported this picture 
(Manjiviona & Prior, 1999; Miller & Ozonoff, 2000; Ozonoff, et al., 2000; although see 
Rinehart, Bradshaw, Moss, Brereton, & Tonge, 2001). In their neuropsychological profiles 
of autism and AS, Manjiviona and Prior (1999) tested participants on the Tower of London 
(ToL) test and found no significant group differences. In two studies by Ozonoff and 
colleagues (Miller & Ozonoff, 2000; Ozonoff, et al., 2000), no group differences in planning 
were observed on either Tower of Hanoi or the Tower of London task from the CANTAB 
(Robbins, et al., 1994), nor were they evident for two measures of cognitive flexibility, the 
WCST and the Intradimensional/Extradimensional Test. In a concurrent study to their 
analysis of CCC scores in autism and AS,  Verté, Geurts, Roeyers, Oosterlaan, & Sergeant  
(2006) compared AS and HFA participants on a large EF battery, including both the WCST 
and the ToL. Again, no group differences were observed in EF skills.  
For other executive tasks a more mixed picture has been observed. Rinehart and colleagues 
have argued (Rinehart, et al., 2001, 2008; Rinehart, et al., 2002) that individuals with HFA 
show deficits in inhibition and selective attention that are not seen in Asperger Syndrome. 
Rinehart et al. (2001) compared groups of 6-20 year-old participants with autism or AS each 
with separate groups of typically-developing age- and FSIQ-matched controls on a 
hierarchical stimulus task (similar to a Navon Hierarchical Figures task: Navon, 1977). The 
task, along with measuring perception of local-global stimuli, required participants to switch 
between either local or global responses. Compared to their controls, HFA participants were 
slower to switch from a local response to a global response, whereas no such difference was 
seen between AS participants and their control counterparts (Rinehart, et al., 2001). Using a 
similar matching methodology (i.e. no direct AS/HFA comparison, but concurrent 
comparisons with matched TD controls), Rinehart and colleagues have reported autism-
specific difficulties on a Stroop-style inhibition task (Rinehart, et al., 2002) and an 
inhibition-of-return measure of selective attention (Rinehart, et al., 2008).  
These findings come from one research team and are based on measures that have not been 
widely deployed in studies by other groups: research using different measures of attention 
and inhibition has not always supported Rinehart et al.’s claims.  A small study by 
Kleinhans, Akshoomoff, & Delis (2005) that used the DKEFS (Delis, et al., 2001) battery to 
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compare EF skills in adolescents and adults with AS (n = 6) and HFA (n = 6) reported better 
visual-scanning  performance in AS participants on the DKEFS Trail-Making Test. 
However, Verté et al.’s (2006) much larger EF study, which included a number of measures 
that rely on intact inhibition and spatial attention skills (e.g. the Change task; De Jong, Coles 
& Logan, 1995; and the Self-Ordered Pointing Task; Petrides & Milner, 1982 ) found no 
differences between autistic and AS participants.  
Moreover, it may be important when talking about such impairments to distinguish between 
different types of selective attention and inhibition (as noted in chapter 1): reviews of studies 
on the topic suggest that selective attention, but not prepotent inhibition, is problematic in 
particular for ASD individuals (Adams & Jarrold, 2012; Christ, et al., 2011). Specific 
comparisons of this kind between HFA and AS individuals have not – to this author’s 
knowledge – been made to date.   
Very few studies have reported specifically on problem-solving skills in AS. The problem-
solving task used here, Twenty Questions, has been thus far only been applied to groups of 
ASD participants who have a diagnosis of autism.  In Minshew et al. (1994) and Minshew et 
al. (2002), all the participants were reported to have possessed a diagnosis of autism, while 
in Alderson-Day & McGonigle-Chalmers (2011) and Alderson-Day (2011) only one 
participant in each study possessed a diagnosis of AS. The AS participants in both of the 
latter cases were either the top or second best performer in the ASD group, suggesting good 
problem-solving skills, but these data are clearly insufficient to draw any firm conclusions 
about the wider AS population. 
Other studies on AS and HFA groups have deployed measures that are referred to as verbal 
problem-solving tasks, but the tasks used do not necessarily tap similar processes to the 
TQT, and have produced mixed results. For example, in Szatmari et al.’s (1990) early 
clinical profile of an AS group, participants completed the Children’s Word Finding Test 
(Pajurkova, Orr, Byron, & Finlayson, 1976), a task where participants must infer a common 
missing word from a set of incomplete sentences. No significant differences were observed 
between AS participants and a group of HFA individuals, suggesting comparable problem-
solving abilities, and AS individuals performed significantly worse than typically-developing 
counterparts (Szatmari et al., 1990). 
Aside from the problem that a language delay criterion was not deployed in this particular 
study (as noted above), a more problematic issue is the requirement to utilise sentence 
contexts to identify the missing words. Problems with using contextual cues in language and 
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other domains are thought to be present across the autistic spectrum, and have been a 
commonly cited finding in support of a weak central coherence deficit (Happé & Frith, 
2006). As such, while nominally a verbal problem-solving measure, this task is possibly 
better interpreted as a measure of contextual processing. 
Other verbal problem-solving measures that have been used include the Verbal Absurdities 
test and the Problem Situations Test of the Stanford Binet battery. Manjiviona & Prior 
(1999) in their comparison of the neuropsychological profiles of AS and HFA individuals, 
reported group differences on the latter but not the former, with AS individuals performing 
better on the Problem Situations task. On both measures, linguistic cues and descriptions 
must be used to identify an answer, and in this respect, a problem must be solved verbally. 
Unlike classic problem-solving, though, there is no generation of strategy or selection of 
possible steps or moves towards solving a problem – or at least, not in the same way as the 
TQT. Thus, while the findings of Manjiviona & Prior (1999) may broadly support the 
expectation of an AS/autism difference on the TQT, they only do so in a very general way.   
On related tasks, a few studies have examined generative and concept formation abilities in 
AS as compared to autism. Word generation has been found to distinguish between AS and 
HFA participants in one recent study: Spek, Schatorje, Scholte, & van Berckelaer-Onnes 
(2009) reported impaired letter and semantic fluency in a group of HFA adults (compared to 
controls), but relatively intact performance in a matched group of AS adults. However, 
previous studies that have tested AS and HFA participants on fluency have not always 
observed consistent differences (Kleinhans, et al., 2005; Manjiviona & Prior, 1999; Verté, 
Geurts, Roeyers, Oosterlaan, et al., 2006). In other studies, Klin et al. (1995) reported that 
AS participants were exhibited greater difficulties with non-verbal concept formation than 
HFA participants, while Craig, Baron-Cohen and Scott’s (2001) observed that children with 
AS were better than HFA participants at combining unreal categories (e.g. a metal horse) and 
spontaneously transforming pictures on different types of drawing tasks. There are no 
measures of generativity or concept formation, though, that have been used in more than one 
study and have shown consistent AS/HFA differences.  
 
In summary, while a number of studies have compared individuals with Asperger Syndrome 
and autism in terms of their cognitive, linguistic and executive profiles, few conclusive 
differences have been found. Differences are sometimes seen for general cognitive abilities 
(in particular VIQ), for specific IQ subtests (such as Vocabulary), and for cognitive tasks 
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that rely heavily on language skills. Gross differences in cognitive and linguistic abilities are 
often not evident when the cut-off of age 3  is deployed, but there may be other early 
language indicators that are more powerful discriminators of subgroups within the autistic 
spectrum. Executive functioning skills appear to be largely similar in autism and AS for 
planning and cognitive flexibility, and they may differ for aspects of inhibition, problem-
solving and generativity, but further evidence is needed to support specific conclusions about 
generalisable group differences.  Particular components of language processing also need to 
be examined more specifically before predictions can be made about problem-solving 
performance in AS and autism; namely, semantics, and how semantic organisation may 








Chapter 7:Problem-solving in Asperger Syndrome and autism 
 
While few general differences between Asperger Syndrome and autism appear to exist, the 
preceding review highlights important ways in which the cognitive and linguistic skills of 
AS and autistic individuals could differ in an experimental comparison between the two 
groups. For the measurement of problem-solving skills, this highlights possible confounds 
that need to be controlled for, and provides a basis for predictions to be made about TQT 
performance. 
 
Controlling for the right factors 
First, it is clearly important that any comparison between participants will involve groups 
with comparable levels of full-scale, verbal, and non-verbal IQ. Although individuals with 
AS may in general have greater strengths in VIQ, it is important to show that any advantage 
in problem-solving exists over and above and differences in VIQ abilities (such as 
vocabulary). Greater VIQ skills, or a relatively stronger VIQ to NVIQ profile may be taken 
to reflect the developmental path of AS participants. But only matching or controlling for 
VIQ would show that, with the same cognitive resources, AS participants are able to 
approach a verbal problem more efficiently than HFA participants.  
A related factor to control for is language ability. The studies reviewed previously show that 
gross language differences are largely not evident when IQ is properly controlled for, and it 
is important to note that VIQ assessments, while nominally measures of cognitive ability, 
will also tap skills covered by standardised language measures, such as the CELF (Semel, et 
al., 1995).  For example, the WASI measures Vocabulary and Similarities both rely upon a 
sufficient level of expressive and receptive language proficiency. Nevertheless - especially 
when one considers Asperger’s original descriptions of chatty, verbose children - it is 
important to bear in mind other ways in which a group of AS participants may seem more 
linguistically able than a group of HFA participants. It is at least plausible that participants in 
both groups may possess the same vocabulary skills, for instance, and yet AS participants be 
more fluent in their use and production of such vocabulary. If so, asking questions on a TQT 
could just be easier for more fluent ASD participants. Thus, the inclusion of a measure of 
verbal fluency is needed, to control for this confound. 
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Equally important, though, is to check to what extent participants actually showed delays in 
their language development in early life, as a diagnosis of either AS or HFA does not 
necessarily indicate intact or delayed language development respectively. Therefore, any 
analysis based on diagnosis must be followed by one based on the presence or absence of 
language delay. Alongside this, additional metrics of early language skills at different ages 
may also contribute important information on the relationship between language 
development and later cognitive skills. 
 
Finally, although socio-emotional functioning has not been discussed in detail so far, it is 
important to ensure that AS and HFA individuals have at least a comparable level of autistic 
behaviour. If one group showed impairments on the tasks described above but also 
demonstrated a much more severe clinical profile, any differences in group performance 
could just result from problems with handling the social-interactive demands of the testing 
session. Clear conclusions about underlying cognitive differences would therefore be 
problematic. One way to do this is to utilise a measure of autistic tendencies and behaviour – 
such as the Autism Spectrum Quotient (Baron-Cohen, Hoekstra, Knickmeyer, & 
Wheelwright, 2006) – to check the two diagnostic groups do not greatly differ in the degree 
of their symptomatology. 
 
Bearing these factors in mind, an experiment was planned that compared three groups of 
adolescents: those with Asperger Syndrome (AS), those with High-Functioning Autism 
(HFA), and those with a history of typical development (TD). Participants completed the 
Twenty Questions Task, the Question Discrimination and Plan Construction Tasks, and the 
Semantic Decision Task. The Vocabulary, Similarities and Matrix Reasoning subtests of the 
WASI were used to match and otherwise control for cognitive ability levels
47
. Where 
possible, participants were matched for age, although given that the HFA group all 
necessarily had a history of language delay, it was expected that older participants may need 
to be recruited in order to match VIQ levels for this group in particular. 
 
To provide an additional check on diagnoses, the families of participants were asked to 
complete a short questionnaire on their child’s language history. Families were asked to 
                                                   
47 To enable the inclusion of the new tasks in the testing session, the Block Design subtest of the 
WASI was not deployed in this study. Because of the nature of the TQT, VIQ subtests were 
prioritised, and of the two NVIQ subtests, MR is related to TQT performance more consistently than 
Block Design. In addition, MR but not Block Design is used in the two-test short form of the WASI 
(Wechsler, 1999).  
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indicate the age of their child’s first word and first phrase (following questions on the ADI; 
Lord et al., 1994). They were also asked to rate their children’s overall language competence 
at 3, 5, 7 and the age they are now. To address potential differences in fluency, two measures 
of verbal fluency were deployed (the Letter Fluency and Semantic Fluency subtests from the 
ACE-R; Mioshi, Dawson, Mitchell, Arnold, & Hodges, 2006). To control for possible 
differences in autistic tendencies, participants’ families also completed the adolescent-
appropriate version of the AQ (Baron-Cohen, et al., 2006). 
 
Making predictions about AS vs HFA performance on the TQT and related tasks 
As outlined in the previous chapter, specific data on verbal problem-solving skills in 
Asperger Syndrome are relatively scarce, and no studies to date have included an AS-only 
group in experiments with the TQT. Predictions about problem-solving performance can be 
made, however, by drawing on two sources: the patterns of data already seen in experiments 
1-3, and the findings from studies on related cognitive skills that were reviewed in the 
previous chapter. 
In each of the above experiments, the key outcome on the TQT that differentiated typical and 
atypical performance was question quality, or the proportion of items that were guaranteed to 
be eliminated per question. This outcome, above all others, would appear to pick out the 
similarity in performance seen in deaf and ASD participants, and both the strong and weak 
arguments propose that this similarity in performance is the product of atypical language 
development. If these arguments are correct, then participants with AS should not show this 
difficulty, because of their more typical language history. Therefore, the main outcome on 
which AS and HFA participants should be expected to differ on the TQT is question quality: 
if HFA participants show reduced question quality compared to controls, AS participants 
should not.  If typical language development is required for questioning efficiency, AS 
participants should, if anything, be very similar to their typically-developing peers. 
This represents what may be considered the primary outcome of the TQT, but there are also 
a number of secondary outcomes on the task and other measures that may indicate 
differences between AS and HFA participants.  For these, one can look to the underlying 
processes required on the TQT, such as executive functions (namely planning, selective 




Concerning planning, few differences have been evident in studies comparing the abilities of 
AS and HFA groups. Studies by Ozonoff et al. (1991), Ozonoff et al. (2000), and Manjiviona 
& Prior (1999) all found no differences in Tower task performance between AS and autistic 
participants, suggesting similar levels of classically-measured planning abilities. In those 
studies, both groups showed difficulties in planning, whereas in the first experiment reported 
here, only less able ASD participants struggled with constructing an effective plan for the 
TQT (here defined as a plan that systematically narrows down possibilities). As AS 
participants are likely to be at the more-able end of the spectrum, and there is no reason to 
assume that their planning abilities differ from able HFA participants, this means that both 
groups should be able to produce narrowing plans.  
Where AS and HFA may be expected to differ, however, is in the general efficiency of their 
planning. In experiment 1, ASD participants selected less efficient questions on the TQT and 
on the the planning task. This appeared to indicate a common problem with concept selection 
on the two tasks. Therefore,  if AS participants were expected to be more efficient than HFA 
participants in their questioning on the TQT, they should also show advantages in the 
expected question quality of their plans - irrespective of any similarities the two groups may 
have in their use of  narrowing
48
. 
Previous research suggests no clear differences in selective attention abilities between AS 
and HFA individuals, although it has been suggested that inhibitory skills may be more 
likely to be impaired in people with autism (Rinehart, et al., 2002). This may imply that 
individuals with AS are less likely to impulsively guess at answers on Twenty Questions 
than HFA participants. Beyond, this, however, it is not clear that selective attention abilities 
in the two groups would lead to diverging performance on the TQT.  
A potentially more important difference is in verbal working memory skills. If participants 
with AS have greater levels of ability for cognitive processes that have to draw on language, 
then their response to TQT trials where elimination is prohibited may differ. Specifically, 
they may be expected to show less of a decrement in performance, as compared to the 
increased number of questions participants with autism use when faced with an unchanging 
set (Alderson-Day, 2011). Therefore, it was predicted that HFA participants would perform 
worse when elimination is prohibited, but AS participants would not.  
                                                   
48 For question discrimination, based on the previous ASD data from experiment 1, intact performance 




Thus, in addition to the hypothesised difference in question quality, specific predictions of 
how AS and HFA participants may differ can be made for performance on the planning tasks 
and other outcomes on the TQT itself.  Predicting responses on the semantic decision task is 
more difficult, however.  First, the measure was new for both AS and HFA participants; in 
contrast to the planning tasks, this particular tool had not been used before with an ASD 
group. Second, the studies on language skills that were discussed in chapter 6 only compared 
AS and autistic participants in a very general way. Making specific predictions about SDT 
performance required a more focussed exploration of semantic processing in individuals in 
autism, and how this compares to the same sorts of skills in Asperger Syndrome. As such, 
before outlining the main hypotheses about this task, the following section provides a brief 
review of semantic categorisation and organisation skills in autism and AS. 
 
Semantic processing in autism 
In contrast to other structural language skills, semantic processing has historically been an 
area of language and cognition that is thought to be specifically disrupted in autism spectrum 
disorders (e.g. Hermelin & O'Connor, 1970; Kjelgaard & Tager-Flusberg, 2001). Semantic 
development has been proposed to be delayed or atypical in autism by various researchers, 
who have suggested that the early difficulties in social interaction and communication shown 
by autistic children also disrupt the process by which they acquire new word meanings (e.g. 
Hobson, 1995) .  
 
Problems with language acquisition for young autistic children are consistent with such an 
idea. But it is also important to show that any such atypicalities in semantics endure in later 
years for autistic children, rather than simply reflecting a delay in semantic vocabulary. 
Young children with autism who show poor semantic skills are likely to just have language 
delay. In contrast, children whose language abilities catch up (in terms of vocabulary for 
example), but still show differences in underlying semantic processes (such as encoding or 
organisation) point to an enduring difference that reflects their language history. 
 
Research on categorisation skills in autism appeared to suggest that at least basic semantic 
abilities are not necessarily impaired in autism: sorting and identification of basic and 
superordinate categories in autistic participants have been observed to be intact (Tager-
Flusberg, 1985a, 1985b; Ungerer & Sigman, 1987) . However, later studies also highlighted 
problems with more abstract or complex semantic sorting (Shulman, et al., 1995), slowed 
responses to atypical exemplars of categories (Gastgeb, et al., 2006) and preferences for 
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concrete over abstract criteria in sorting tasks (Ropar & Peebles, 2007). This pattern of 
findings arguably implicates abnormalities in underlying semantic processes, even when 
basic categorisation abilities are intact. 
 
Further evidence of this kind of residual semantic atypicality was reported in a study by 
Kelley, Paul, Fein, & Naigles (2006), that compared the language abilities of 14  children 
with an ASD (age-range 5-9) and 14 typically developing age and sex-matched peers. The 
ASD children were described as being an “optimal outcome” group in the sense that they 
were all a) within the normal range for IQ, b) placed within mainstream schools, and c) 
considered to be functioning at a level comparable to their fellow students. While the ASD 
group was mixed in terms of  prior diagnosis (mostly PDD-NOS, but also AS and autism), 
re-assessment by the study authors at the time of testing confirmed that most actually 
qualified for autistic disorder or PDD-NOS, and all but two showed evidence of delays in 
language skills in the first 36 months. On standard measures of expressive vocabulary, no 
differences were observed between ASD and TD participants. ASD participants also showed 
relative strengths in grammatical understanding and phonology. However, ASD participants 
were observed to be worse than their counterparts in their lexical semantic skills, as 
measured on tasks where a new category term must be inferred by participants. This suggests 
that ASD children may retain good word knowledge without a fuller understanding of 
semantic structures. As put by the authors, the ASD participants in their study  
“knew many words, thus demonstrating understanding of the identification function 
of words and concepts...[but] What they may have had difficulty with are other 
conceptual functions, such as that which motivates the relations between concepts 
and that which allows for the induction of hidden properties” (Kelley, et al., 2006, p. 
821) . 
What is notable about the study by Kelley and colleagues is that it examined a very able 
group of autistic children and assessed them in-depth on a range of language measures. In 
this group, assessment with standardised language measures alone did not highlight 
significant differences with TD participants – showing what can clearly “catch up” following 
language delay – but further assessment of complex and subtle linguistic skills highlighted 
differences in their semantic skills.  
 
Evidence from electrophysiology research supports the existence of underlying semantic 
abnormalities in autism. In a study using electroencephalography (EEG), Dunn & Bates 
(2005) compared electrophysiological responses to auditorally presented  words in 18 
children with autism and 18 typically-developing controls, matched for age and NVIQ, and 
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split into younger (age 8) and older (age 11) age groups. The paradigm consisted of 
participants listening to a series of words that were either a member of a particular semantic 
category or not. While younger autistic participants showed an abnormal, early response to 
the words (N1), this was not seen in older ASD participants (aged over 11). However, 
compared to controls both younger and older participants showed reduced moderation of the 
N400 response (an indicator of semantic congruency) for in vs out-category words. This 
result replicated the findings of an earlier experiment by the same research group (M. Dunn, 
Vaughan, Kreuzer, & Kurtzberg, 1999), and was more prominent for older ASD participants, 
suggesting a persistent, rather than declining, atypicality in semantic processing. 
 
Individuals with autism also appear to draw upon different cognitive resources to support 
their semantic skills. For example, a study by Toichi and Kamio (2001) used a word priming 
paradigm to examine the semantic associations of a group of adolescents and young adults 
with autism compared with age and IQ-matched typically developing controls. In the task 
participants were presented with a prime word for two seconds (printed on a card) and then a 
partially complete target word for 15 seconds, after which they had a minute to provide the 
correct word (there was only one possible answer each time). Primes and targets were either 
semantically related (e.g. bus-train) or unrelated (TV-tie). In both HFA and TD groups, 
performance was more accurate for semantically related pairs of words than unrelated pairs, 
suggesting similar semantic associations for common words.  However, correlations with 
task performance in each group appeared to differ:  the performance of HFA participants was 
significantly related to scores on the Raven’s Progressive Matrices and other measures of 
NVIQ, a relation that was not seen for TD participants.  The authors speculated that “...the 
two groups might have employed different strategies. For example, individuals with autism 
may be more dependent on nonverbal strategies, such as visual imagery, which results in 
manipulating language differently from individuals without autism” (Toichi & Kamio, 2001, 
p. 488). 
Use of other cognitive resources in semantic processing was also documented in a study by 
Gaffrey et al. (2007) using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The study 
examined the neural correlates of semantic decision making in a mixed group of 10 adults 
with autism spectrum disorder (8 autism, 2 AS), and 10 age and NVIQ-matched controls. 
The semantic decision task (which provided the basis for the measure used in chapter 5) 
consisted of a series of basic exemplar words, presented consecutively. Participants had to 
indicate for each word whether they were part of a given semantic category, such as tools. In 
contrast to controls, ASD participants were significantly less accurate for judging colour and 
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feeling words, but not tools. More importantly, though, ASD participants appeared to utilise 
different cortical regions in their semantic processing, drawing particularly on extrastriate, 




While these findings appear to converge to suggest atypical processing of semantic 
information in autism, this is not always observed. In contrast to the above results, 
Whitehouse, Mayberry & Durkin (2007) argued that semantic skills were typical in 
individuals with autism for encoding of new semantic information. Using a word recall 
paradigm, the authors examined recall for semantically and phonologically related words in 
20 children with autism and 20 typically-developing children matched for verbal age and 
reading ability. No differences were observed for the number of items recalled in either 
condition, suggesting that semantic relations were typical enough to support recall processes 
in ASD participants.  
 
 
Direct comparisons of semantics in autism and Asperger Syndrome 
Very few studies have directly compared semantic processing in autism and Asperger 
Syndrome, perhaps because language skills in general are often assumed to be better in the 
latter. In fact, if the link between social interaction and semantic development is assumed to 
be a valid one (and a number of developmental theorists would make that assumption, e.g. 
Baldwin & Tomasello, 1998; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1992), an important conclusion follows: 
children across the autistic spectrum should show evidence of atypical semantic 
development, whether they have autism, Asperger Syndrome or other forms of ASD.  That 
is, one should not expect semantics to necessarily be “normal” in children with Asperger 





Where they might be expected to vary is in the extent of that atypicality, as some children 
may be able to engage in the interactions necessary for acquiring semantics more readily 
than others, because of their additional structural language skills (for an example of this, see 
                                                   
49 See also Harris et al. (2006), for an example of irregular responses to abstract vs concrete semantic 
terms in ASD individuals. That study is not discussed here because it used a mixed ASD group with a 
high proportion of AS participants (5/14), without reporting on within-group differences. 
Nevertheless, its findings are broadly consistent with those discussed above. 
50 This is essentially Lorna Wing’s (1981) point: children with AS may show greater vocabulary than 
in autism, but the semantic knowledge they develop is not quite the same as that seen in the lexicons 
of typically developing children, because their difficulties with social interaction will affect word 
acquisition and use.  
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McGregor & Bean, 2012). Comparisons between Asperger Syndrome and autism, in terms 
of semantics, may be likely to be one of degree: semantic atypicalities in both, but only 
significantly so in the case of children with autism. 
 
The majority of categorisation studies discussed previously have only examined groups of 
individuals with autism, or have used mixed groups with the generic label of autism 
spectrum disorder. One exception is Verté et al. (2006), in which the SON-R Categories test 
was applied to groups of AS, HFA, PDD-NOS and typically developing participants. 
However, in this case no significant group differences were observed. 
 
In some cases, the same researchers have deployed similar paradigms across separate studies 
with AS and HFA groups. In a follow-up study to Toichi & Kamio (2001),  Kamio, Robins, 
Kelley, Swainson, & Fein (2007) examined whether AS individuals show similar differences 
in their approach to semantic tasks. The study compared a mixed group of AS and PDD-
NOS children (n = 11), all of whom showed no delays in their language development, to a 
group of age and IQ matched TD children on a lexical decision task. At the time of writing, 
the authors considered this to be “the first [study] to address automatic lexical/semantic 
abnormalities in individuals with HFASD without a history of early language delay” (Kamio, 
et al., 2007, p. 1120).  
 
As in Toichi & Kamio (2001), the paradigm depended on the presentation of a prime 
(presented for 250ms), and then a response that was either semantically related or unrelated 
to that prime. In this study, the response depended on judging whether the target word 
(presented for 4s) was an actual word (e.g. bread) or a non-word (e.g. boarb). Whereas 
control participants exhibited a facilitation effect for semantically-related pairs of prime and 
target words, AS/PDD-NOS participants demonstrated no such effects, suggesting irregular 
associative processes in their response to words. Kamio et al. (2007) used this lack of an 
effect to suggest that AS individuals, just like language delayed autistic individuals, exhibit 
abnormal semantic processing.  
 
When compared to the typically-developing individuals in their study, this conclusion is 
reasonable: the AS group in Kamio et al. (2007) were no less accurate or slower in their 
responses to words, but did not show the benefit that control participants did when words 
were semantically-linked. This suggests an underlying difference in how responses to words 
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were arrived at, rather than a specific problem with word comprehension, for example, or a 
more general difference in speed of processing. 
 
The findings do not, however, suggest that associative processes were necessarily identical 
across the ASD groups reported on in Toichi & Kamio (2001) and Kamio et al. (2007). First, 
the HFA participants in Toichi & Kamio (2001) did show semantic priming effects, whereas 
the AS/PDD-NOS participants in Kamio et al. (2007) did not. Second, the paradigms utilised 
in each study differed notably; whereas in Toichi & Kamio (2001) participants viewed a 
prime for two seconds, primes were displayed for 250 milliseconds in Kamio et al. (2007): as 
noted by the authors, the former engages explicit processing, whereas the latter engages 
much more automatic, implicit processes. Finally, the tasks differed in what participants 
were asked to do: in Toichi & Kamio (2001), the identification of a possible word to fit the 
partially-completed target is a processing-heavy, explicit search of possibilities. In contrast, 
the lexical decision paradigm employed by Kamio et al. (2007) asks for a much quicker 
yes/no decision about the validity of a presented word. As such, while the two studies both 
point to potential abnormalities in ASD semantic processing, it is not at all clear that they 
speak to exactly the same effects or processes. 
 
A recent study that compared HFA and AS participants on the same paradigm was 
conducted by Speirs et al. (2011). Rather than examine semantic priming, Speirs and 
colleagues used a lexical decision task to measure priming based on either phonological or 
orthographic similarity; that is, the sound of words as compared to the actual form of the 
words themselves. Primes that were identical to their target necessarily contained both types 
of similarity (e.g. blue-BLUE), while other primes were similar in one respect more than 
another: for example, the pair “blue-BLEW”  provided a full phonological prime without a 
full orthographic prime, whereas “blue-BLOG” contained some orthographic association, but 
less of a phonological cue for the target word. Primes appeared for 54ms and targets for 
500ms. In typically-developing individuals, the identical prime was expected to produce 
significantly faster responses than primes that are only similar, but not identical, to their 
target, reflecting an automatic processing response.  
 
In Speirs et al. (2011), 11 participants with AS, 11 with HFA and 11 typically-developing 
controls, matched for age and IQ, were compared on the lexical task. TD participants showed 
the expected effect, with identical primes producing significantly quicker responses than 
orthographically similar primes. The AS group showed a similar effect, suggesting easy 
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access to the target words when primed with the identical word. In contrast, the HFA group 
showed no difference between identical pairs of words and orthographically similar pairs of 
words (both of which were responded to quicker than baseline unrelated pairs). This, the 
authors suggested, implied an immature or at least differential process by which words were 
being accessed in the autistic lexicon (Speirs et al., 2011). 
 
In contrast to the studies by Kamio and colleagues, the paradigm used by Speirs et al. (2011) 
does not assess semantic knowledge or semantic organisation, and the ability to generalise 
their findings is limited by the small sample of participants studied. Despite these caveats, its 
strength is that it allows for direct comparisons between matched AS, HFA and TD 
participants. In this particular case, access to the lexicon in AS individuals would appear 
closer to typical development than autism.    
 
 
Making predictions about semantic decision performance in AS and HFA 
To this author’s knowledge, no studies to date have directly compared AS and HFA 
individuals on the same measures of word association (e.g. Marschark et al., 2004), semantic 
priming (e.g. Toichi & Kamio, 2001) or semantic decision (e.g. Gaffrey et al., 2007). In the 
absence of such studies, predicting the comparative performance of AS and HFA participants 
on the semantic decision task used in the preceding chapter is speculative. Bearing these 
caveats in mind, some initial predictions could at least be made.  
 
First, it was hypothesised that participants with autism would show atypical performance on 
the semantic decision task. If the strong argument outlined in previous chapters is taken to be 
correct, then it followed that atypicality would be evident as a discrepancy in reaction times 
for basic and superordinate category judgements on the SDT (as it was in deaf participants). 
Furthermore, if this was to serve an explanatory purpose, then this discrepancy should 
predict their performance on the Twenty Questions Task. 
 
Second, it was thought that AS participants were also likely to show atypicalities on the 
semantic decision task. However, this was predicted to be less evident than in autistic 
participants, and to either not correlate or be related to a lesser degree to TQT performance 










Fifteen children with Asperger Syndrome (14 M: 1F; ages 9-16) and 15 children with autism 
(14 M: 1F, ages 9-18) were recruited from the Edinburgh and Lothians area. As in 
experiment 1, participants’ original diagnoses were made by local clinical services, who use 
a range of gold-standard diagnostic measures, including the ADI-R (Lord, Rutter & Le 
Couteur, 1994) and the ADOS (Lord et al., 2000). A subset of the participants (n = 5) had 
also had their diagnosis reconfirmed within the past three years by a trained researcher using 
the ADI-R. Following recruitment, parents were asked to confirm any prior diagnoses and 
complete the questionnaire on their child’s language history (see below). Exclusion criteria 
included the presence of any other neurological conditions, language impairments or specific 
reading difficulties that could prejudice the results, with reference specifically to the 
language demands of the tasks (e.g. dyslexia). Participants with other developmental 
disorders known to be comorbid with ASD (such as ADHD) were not excluded in the first 
instance, although in the event only one ASD participant had a dual diagnosis of autism and 
ADHD
51
. All ASD participants fell within the high-functioning range (FSIQ >70). Fifteen 
typically-developing children (10 M/5 F; ages 9-18) were recruited from the Edinburgh and 
York areas to provide a neurotypical control group.   
 
Recruitment & settings 
Participants with an ASD were primarily recruited via mail-outs from a local charity for 
autism and parent groups from the region. Families interested in the research were asked to 
return a reply slip attached to an information letter explaining the research. Following this, 
families that were known to the university due to involvement in prior research were 
contacted via email or telephone to complete the participant groups. Typically-developing 
participants were recruited from a database of local families that had been involved in 
research with the department before. Testing sessions were conducted either in a quiet room 
at the university, or, where it was more convenient for families, in the homes of participants.  
  
 
                                                   





Table 9 shows the age and IQ data for the three participant groups. IQ estimates were based 
on the Vocabulary and Similarities (VIQ) and matrix reasoning (NVIQ) subtests from the 
WASI. Although not individually matched, the three groups did not significantly differ for 
overall full-scale, verbal and non-verbal IQ, based on scores on the WASI (Wechsler, 1999). 
However, mean differences in FSIQ and VIQ were clearly approaching significance between 
HFA and TD participants. No significant pairwise differences were observed for verbal 
mental age (ASM(SD) =  17.13 (6.05), HFA M(SD) = 15.22 (5.28), TD M(SD) = 19.08 (6.71)) or 
non-verbal mental age (ASM(SD) = 13.20 (2.91), HFA M(SD) = 13.01 (2.80), TD M(SD) = 11.65 
(3.22)), although a trend was observed for TD participants to have greater VMA than HFA 
participants (t = -1.758, df =28 , p = .091). Attempts were made to match the groups for age, 
although in order to recruit sufficient numbers of HFA participants with comparable ability 
levels to the AS group, the eventual HFA group was significantly older than the group of AS 
participants (HFA>AS, t(28) = 2.157 , p = .040). 
 
One point to note here is that the HFA participants included in this study were of a generally 
higher level of ability than those who took part in experiment 1, particularly for VIQ. The 
two groups differed both in terms of mean VIQ  (Ex1: 95.55 vs Ex4: 104.40) and range  
(Ex1: 65-141 vs Ex4:74-132). 
 
Design 
A between-groups (AS vs HFA vs TD) design was deployed, comparing participants on the 
TQT and subsequent control tasks. Following this, within-group analysis was conducted to 
assess the relationship between TQT performance and other task scores. 
 
Materials & procedure 
- The Twenty Questions Task (TQT) 
The first task attempted was the TQT. The stimuli, format and instructions for the TQT 
deployed was identical to those used with young deaf participants in the preceding 
experiment. Participants completed three games of Twenty Questions using a 24-item set: 
the first two trials allowed for elimination of items during search while on the last trial 
elimination was prohibited. Alongside the game board a Dell Inspiron 17 “ Laptop was used 
to provide the “random selector” animation and audio-visual feedback during the game. Prior 
to starting participants were asked if they had played Twenty Questions or similar games 















Table 9. Age and IQ scores for AS, HFA and TD participants. 
 
AS (n=15) HFA (n=15) TD (n=15) 
  M SD M SD M SD Sig. 
Age 12.93 2.09 14.74 2.49 14.05 2.72 HFA>AS* 
FSIQ 107.40 14.48 102.73 13.71 110.40 10.54 (TD>HFA) 
VIQ  111.00 18.05 104.40 16.36 113.80 12.62 (TD>HFA) 
NVIQ 102.20 11.67 99.87 12.11 105.33 16.72 n.s. 
* p < .05. Differences in brackets indicate contrasts approaching significance (p <.1)  





- Question Discrimination (QD) and Plan Construction (PC) 
Following the TQT, all participants attempted the question discrimination and plan 
construction tasks from experiment 1. For QD, participants completed 10 forced-choice 
question discriminations (i.e. is it better to ask X or Y first?). For PC, participants were 
asked to select five questions that would be useful to use “if we were to play the game 
(Twenty Questions) again in a moment”. Once five questions were selected, participants 
were then asked to order them in terms of which question they would ask first, which they 
would ask next, etc. In a departure from experiment 1, however, participants did not then 
attempt further TQT trials. 
 
- Semantic Decision Task (SDT) 
The semantic decision task from the preceding experiment was deployed. As with deaf 
participants, the first trial of the first round (identifying “LOOT”) was used as a practice trial 
and excluded from later analyses. 
 
- Letter and Semantic Fluency  
To assess verbal fluency abilities the Letter and Semantic Fluency subtests from the 
Addenbrooke ‘s Cognitive Examination – Revised  (ACE-R; Mioshi, et al., 2006) were 
administered. For letter fluency, participants were given the following instructions: 
“I’m going to give you a letter of the alphabet and I’d like you to generate as many 
words as you can beginning with that letter, but not the names of people or places. 
Are you ready? You’ve got a minute, and the letter is P” 
Following this, participant completed the semantic fluency task for the category “animals”. 
 
- AQ and Language Questionnaires 
As outlined above, the families of participants were asked to complete the AQ-Adolescent 
Version (Baron-Cohen, et al., 2006), a measure of autistic traits. The AQ consists of 50 items 
describing specific behaviours, to which respondents indicate their level of agreement. Each 
item has four response options (Definitely Agree, Slightly Agree, Slightly Disagree, 
Definitely Disagree). 
 
The language questionnaire was a bespoke measure consisting of six questions, all to be 
completed by the participants’ family. The first two concerned early language milestones.  
1. What age was your child when they said their first word? 
2. What age was your child when they used  their first phrase of three or more words? 
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Parents were asked to indicate, where possible, to the nearest month, or provide their best 
estimate if unsure. 
The following four questions asked parents to rate their children’s overall language 
competence at ages 3 and up.  
Compared to other children, what were your child’s language skills like  
3. At three years of age? 
4. At five years of age? 
5. At seven years of age? 
6. Compared to other children, what are your child’s language skills like now? 
Parents indicated their ratings on a 5-point Likert scale (Much worse, A bit worse, About the 
same, A bit better, Much better).  
 
Scoring & analysis  
Scoring and analysis for the TQT, QD, PC and SDT tasks were the same as reported in 
previous chapters. The primary outcome upon which problem-solving was assessed was 
again mean question quality. Unless otherwise stated, parametric statistics (primarily 
analysis of covariance) were used to compare the three groups on the main task outcomes. 
Covariate analysis, using age, VIQ and NVIQ as covariates, was used to assess influences of  
age and general ability. In addition, matched subsets of participants were used to follow up 
the covariate analysis (as in previous chapters).  
The ACE-R fluency tests can be scored on a scale from 0-7 depending on the number of 
words generated. To maximise variance in participants’ scores, however, raw scores were 
used instead to compare the three participant groups.  
The AQ provides a total score, and subscale scores for Social Skills, Attention to Detail, 
Attention Switching, Communication, and Imagination. In the original AQ (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001) and AQ-Adolescent (Baron-Cohen, et al., 
2006), items were scored 0 or 1 depending on the presence or absence of an autistic trait (i.e., 
positive and negative options are collapsed into two categories), on a scale from 0 to 50.  
However,  later developments of the AQ (Auyeung, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Allison, 
2008), have scored items on a four point scale (0-3), reflecting the four options that 
respondents can choose, and providing scores from 0-150. The present study used the latter 





Prior to the main analysis, potential confounds of game experience, prior study participation 
and AQ levels were checked. All but one participant (a control) had prior experience of 
Twenty Questions in some form. No significant differences in question quality were 
observed between participants who had (n = 19) and had not (n =26) attempted the TQT 
before (t (43) = 0.126, p = .900, two-tailed t-test used). Despite repeated requests, one family 
in the HFA group did not provide a completed AQ or language questionnaire. In the 
remaining data, both AS (AQM(SD)= 105.73(19.08)) and HFA (AQM(SD)=  101.50 (23.33), n = 
14)  participants scored higher than TD participants (AQM(SD)= 46.13 (22.42)).  Crucially the 
two ASD groups did not significantly differ from one another (t(27) = 0.537, p = .596, all 
subtests p>.50).  
 
Twenty Questions Task 
Table 10 displays the main task outcomes for the TQT. A univariate analysis of covariance 
was used to compare mean question quality scores in the three groups, using age, VIQ and 
NVIQ as covariates. A significant main effect of group was observed (F (2,39) = 4.858, p 
=.013,  eta
2
p =  .199), alongside positive contributions for age  (F (1,39) = 4.033, p =.052,  
eta
2
p =  .094) and VIQ (F (1,39) = 10.283, p =.003,  eta
2
p =  .209; all other effects n.s.). 
Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons indicated that the questions of HFA participants 
were significantly less efficient than those of AS participants (p = .021) and TD participants 
(p = .041). No difference was observed between AS and TD participants (p = 1.0)
52
.  
A less marked but nonetheless significant difference was also observed for the mean number 
of questions taken on each trial. A similar ANCOVA was run, producing a main effect of 
group (F (2,39) = 4.310, p =.020,  eta
2
p =  .181) and significant effect of Age (F (1,39) = 
12.670, p =.001,  eta
2




                                                   
52 The HFA participant with a dual diagnosis of ADHD scored well within the range for his group 






Table 10. Task performance by AS, HFA, TD participants. 
 
AS HFA TD 
  M SD M SD M SD Sig. 









QQ 0.33 0.05 0.27 0.07 0.33 0.50 HFA<AS,TD* 
QT 5.05 1.02 5.53 1.41 4.62 0.84 
HFA>TD*, 
(HFA>AS) 
Grouping (mean %) 66.35 13.76 59.92 15.85 65.07 15.23 n.s. 
Guessing (mean %) 14.76 16.41 10.55 12.92 6.38 7.36 n.s. 




QD 7.86 2.17 7.13 1.73 8.13 0.99 n.s. 









QQ1 0.30 0.14 0.27 0.15 0.33 0.12 n.s. 
QQ2 0.22 0.12 0.21 0.10 0.26 0.12 n.s. 
QQ3 0.20 0.08 0.13 0.10 0.21 0.11 (HFA< AS, TD) 
QQ4 0.24 0.13 0.20 0.10 0.20 0.10 n.s. 
QQ5 0.17 0.10 0.16 0.10 0.19 0.13 n.s. 
Mean QQ 0.23 0.06 0.19 0.07 0.24 0.04 n.s. 









Accuracy 1 27.40 2.74 27.07 3.81 27.73 2.71 n.s. 
Accuracy 2 27.13 2.36 28.33 2.35 29.00 1.13 AS<HFA, TD* 
Accuracy 3 25.87 2.13 26.53 2.59 27.40 2.26 n.s. 
Mean RT1 (ms) 653.15 231.51 657.27 291.12 563.14 131.97 n.s. 
Mean RT2 (ms) 879.36 279.15 870.08 313.20 734.39 139.61 n.s. 
Mean RT3 (ms) 1009.75 410.11 1011.88 347.32 853.44 205.02 n.s. 









Letter (P) 9.20 5.27 9.73 4.25 12.40 3.98 
TD>AS*, 
(TD>HFA) 
Semantic (Animals) 17.60 6.56 17.53 5.66 21.40 4.22 
TD>AS*, 
(TD>HFA) 








* p < .05. Differences in brackets indicate contrasts approaching significance (p <.1) 
AS = Asperger Syndrome, HFA = High-Functioning Autism, TD = Typically Developing, TQT = 
Twenty Questions Task, QD = Question Discrimination, PC = Plan Construction, SDT = Semantic 




significantly more questions than TD participants (p = .026), and, to a lesser degree, AS 
participants (p = .083)
 53
.  
Non-parametric statistics were used for the rates of grouping and guessing. The use of 
grouping questions was high (60-65%) in all groups, and on average outright guesses were 
used twice as much in AS and HFA participants compared to TD participants. However, 
Kruskal-Wallis ANOVAs indicated no significant differences between the groups (all p > 
.400). 
Mixed ANCOVAs were used to assess changes in efficiency across the three task trials. 
Despite the switch from allowing elimination (trials 1 & 2) to prohibiting it, no significant 
Group*Trial interactions were evident for question quality (all p > .300, all eta
2
p < .060) or 
the number of questions taken (all p > .290, all eta
2
p < .065). As figure 24 shows, this 
suggests that overall group differences on these variables were fairly consistent across trials. 
Changes in grouping and guessing were assessed non-parametrically using individual 
Friedman’s ANOVAs in each group. These analyses indicated no significant changes in the 
use of guesses, but changes for grouping in AS (X2 (2) = 5.216, N = 15, p = .075) and HFA 
(X2 (2) = 7.509, N = 15, p = .020) participants. AS participants generally improved in their 
grouping before dropping on trial 3, whereas HFA participants used grouping less with each 
trial (see figure 25).  
Finally, the group differences in question quality were re-analysed using matched subsets of 
participants. It was possible to match 12 participants in each group to within 10 points for 
verbal IQ (AS-12 VIQM(SD)= 108.92 (14.45); HFA-12 VIQM(SD)= 110.33 (11.82); TD-12 
VIQM(SD)= 110.58 (11.60); all pairwise contrasts p >.750). The groups also did not differ on 
NVIQ (AS-12 NVIQM(SD)= 102.25 (11.41); HFA-12 NVIQM(SD)= 103.50 (17.47); TD-12 
NVIQM(SD)= 103.50 (11.60); all p >.780), although some age differences between the groups 
were still apparent (AS-12 AgeM(SD)= 155.25 months  (25.71); HFA-12 AgeM(SD)= 176.25 
(33.08); TD-12 AgeM(SD)= 168.50 (35.22); AS<HFA: t(22) = -1.736, p = .096).  
                                                   
53 When VMA was included in this analysis as an alternative covariate, very similar results were 
returned for both QQ (group F (1,41) = 3.931, p =.027,  eta2p =  .161) and QT (group F (1,40) = 3.426, 




Figure 24. Changes across Twenty Questions trials in question quality (top)  and questions used 
per trial (bottom) in each group. TQT = Twenty Questions Task, QQ = Question Quality, QT – 





Figure 25. Changes across TQT trials in grouping questions (top) and guess questions (bottom) 
in each group. TQT = Twenty Questions Task, AS =Asperger Syndrome, HFA = High-Functioning 




A univariate analysis of covariance, this time only including Age as a covariate, was applied 
to the three subsets of participants for their mean QQ scores. This produced a main effect of 
group (F (2,32) = 3.684, p =.036,  eta
2
p =  .187), with significant pairwise contrasts between 
HFA participants and the other two groups (HFA<AS, p = .015; HFA<TD, p = .048)
54
. In 
this analysis, AS participants were actually the best performers (QQ M(SD)= 0.328 (0.040)), 
followed by TD participants (QQ M(SD)= 0.320 (0.046)) and HFA participants (QQ M(SD) = 
0.282 (0.050)). Thus, the subset analysis largely supported the initial analysis of the whole 




Question Discrimination  
A three-way univariate ANCOVA was used to compare question discrimination scores in 
AS, HFA and TD participants. No significant main effect of group or any specific covariate 
effects were observed (Group: F (2,39) = 0.886, p =.420,  eta
2
p =  .043, n.s.; all other 




Separate Friedman’s ANOVAs were used within each group to assess the structure of 
participant plans. Each group showed evidence of moving from high QQ to low QQ 
questions across their five questions, with effects that were either significant or approaching 
significance (AS: X2 (4) = 9.333, N = 15, p = .053; HFA X2 (4) = 7.509, N = 15, p = .013; 
TD: X2 (4) = 12.222, N = 15, p = .016). As figure 26 shows, the plans constructed by 
participants were largely similar across groups. The questions selected for question 3 were 
on average slightly lower for HFA participants than AS participants (Mann-Whitney U =  
                                                   
54 The actual contribution of Age in this model was non-significant (F (1,32) = 0.594, p =.447,  eta2p =  
.018, n.s.), but its inclusion seemed to make a difference to the Group effect observed (presumably 
because it removed any age-related noise in the data). When age was not included, the main group 
effect was less marked, but still significant (F (2,33) = 3.435, p =.044,  eta2p =  .172).  
55 Again, very similar results were observed when mental age was taken into account. No differences 
were evident between the subgroups for VMA (AS-12M(SD)= 16.17 (5.74); HFA-12M(SD)= 16.46 (5.19); 
TD-12M(SD)= 18.34 (6.17); all p >.300). For NVMA, AS (M(SD) = 13.61 (2.97)) and HFA (M(SD)= 
13.67 (2.70)) participants scored significantly higher than TD (M(SD) = 10.97 (2.88)) participants 
(AS>TD p = .038; HFA > TD p = .027). When NVMA was included as a covariate in the analysis of 
mean QQ scores, a significant group effect was observed (F (2,32) = 4.242,  p =.023,  eta2p =  .210) 
alongside pairwise comparisons that were approaching significance for AS>HFA (p = .05) and TD> 











Figure 26. Mean efficiency of plans in AS, HFA and TD participants. QQ = Question Quality, AS 





95.00, N = 30, p = .004) and TD participants (U = 61.50, N = 30, p = .032), but it should be 
noted that this difference would not survive a correction for multiple comparisons. 
Three-way univariate ANCOVAs indicated no significant differences for mean question 
quality (Group: F (2,39) = 0.993, p =.380,  eta
2
p =  .048, n.s.) or plan gradient (Group: F 
(2,39) = 0.126, p =.882,  eta
2
p =  .006). VIQ was observed to significantly contribute to mean 
QQ of plans (VIQ: F (1,39) = 4.550, p =.039,  eta
2
p =  .104; all other effects n.s.). For plan 
gradient, effects were observable for Age (F (1,39) = 2.872,  p =.098,  eta
2
p =  .069), VIQ (F 
(1,39) = 4.540, p =.039,  eta
2
p =  .104) and NVIQ (F (1,39) = 4.486, p =.041,  eta
2
p =  .103), 
suggesting that older and more able participants tended to narrow their plans to a greater 
degree.    
 
Semantic Decision Task 
Accuracy rates were high for participants in each group across all three conditions of the 
semantic decision task. Kruskal-Wallis tests indicated no significant differences between the 
groups for condition 1 (word identification: X2 (2) = 0.266, N = 45, p = .875) and condition 3 
(basic>super: X2 (2) = 4.295, N = 45, p = .117) , but a significant contrast for condition 2 
(super>basic: X2 (2) = 8.462, N = 45, p = .012). Pairwise Mann-Whitney U-tests indicated 
that this difference lay primarily in the performance of AS participants, who scored slightly 
lower for accuracy than HFA (U = 62.50, N = 30, p = .030) and TD  (U = 49.50, N = 30, p = 
.007) participants. 
Mean RTs for participants on the SDT were log10 transformed to enable a repeated 
measures of analysis of covariance to be run on the data
56
. A linear effect approaching 
significance was observed (F (1,39) = 3.476, p =.070,  eta
2
p =  .082), reflecting the general 
increase in RTs with each condition (see table 10). However, no significant group effect (F 
(2,39) = 0.455, p =.637,  eta
2
p =  .023, n.s.) or Group*Condition interaction effect (F (2,39) = 
1.024, p =.369,  eta
2
p =  .050, n.s.) was observed,  indicating that RTs were comparable 
across the groups, for each condition. Faster performance overall was significantly related to 
age  (F (1,39) = 8.967,  p =.005,  eta
2
p =  .187) and VIQ (F (1,39) = 5.881,  p =.020,  eta
2
p =  
.131). 
                                                   
56 Such a procedure could have also been applied to the data from the Plan Construction task. 
However, log transforming that data did not significantly normalise the data distributions, making 




Figure 27. The relationship between question quality during Twenty Questions and reaction 
differences in semantic decisions for AS< HFA and TD groups. QQ = Question Quality, SDT = 
Semantic Decision Task, AS = Asperger Syndrome, HFA = High-Functioning Autism, TD = 
Typically-Developing. Significant relationships (p <.05) are shown with solid lines, non-significant 
with dashed lines. 
 
Figure 28. The relationship between questions used per trial during Twenty Questions and 
reaction differences in semantic decisions for AS< HFA and TD groups. QT = Question used per 
Trial, SDT = Semantic Decision Task, AS = Asperger Syndrome, HFA = High-Functioning Autism, 
TD = Typically-Developing. 
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For comparison with the data from experiment 3, the difference between mean RTs for  
conditions 2 and 3 was also calculated. The mean difference was highest in the HFA group 
(141.80ms), followed by the AS group (130.40ms) and the TD group (119.06ms), but a 
univariate ANCOVA found no significant effect of group on this outcome  (F (2,39) = 0.036, 
p =.965,  eta
2
p =  .002, n.s.)
57
.  
As in experiment 3, backwards regression analyses were used to assess for relations between 
SDT and TQT performance. For mean question quality, the difference in RTs between 
semantic conditions was a significant predictor in the model returned for typically-
developing participants (R
2 
= .482, F(2,12) = 5.584, stan. beta = -.773,  p = .008) but not AS 
(stan. beta = .147,  p = .625)  or HFA participants (stan. beta = .002,  p = .989; see figure 27). 
For the number of questions used on the TQT, none of the models returned included 
semantic asymmetry as significant predictor of performance for any group (all stan. beta 
<.450, all p-values > .098). Thus, as figure 28 shows, the specific relation observed between 
SDT and TQT performance in deaf children was not replicated in any of the groups tested. 
Based on the lack of RT differences across the groups, post-hoc correlational analyses were 
conducted to explore other relations between SDT and TQT performance. Across all 
participants combined, mean question quality was observed to negatively correlate with 
mean response time on SDT condition 2 (R = -.302, N = 45, p = .044), and, to a lesser extent, 
condition 3 (R = -.258, N = 45, p = .086; Spearman’s Rho used).  That is, slower responses 
for semantic decisions were associated with lower question quality, when AS, HFA and TD 
groups were analysed together. 
 
Verbal Fluency 
Due to skew in the performance of the AS group, Kruskal-Wallis tests were used to compare 
fluency performance across the groups. A difference approaching significance was observed 
for Letter Fluency (X2 (2) = 5.175, N = 45, p = .075), alongside a significant difference for 
Semantic Fluency (X2 (2) = 6.33, N = 45, p = .042). Pairwise Mann-Whitney tests indicated 
that TD participants tended to produce more words on the letter fluency task than AS 
                                                   
57 This contrasts with the mean difference of 175.31ms recorded by deaf participants in the previous 
experiment. Direct comparisons between RT data from experiments 3 and 4 were not conducted due 
to considerable differences in cognitive ability between the deaf participants on the one hand and AS, 
HFA and TD participants on the other hand. Because the groups were barely overlapping in verbal 
and non-verbal IQ, ANCOVA would not have been appropriate and matching of subgroups was not 
possible.   
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participants (U = 62.00, N = 30, p = .035) and, to a lesser degree, HFA participants (U = 
72.00, N = 30, p = .093). Similar differences were evident for  semantic fluency (TD>AS: U 
= 54.50, N = 30, p = .015; TD>HFA: U = 67.50, N = 30, p = .062).  
To examine what influence fluency differences may have had on TQT performance, a log10 
transform was applied to fluency scores and the resulting indices were then included as 
covariates in an ANCOVA for mean QQ. As before, this produced a significant main effect 
of group (F (2,40) = 4.546, p =.017,  eta
2
p =  .185), but no significant covariate effects were 
observed for the log transforms of either letter fluency (F (1,40) = 1.542, p =.222,  eta
2
p =  
.037, n.s.) or semantic fluency (F (1,40) = 0.104, p =.748,  eta
2
p =  .003). This suggested that 
any differences in verbal fluency that existed between the groups did not explain the 
observed difference in question quality on the TQT. 
 
 
Reanalysis according to language ratings 
Table 11 shows the mean scores for each group on the language questionnaire. As stated 
above, this reflects the results from 15 AS and 15 TD but only 14 HFA participants, due to 
missing data from one family. Individual data points for 1 AS participant (Q6) and 3 TD 
participants (one Q1, three Q2) were also not available, either because of parents not being 
able to remember specific ages, or simply because those questions were left blank. Kruskal-
Wallis omnibus tests followed by pairwise Mann-Whitney U tests indicated significantly 
later development of language skills for HFA participants as compared to the other two 
groups (all p<.05, uncorrected). For ages 3,5 and 7 language ratings also tended to be 
significantly worse than either AS (all p<.099) or TD participants (all p<.05). For current 
language rating, no significant difference was evident between HFA and AS participants (U 
= 79.00, N = 28, p = .384, n.s.), but a difference approaching significance was observed 
between HFA and TD participants (HFA<TD: U = 62.50, N = 29, p = .058). 
In the AS group, 13 of the 15 participants would have qualified for a DSM-IV diagnosis of 
Asperger Syndrome, based on development of first words before 24 months and first phrases 
by 36 months. In contrast, two participants would have qualified for an autism diagnosis, 
based on the presence of delays in either of the above criteria. In the HFA group, 10 
participants would have qualified for a diagnosis of autism. Parents for the four other HFA 
participants reported the reaching of these language milestones prior to 36 months, although 
192 
 
in at least one case this was followed by a severe regression in language skills that was only 
corrected many years after. Thus, at least 11 of the HFA participants fitted a diagnosis of 
autism based on their language history. None of the TD participants were reported to have 
had delays in their language skills past the 24/36 month cut-offs. In cases where parents 
could not remember specific ages of language milestones, or responses were left blank, there 
were nevertheless no concerns recalled about early language development. 
Based on the parent reports, performance on the TQT was reanalysed for ASD participants 
with (ASD+L, n = 13) and without (ASD-L, n = 16) language delays. The resulting age and 
IQ data for these groups is presented in table 12, along with the existing data for TD 
participants (for ease of comparison). The only significant difference evident between the 
groups was for VIQ, on which TD participants scored higher than ASD participants with 
language delay (ASD+L < TD: t (26) = 2.281, p = .031, all other pairwise contrasts p > 
.150).     
Mean QQ scores of the three groups were compared using an ANCOVA that included VIQ 
as a covariate. A significant effect of VIQ was observed (F (1,40) = 8.173, p =.007,  eta
2
p =  
.170) along with a main effect of Group that approached significance (F (1,40) = 3.205, p 
=.051,  eta
2
p =  .138). As in the prior analysis, this reflected a general advantage for TD 
(M(SD)= 0.33 (0.05)) and ASD-L (M(SD)= 0.32 (0.05)) participants over ASD+L participants 
(M(SD)= 0.27 (0.07)). Pairwise comparisons between the groups indicated that both of these 
contrasts were significant (ASD+L < TD: p  = .021; ASD+L < ASD-L: p = .047). Thus, the 
reanalysis of ASD participants based on language history appeared to support the initial 
analysis based on current diagnosis: those with language delay asked less efficient questions 
than those without language delay. 
Following this, post-hoc regression analyses were used to assess which early language 
indicators were the best predictors of TQT performance. The answers for questions 1 to 6 
from the questionnaire were entered into a backwards method regression analysis, with mean 
QQ as the dependent variable.   
Log10 transforms were used for the analysis due to non-normal data in the questionnaire 
responses. In the resulting model, question 2 (age of first phrase) was the strongest predictor 
(R
2 
= .272, F(3,37) = 4.615, stan. beta = -.468,  p = .006). As figure 29 shows, earlier ages of 
first phrase were associated with greater question quality scores on the TQT. Also retained in 











Table 11. Language milestones and ratings by parents for AS, HFA and TD participants. 
 
AS  HFA (n=14) TD 
  M SD M SD M SD Sig. 








Q1. Age of first word (m) 12.76 6.23 23.82 19.26 10.00 3.37 HFA>AS,TD* 
Q2. Age of first phrase (m) 21.13 12.48 43.21 20.21 17.21 8.84 HFA>AS,TD* 




Q3. Age 3 language rating 3.20 1.51 2.07 1.54 3.33 0.82 
HFA<TD*, 
(HFA<AS) 
Q4. Age 5 language rating 3.47 1.11 2.36 1.45 3.53 0.74 HFA<AS,TD* 
Q5. Age 7 language rating 3.53 1.17 2.50 1.40 3.73 0.80 HFA<AS,TD* 




Q6. Current language rating 3.50 1.18 3.04 1.37 4.00 0.86 (HFA<TD) 




* p < .05. Differences in brackets indicate contrasts approaching significance (p <.1)  




Figure 29. The relationship between age of first phrase and mean question quality during 
problem-solving. QQ = Question Quality, AS = Asperger Syndrome, HFA = High-Functioning 
Autism, TD = Typically Developing,  
 
 
Table 12. Age and IQ scores for ASD participants with language delay, without language delay 
and typically-developing participants. 
 
ASD+L (n = 13) ASD-L (n = 16) TD (n = 15) 
  M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) Diff 
Age 14.02 2.87 13.61 2.18 14.05 2.72 n.s. 
VIQ  102.31 14.04 111.50 19.28 113.80 12.62 ASD+L < TD* 
NVIQ 98.77 12.75 102.50 11.29 105.33 16.72 n.s. 
  *significant at p<.05. 
ASD+L = Autism Spectrum Disorder with Language Delay, ASD-L = Autism Spectrum Disorder 





question 6, current language rating (stan. beta = -.352,  p = .043)
58
. None of the other 
language indicators were retained in the model (all stan. betas <.200, all p > .500).  
Correlational analyses were also run between mean QQ and AQ scores, for exploratory 
purposes. Across all participants combined, total AQ score was observed to correlate 
moderately with mean QQ at a level approaching significance (Spearman’s Rho r = -.264, N 
= 44, p = .083)
59
, with greater task performance being associated with lower AQ scores. 
Stronger relations were observed for the Attention to Detail (r = -.313, N = 44, p = .039), 
Communication (r = -.273, N = 44, p = .072) and Imagination (r = -.346, N = 44, p = .021,) 
subscales of the AQ, although none would have been strong enough to survive an 
appropriate Bonferroni correction. In all cases, reports of less autistic traits were associated 
with greater efficiency on the TQT. 
Although no significant AQ-TQT correlations were observed when groups were analysed 
individually (possibly due to the loss of statistical power), the directions and strengths of 
correlations were still informative for comparing the three groups. The correlations with 
mean QQ for total AQ and Communication appeared to be driven by HFA participants (AQ r 
= -.287, AQ-Comms r = -.316) but not AS (AQ r = .050, AQ-Comms r = -.032) or TD (AQ 
r = -.134, AQ-Comms r = -.039) participants. In contrast, the correlations for Imagination 
were strongest in AS (AQ-Imag r = -.203) and TD (AQ-Imag r = -.265) participants, but not 
HFA participants (AQ-Imag r = -.062). Attention to Detail was related to performance for 
TD participants (AQ-Att r = -.336), but neither AS (AQ-Att r = -.032) or HFA participants  
(AQ-Att r = -.062). Thus, while TQT performance appeared to be related to autistic traits, 
these differed for HFA, AS and TD participants.    
 
Discussion 
The main finding of the fourth experiment was that participants with high-functioning autism 
and participants with Asperger Syndrome significantly differ in their performance on the 
Twenty Questions Task. Specifically, participants with Asperger Syndrome were more 
efficient in their questioning than HFA participants and performed at a similar level to age- 
and IQ-matched typically developing children. The difference in questioning quality between 
the two ASD groups was significant even when general IQ abilities were taken into account 
either statistically via analysis of covariance, or by matching subsets of participants. The 
                                                   
58 These predictors are also retained with the addition of VIQ into the model. 
59 All correlations two-tailed & uncorrected for multiple comparisons. 
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difference was also significant when controlling for verbal fluency performance, and when 
the AS and HFA groups were redefined according to parental reports of language history. As 
predicted, participants with more typical language development were better at asking 
efficient questions on the TQT than those who had shown some degree of language delay in 
their early years – a point supported by the observed relationship between age of first phrase 
(Q2) and mean question quality.   
Alongside question quality, HFA participants took more questions on average to reach the 
target than TD participants, although the difference with AS participants on this outcome 
was less marked. On question types, HFA participants did not differ from the other two 
groups: all three groups used grouping for approximately two thirds of their questions. In 
addition, HFA, AS and TD participants did not differ in their response to changing task 
conditions, with all three groups showing a consistent level of performance for trials where 
elimination was and was not prohibited.   
This suggests that the HFA group included here was in many respects a high-performing 
one, that certainly understood what kind of strategy was required by the task and, for the 
most part, deployed similar questions to AS and TD participants. It is also important to 
reiterate here as well that the mean IQ and range of this HFA group was higher than in 
experiment 1. Despite this, their efficiency in problem-solving continued to fall behind that 
seen for the participants in the other two groups; a finding that is consistent with the results 
from each of the experiments reported in previous chapters, and in accordance with the 
performance of  the predominately HFA group of participants in Alderson-Day & 
McGonigle-Chalmers (2011).     
Tangential to the main task outcome, it is surprising that none of the ASD participants 
appeared to be significantly affected by the switch from allowing elimination of items to the 
non-elimination trial. As reported in Alderson-Day & McGonigle-Chalmers (2011) and (to a 
lesser extent) in the first experiment here, this has before prompted ASD participants to 
require more questions to find the target, possibly because of problems with maintaining 
which questions have already been asked in working memory. If both HFA and AS 
participants are not expected to generally differ in their executive functioning skills 
(Macintosh & Dissanayake, 2004), then both might be expected to show some form of drop-
off in performance in this condition. Alternatively, if AS  participants possessed greater 
verbal working memory skills, one might expect only HFA participants to struggle with this 
stage of the task. However, neither of these possibilities occurred, as both groups were 
apparently unaffected by the change in task demands. 
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One way in which this deployment of the TQT differed from those previous experiments was 
in the number of trials used. For example, all participants completed at least two non-
elimination trials (without written aids) in experiment 1, whereas they only attempted one 
trial in this way in the present experiment. As the number of questions used can be affected 
by lucky guesses, it may be that a single trial is insufficient to pick out changes in 
performance in this way. 
Another possibility, given the overall level of performance, is that both HFA and AS 
participants possessed a strategy or schema that could support their search even when they 
could not eliminate items from the set. As outlined in previous chapters, deployment of 
questions that narrow down search in a systematic way can provide a hierarchical structure 
to guide ones’ questions, as in the sequence LIVING>ANIMAL>PET. If such a sequence is 
followed, then participants only really need to remember the answer to the last question that 
they asked at any point in the search. If a logical sequence of questions is not followed – that 
is, if there is no systematic and logical link between questions – then recalling what has and 
has not already been asked could be much harder, as it requires recall of a number of 
unrelated questions (e.g. ANIMAL? FOUND IN KITCHEN? HAS WHEELS?). 
Supporting this interpretation are the data from the question discrimination and plan 
construction tasks. As in the previous experiments, no group differences were observed for 
question discrimination, suggesting comparable levels of understanding for what constitutes 
an effective question in isolation. But in addition, all three groups showed evidence of 
narrowing in their planning, suggesting an appreciation that sequences of questions need to 
systematically eliminate possibilities from the set, moving from the general to the particular. 
Thus, the lack of any significant drops in TQT performance for either of the ASD groups 
may reflect a better understanding and ability to produce sequences of effective questions in 
these particular participants, in contrast to previous experiments. 
Also on the topic of the plan construction task, the lack of any significant efficiency 
differences in planning for HFA, AS and TD participants is a slight concern that needs to be 
acknowledged. In contrast to the ASD participants in experiment 1 (whether analysed as a 
whole group or divided into high and low levels of VIQ), the HFA group in this study did 
not construct plans that were any less efficient in expected question quality than AS or TD 
participants. This being a slightly older HFA group (14.7 vs 13:7), it may be that planning 
skills improve with age for ASD participants, allowing for a greater or more in-depth 
consideration of possible questions to use in a plan. Such an interpretation would also be 
consistent with the lack of any major differences in planning efficiency seen for deaf adults 
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in experiment 2. Without further data, though, it is hard to assess whether this does reflect an 
age-related change in planning skills; it may just indicate a lack of reliability for the task as a 
measure of planning.     
Finally, although some group differences were observed in accuracy on the semantic 
decision task, no significant differences were observed for reaction times on either of the key 
semantic decision conditions, or discrepancies between the two. Longer reaction times for 
basic-to-superordinate decisions (i.e. condition 3) compared to superordinate-to-basic 
decisions (condition 2) were evident in each of the three groups equally, in a similar manner 
to that seen for deaf participants.  This suggests that an asymmetry in responses on this task 
is not atypical, despite the high frequency of associations included in the task (c.f. Loftus, 
1973). Therefore, although semantic associations may have been related to problem-solving 
performance in deaf participants, they could not be said to exhibit atypical semantic 
organisation.   
Importantly, the difference in reaction times for basic to superordinate and superordinate to 
basic decisions did not consistently predict TQT performance for either HFA or AS 
participants, in contrast to the relation observed for deaf participants. TD participants did 
show a negative relation between question quality and reaction time asymmetry, indicating 
that participants with less of a discrepancy in semantic decision performance also asked 
more efficient questions. But this, again, did not fully cohere with the data seen in the deaf 
group, who only showed TQT-SDT relations for the number of questions used, not question 
quality.  
As in the plan construction task, it may be that the SDT lacks reliability or sensitivity to 
measure more subtle differences in semantic skills, or it could be that these data reflect 
genuinely intact levels of semantic processing in ASD participants. Either way, there are no 
data  evident here from the SDT to suggest that semantic organisation underpins problem-
solving difficulties in ASD individuals. HFA participants were less efficient than AS 
participants in their questioning, but apparently not because of any apparent asymmetries in 
their semantic relations. Indeed, the only group difference seen in semantic skills in this 
instance was for AS participants, not HFA participants, to be less accurate in their 
judgements about superordinate-to-basic relations (condition 2). 
The general discussion in Chapter 8 will discuss the implications of these results, with 
specific reference to the strong and weak arguments outlined previously. Before doing so, it 
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is important to acknowledge a few caveats that limit the reliability and scope of these 
findings. 
 
Caveats and limitations   
Bearing in mind some of the issues discussed in chapter 6, the first limitation of these data 
concerns the contrast between HFA and AS participants. As in previous studies, this project 
was reliant on the adequacy of original diagnoses. In order to check that these do reflect 
language histories, parents were asked to report participants’ language milestones, which 
may have occurred over 10 years ago. Thus, the main contrasts are dependent not only on the 
accuracy of previous diagnoses, but on the accuracy of parents’ retrospective reports. The 
data provided in this way appeared to largely fit the existing diagnoses, with one or two 
discrepancies (13/15 AS, 10/14 HFA), something which is probably representative of the 
clinical population as a whole. Furthermore, the reanalysis of TQT performance according to 
language history largely supported the original result.  Nevertheless, it still needs to be 
acknowledged that the method of discriminating groups deployed here is possibly less 
reliable or powerful than, say a full re-diagnosis of all participants according to existing 
diagnostic criteria, or using medical records to establish early language milestones. For 
practical reasons such methods were not possible in this instance, but they could be used in 
future work.     
On a related point, while parents were asked to categorically rate previous and current 
language skills, this is at best a crude indicator of language proficiency. It may have been 
preferable to utilise a standardised measure of language skills, such as the CELF (Semel, et 
al., 1995): if earlier scores were available, these could be used to assess for later predictive 
relations with problem-solving performance, while current scores could be used to match 
participant groups, especially for AS and HFA participants. To allow for other experimental 
tasks to be used in the time allowed, it was not possible to deploy an in-depth language 
battery in this instance, but a larger study with an existing database of ASD participants 
should be able to achieve this. It is also worth noting that, while a measure like the CELF 
was not deployed here, the tasks that were used assessed lexical knowledge (WASI 
Vocabulary), categorisation skills (WASI Similarities, Semantic Decision Task) and word 
fluency (ACE-R Letter & Semantic Fluency). Thus, a number of language skills were 
covered and controlled for, even if a standardised battery was absent.  
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In summary, the fourth and final experiment appeared to demonstrate a difference in 
problem-solving performance within the autistic spectrum. HFA participants, being those 
with generally delayed and less typical language development, asked less efficient questions 
on the TQT than typically-developing participants. AS participants, without language delay 
and with more typical language histories, showed no such difficulty. Other group differences 
were generally less forthcoming, and the prediction that TQT performance in ASD 
individuals would be moderated by semantic decision skills was not supported. These 




Chapter 8:  General Discussion 
 
The main aim of this research was to explain why individuals with autism spectrum 
disorders have difficulty with certain types of verbal problem-solving. Using the Twenty 
Questions Task, this specifically was an investigation into why people with ASD who appear 
to have sufficient vocabulary, language knowledge, and reasoning skill, are still less efficient 
than typically-developing counterparts in the strategies they deploy; namely, in asking 
effective questions. 
As outlined in the very first chapter, there is a range of theories and explanations that could 
be applied to this behaviour. Most pertinent to the question is Minshew and colleagues’ 
(2002)  suggestion that this reflects a “concept formation deficit”, or the ability to 
“spontaneously form schemata or paradigms that organize information” (Minshew et al., 
2002; p333). Here, inefficiency in problem-solving is a problem of coming up with a 
strategy unprompted, in a way that draws out the relevant information from a set of stimuli  
(e.g. the individual items in a TQT set) and groups them together in a meaningful and 
effective way. The best evidence for this from the TQT is the increased tendency of ASD 
participants to guess at individual items, rather than ask grouping questions (Minshew, 
Meyer, et al., 2002; Minshew, et al., 1994). 
A related, but more general idea, is that this reflects a bias or tendency in the cognitive 
processing of autistic individuals, towards the local (in this case, individual exemplars) and 
away from the global (general semantic categories). This may be interpreted as an 
enhancement of local processing skills (Mottron, et al., 2006) or a bias away from global, 
“centrally coherent” processing (Happé & Frith, 2006). The evidence for this kind of account 
is largely drawn from studies of perception, rather than problem-solving or reasoning, but it 
fits well with the tendency of ASD participants to be restricted in the scope and generality of 
questions that they ask (Alderson-Day & McGonigle-Chalmers, 2011). 
While both of these descriptions have their merits, the experiments included here constitute 
an attempt to go further in explaining what drives problem-solving performance in autism; 
where apparent cognitive deficits or biases come from in the development of this particular 
cognitive faculty. As the Twenty Questions Task is a complex measure, relying on multiple 
skills, it requires a detailed task analysis and close examination of a range of cognitive 
processes. The research conducted in Alderson-Day & McGonigle-Chalmers (2011) 
represented a first attempt at doing so. The studies reported here fulfil the project by testing a 
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range of candidate explanations, coming from both within autism research (executive 
functioning) and without it (deaf research). 
 
The experiments 
Within recent neuropsychological research, the TQT is treated as a measure of executive 
functioning skills (Baldo, et al., 2004; Marshall, et al., 2003b). A number of researchers and 
theorists have proposed specific problems with executive functioning in autism (C. Hughes, 
et al., 1994; Ozonoff, Pennington, et al., 1991; Russell, 1997). Accordingly, the first 
experiment tested the hypothesis that children with ASD may have difficulty with the 
Twenty Questions Task because of problems with executive skills; namely, problems with 
planning questions, and problems with selectively attending to relevant information in the 
task array. While there was some evidence to suggest that ASD performance was moderated 
by being able to remove redundant items during search, this appeared to be corrected with a 
written reminder of questions that had been asked. This was taken to suggest that ASD 
participants could selectively attend to an unchanging array, and that their apparent 
difficulties during this condition were actually due to problems with remembering questions. 
In contrast, participants with ASD appeared to differ from control participants in their 
planning of questions. ASD participants were good at recognising effective questions in 
advance, but when asked to construct a plan of questions they were less likely, as a group, to 
construct plans that narrowed down possibilities systematically. In addition, the questions 
that made up their plans tended to refer to fewer items than those of controls. When the 
group was divided into those with higher and lower verbal ability (VIQ), narrowing skills 
were evident for more able participants. Problems with selecting efficient questions, 
however, were apparent across the whole ASD group. 
Thus, whatever was causing inefficient questioning by ASD participants on the TQT also 
seemed to be present at the planning stage, when they were thinking about their questions in 
advance. In this case participants were selecting the questions from a set of possibilities, and 
not having to produce those questions themselves – and yet they still selected questions that 
were less efficient than controls. As argued in chapter 2, this does not easily fit with 
Minshew et al.’s (2002) notion of a concept formation deficit, where the problem is one of 
spontaneously producing an organising concept or category. Here, participants had all the 
relevant concepts and categories laid out for them, in question form, and they still chose 
options that lacked effectiveness – despite not having to generate the strategies themselves. 
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Furthermore, this was consistent with the actual performance of ASD participants on the 
TQT: ASD participants were asking a number of grouping questions – that is, generating 
their own concept-based strategies – but the questions they asked were less efficient at 
subdividing the set. Rather than this representing a deficit in “spontaneously forming 
schemata” that could organise the set, this resembled a problem with which schemata were 
being deployed.    
This distinction motivated comparisons with other participants groups in which access or 
availability of categories and concepts are thought to be atypical. In particular, the example 
of deaf individuals was used, as they had previously shown similar performance on the TQT 
(as seen in Marschark & Everhart, 1999), and often show difficulties in semantic 
categorisation that resemble those seen in ASD. Within deaf research, this profile has been 
interpreted as a consequence of their atypical language experiences and delayed language 
development, rather than a problem based in cognitive processes. As children with autism 
also show highly atypical language development,  this prompted the idea that a similar 
explanation may apply in the case of autistic problem-solving. Such a proposal stands in 
contrast to what might be considered purely cognitive accounts, whether that is a concept 
formation deficit, a cognitive style, or specific types of executive dysfunction.  
Experiments 2 and 3 sought to interrogate this possibility further by examining the deaf 
profile on the TQT in more detail. In experiment 2, the performance of deaf and hearing 
adults were compared on the TQT and a task that assessed basic and superordinate category 
use in everyday descriptions. The results appeared to broadly replicate previous reports of 
deaf adults asking less efficient questions than hearing adults, although this effect could not 
clearly be separated from differences in general cognitive abilities. In addition, while some 
differences may have been expected due to differences in category use in sign language, this 
was not observed on the picture descriptions task, and did not appear to relate to TQT 
performance. 
Experiment 3 followed this by comparing the performance of deaf children on the TQT with 
the data from ASD children and hearing, typically-developing children collected in 
experiment 1. Like ASD children, the deaf participants in this study asked questions that 
eliminated fewer items than control children. In addition, some aspects of their performance 
(the number of questions they used on each trial) were predicted by a novel index of their 
semantic organisation: the difference between reaction times for superordinate and basic 
semantic judgements. Building on the theoretical proposals of Marschark et al. (2004), this 
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was the first demonstration that TQT performance is related to underlying semantic 
organisation in deaf individuals.  
Finally, if the comparison between deaf and autistic problem-solving was a valid one, then 
ASD children with more typical language development should be expected to perform well 
on the TQT. The fourth experiment tested this by comparing the performance of children 
with Asperger Syndrome, children with autism, and typically-developing children. As 
predicted, children with AS were just as good at the task as control children, and showed 
none of the efficiency impairments seen in autistic participants – an effect evident when the 
groups were redefined according to parental reports of language history, and specifically 
related to the age that participants’ first phrases appeared. However, TQT performance was 
not related in any clear way to semantic decision performance for either of the ASD groups. 
Thus, problem-solving performance appeared to be moderated by language history in ASD, 
but not necessarily because of underlying characteristics of semantic organisation. 
 
Implications for the strong and weak arguments     
The comparison between deaf and autistic cognitive profiles in chapter 3 prompted the 
proposal of two hypotheses that could explain autistic problem-solving: a strong argument 
and a weak argument. In the strong argument, the deaf and autistic problem-solving profiles 
arise out of a common causal route: atypical semantic organisation, as a result of language 
delay. In the weak argument, the problem-solving profiles in autism and deafness are seen as 
similar in background, but not overlapping. Both are the product of atypical language 
development, but they do not necessarily take the same causal route, via atypical semantic 
development. 
The strong argument was referred to in this way because it makes specific a route by which 
problem-solving impairments could arise in both deafness and autism. The barriers to 
language in both groups (auditory deprivation in the case of deafness, possible SLI or 
irregular sensory processes in autism) create an early environment in which there is reduced 
opportunity to interact linguistically with others. In this context, semantic categories are 
acquired in a piecemeal and delayed fashion, leading to a semantic lexicon with subtly 
atypical relations and organisational features (such as basic > superordinate asymmetries). In 
later years, when vocabulary and expressive language skills appear to “catch up” for both 
groups, semantic knowledge is intact, but categories may not be as accessible or as readily 
available as when they are required to support strategic, higher-order cognitive operations.  
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The weak argument makes no commitment to the specific route by which problem-solving 
difficulties arise,  but it offers a broad context as a starting point: namely, atypical early 
language development. It is weak in the sense that it is less specific in its developmental 
story, and merely makes the point that autistic and deaf TQT profiles may be similar because 
of similar initial causes. In the scenario that the strong argument is rejected, the weak 
argument can still hold. 
 Ultimately, the data reported here cannot support the strong argument. The findings of 
experiment 3 were broadly in line with this argument, in appearing to support a link between 
semantic organisation and TQT performance in deaf children. But the lack of any 
comparable link between TQT performance and semantic skills in either ASD group means 
that the “semantic route” endorsed by the strong argument does not clearly hold in autism. In 
addition, the presence of asymmetry on the semantic decision task in all participants 
suggests that the differences in reaction time seen for deaf participants were not in fact 
atypical. Semantic organisation may be related to problem-solving performance for this 
group in particular, but there was no evidence to suggest that their semantic decisions were 
atypical in themselves (in contrast to the findings of Marschark et al., 2004).   
From one perspective, this suggests that the strong argument may be wrong about both 
autism and deafness. From another point of view, it could be that deaf problem-solving 
performance is more closely dependent on semantic organisation in some way, but that 
organisation itself is not abnormal. Finally, it could be that the measures used here do not 
provide an adequate index of underlying semantic organisation, and that alternative tasks 
would highlight atypical semantic skills in both autism and deafness. In any case, there is 
certainly not enough positive evidence here to suggest that ASD and deaf problem-solving 
skills are dependent on the same underlying semantic characteristics. Therefore, the strong 
argument cannot be endorsed based on the present results.  
In contrast, the data do still support the weak argument. The main evidence for this is the 
contrast between AS and autistic participants in experiment 4: those with more typical 
language development also asked more efficient questions. Given that the two groups of 
ASD participants did not differ in terms of autistic tendencies, verbal fluency or general 
ability levels, their difference in questioning efficiency seems to strongly support a role for 
language history in verbal problem-solving. Furthermore, the predictive relation of question 
2, age of first phrase, supports the general picture that the weak argument outlines: verbal 
problem-solving difficulties in autism are in some way a reflection of, or related to early 
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language development. In this respect, the problem-solving skills of individuals with autism 
and individuals who are deaf are similar, but not necessarily overlapping. 
The weak argument is committed to the idea that delays in early language development have 
long-term consequences for cognitive skills, and that even very able autistic individuals may 
show residual deficits or hangovers from early development. Such an explanation is also 
committed, to certain extent, to the idea of a “critical period” in language development, after 
which language-related abilities may develop less fluently or in an atypical way (Johnson & 
Newport, 1989; Lenneberg, 1967). The idea of early communicative skills in autism having a 
general predictive value for language skills in later childhood is a fairly common one (see, 
for example, Anderson et al., 2007; Anderson, Oti, Lord, & Welch, 2009; Siller & Sigman, 
2008). As the review of autism and AS studies in chapter 6 outlined, long term effects on 
cognition can be harder to identify, and some would deny that language delay makes any 
difference at all to later cognitive outcomes in ASD (Mayes & Calhoun, 2001). It is 
important to remember, though, that the weak argument is making a claim about the etiology 
of verbal problem-solving in particular, and does not deny the existence of a large degree of 
overlap in skills between those with and without language delays. The significance of verbal 
problem-solving is that it involves the use of linguistic strategies to support a complex and 
ongoing set of cognitive processes – and it is this, in particular, that is proposed to be 
adversely affected by early language development. 
This means that, in the end, the data here may only provide an account of a very specific set 
of cognitive skills. Given the eventual contrast between autism and AS, it seems unlikely 
that this particular kind of problem-solving performance has something general to say about 
typically autistic behaviours, or the autistic cognitive style, as these do not tend to greatly 
differ between autistic and AS individuals. At most, what the weak argument might suggest 
is that the autistic cognitive profile, and any apparent style that is expressed, includes 
separable components, each with their own developmental causes.  
In addition, if the weak argument is retained there is still an explanatory gap. If semantic 
organisation is not the route by which verbal problem-solving difficulties come about, then 
there must be other intermediary mechanisms that link the early language development of 
ASD children and their later cognitive skills. The following section speculates upon some 





1. Integration of executive and language networks 
One possible explanation for later discrepancies in AS and HFA problem-solving is that they 
reflect underlying differences in the structure and function of neural networks, as a result of 
language delay. Specifically, it could be that language centres in the autistic brain, by 
developing late or with atypical localisation, end up lacking in integration with other 
cognitive processes across the cortex.  
For example, on an executive task where a language-based strategy is required, people with 
autism may activate frontal areas associated with executive functioning (such as the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) and temporal areas associated with language processing (such 
as the superior temporal gyrus), but communication between those areas may be lacking in 
some way. This would result in relatively intact executive or semantic skills when assessed 
independently, but possibly inefficient performance where information from one area (e.g. 
semantic categories) needs to be used as a cognitive strategy to support another network. 
(For an example of this kind of process from free recall research in typical individuals, see 
Dickerson et al., 2007).  
A large number of studies have documented abnormalities in brain structure and function in 
autistic individuals that are thought be related to language development, the full range of 
which cannot be adequately discussed here (for a review, see Groen, et al., 2008). One 
common idea of note is that the lateralisation of language to left hemisphere structures may 
be delayed or irregular in autism (see Eyler, Pierce, & Courchesne, 2012, for a recent 
example of this), leading to recruitment of right hemisphere areas, or reduced specialisation 
of  typical language centres (Bigler et al., 2007).  For the purposes of this argument, though, 
it is important to focus on studies that have directly compared individuals with AS and 
autism  
To date, almost all the neuroimaging studies that have compared HFA and Asperger 
Syndrome have done so in terms of brain structure, via measurement of grey and white 
matter volumes (Kwon, Ow, Pedatella, Lotspeich, & Reiss, 2004; Lotspeich et al., 2004; 
McAlonan et al., 2009; McAlonan et al., 2008; Toal et al., 2010). For example, Kwon et al. 
(2004) contrasted structural MRI volumes in nine HFA adolescents, 11 AS adolescents and 
13 controls. Alongside some common abnormalities for both ASD groups (decreased grey 
matter in right inferior frontal gyrus, entorhinal cortex and fusiform gyrus), AS participants 




In a study by the same research group, Lotspeich et al. (2004) compared structural MRI 
scans for 13 low functioning autistic participants (LFA), 18 HFA , 21 AS and  21 TD 
participants aged 7-18. Significant enlargements of cerebral grey matter were seen in LFA 
and HFA compared to controls, while the volume of AS participants fell in between HFA 
and TD participants. In addition, relations with task performance differed between AS and 
HFA participants. In HFA participants increased grey matter was associated with lower 
NVIQ, but this relation was not seen for AS participants. Conversely, increased white matter 
was associated with increased NVIQ in AS but not HFA participants. Thus, while the overall 
grey matter differences between groups suggested a continuum between autism, AS and 
typical development, the relations with behavioural data also suggested complex qualitative 
differences in brain-behaviour relations for AS and HFA participants. 
More significant differences were evident in a recent study by McAlonan et al. (2008). The 
study compared grey matter volumes in 16 AS children, 17 HFA children and 55 TD 
children (mean age = 10). Similar abnormalities for both ASD groups compared to controls 
were seen across the cortex in frontal, temporal and parietal areas. Within the ASD 
participants, HFA children showed smaller volumes than AS children in a range of areas, 
including posterior cingulate, precuneus and the thalamus. Furthermore, volumes for the 
inferior frontal gyrus (an area commonly associated with language production) were 
observed to negatively correlate with age of phrase speech in HFA participants.  
From the same sample, McAlonan et al. (2009) observed differences in white matter 
structure. HFA participants were observed to have greater white matter in the basal ganglia 
than AS participants, and both showed higher volumes for this structure than controls (again 
supporting the idea of a continuum of brain pathology). HFA participants also differed from 
controls in showing decreased white matter in their left hemisphere, specifically for frontal 
areas and the corpus callosum. In contrast, the same abnormalities were evident in AS 
participants, but only for the right hemisphere.  
Structural differences have also been evident in groups of adults. Toal et al. (2010) compared 
grey matter volumes in 39 AS participants, 26 autistic participants (high and low 
functioning) and 33 controls. While both groups differed from controls on a range of grey 
and white matter measures (such as cerebellum volume), they also differed from each other, 
particularly in areas associated with language. Compared to AS participants, autistic 
participants showed increased grey matter in right superior temporal, supramarginal and 
inferior parietal areas, and decreased white matter in the medial temporal lobe. (For 
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preliminary evidence of a number of other areas differing in AS and autistic adults, see Lai et 
al., 2011, https://imfar.confex.com/imfar/2011/webprogram/Paper8895.html ).  
Thus, comparisons between AS and autism have highlighted a range of differences in brain 
structure, in both children and adults. A number have involved language areas, which is 
consistent with the idea that language specialisation in the autistic brain is abnormal, but may 
be more regular in AS.  
Ideally this picture would be added to by evidence from functional neuroimaging studies, but 
unfortunately there do not appear to be any studies that have directly compared groups of AS 
and autistic participants on a functional task (to this author’s knowledge). Supporting the 
idea that communication between different areas of the brain in autism may be impaired, 
many contemporary studies have documented functional connectivity abnormalities (usually 
distal underconnectivity) in mixed ASD or autistic groups (Castelli, et al., 2002; Just, et al., 
2007; Kana, Keller, Cherkassky, Minshew, & Just, 2009; Kana, Keller, Minshew, & Just, 
2007; Kleinhans, et al., 2008; Koshino et al., 2005; Velazquez et al., 2009; Wicker et al., 
2008). Some have also demonstrated this specifically for language-based tasks (Just, et al., 
2004; Kana, Keller, Cherkassky, Minshew, & Just, 2006; Sahyoun, Belliveau, Soulieres, 
Schwartz, & Mody, 2010).  Reduced functional connectivity has been observed in an 
Asperger-only group attempting an emotional faces task (Welchew, et al., 2005), but no 
studies to date have compared the connectivity of language processes or other language-
dependent cognitive tasks in AS and HFA. 
One study that may provide a model for testing this hypothesis was conducted by Sahyoun et 
al. (2010). Their experiment compared fMRI activation in 12 HFA children and 12 age- and 
IQ-matched typically developing children who were attempting a reasoning task. The task 
consisted of matrix puzzles that could either be solved based on visuospatial relations or 
semantic relations. Both groups deployed typical language centres when attempting the task, 
such as the inferior frontal gyrus and superior temporal gyrus. In contrast to controls, though, 
HFA participants showed reduced functional connectivity (i.e. correlated fMRI activity) 
between inferior frontal areas and middle temporal areas. In addition, HFA participants 
recruited ventral temporal and inferior parietal regions during task performance, which the 
authors interpreted as reflecting greater recruitment of visuo-spatial information to solve the 
task. Thus in this case, it appeared that a) communication in a “typical” fronto-temporal 
network was reduced in HFA participants, and that b) alternative visuospatial strategies were 
deployed to complete the reasoning task.   
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This is a different kind of task to the TQT, and would not seem to engage more anterior and 
lateral frontal areas (such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) that are associated with 
classic executive tasks. Nevertheless, if this or another task closer to the TQT was deployed 
with AS participants, one prediction could be that fronto-temporal connectivity will be more 
intact in this group compared to HFA participants
60
. If this was shown to be the case, then it 
would provide some support for the above extension of the weak argument; namely that AS 
and HFA participants differ in the efficiency of their problem-solving because their language 
histories lead to differences in the integration of frontal and temporal networks. 
One problem with this argument that needs to be noted is that the order of cause and effect is 
not necessarily clear. As noted by Toal et al. (2010), we do not yet know whether the 
differences seen in AS and autistic brains are consequences or causes of differences in 
language development: they may reflect “environmental, genetic or compensatory changes in 
the brain” (Toal, et al., 2010, p. 1178). Quite simply, differences in brain development 
between the groups could just reflect core, genetically-programmed differences, that both 
cause delayed (or intact) language development in early years, and later problems with 
utilising language knowledge in effective ways. If so, language delay and later verbal 
problem-solving difficulties in autism would correlate because of a common cause, and not 
because the former causes the latter.  
Except for the possible use of twin study methods, it is not immediately obvious how such 
possibilities could be teased apart. Even longitudinal studies of brain development in the two 
groups would not be able to show that any difference was a specific consequence of post-
natal developmental factors, rather than prenatal programming. It also seems likely (to this 
author) that the actual truth will be a messy combination of the two possibilities. For 
instance, early lack of language specialisation may be evident in early brain structure and 
function for autistic individuals, causing language delay. This lack of language, in turn, 
could reduce experiential input and practice using language networks, such that the 
functional connectivity of language centres and other parts of the brain becomes atypical. By 
adolescence or adulthood, some language centres may be well established (if not necessarily 
in the typical areas, or even the same hemisphere), but the communication between these 
                                                   
60 In a behavioural study associated with this project, Sahyoun et al. (2009) have in fact reported 
differences in verbal vs pictorial strategy use in AS and HFA  participants, with AS participants 
solving the matrix puzzles in a way that appeared to be much closer to typically-developing 
participants. However, an AS group was apparently not included in the fMRI experiment, so it is not 
clear whether such differences extended to the neural domain. Furthermore, the results from the 
behavioural task are possibly confounded by a notable difference in verbal IQ between AS and HFA 
participants in that particular study.  
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areas and regions responsible for other cognitive processes could be reduced – leading to 
reduced performance on complex cognitive tasks where language-based strategies are 
required. 
 
2. Differential use of inner speech 
Another explanation, prompted by some old ideas in developmental psychology and new 
findings in cognitive psychology, concerns inner speech. Inner speech, or verbal mediation, 
is thought to be used by individuals on a range of tasks to support cognitive processes. A 
simple example of this is in short-term memory tasks, where verbal rehearsal may be used to 
maintain memory for a list of items. 
According to Vygotsky (1987), inner speech represents the internalisation of outer dialogue, 
and has its roots in early communicative interactions with others. Based on this principle, it 
has been proposed that inner speech will be compromised in some way or develop atypically 
in autism, because of early and enduring problems with social interaction (e.g. Fernyhough, 
1996). If this is the case, then their approach to a task like Twenty Questions could 
conceivably involve much less internal verbalisation of possible different strategies, 
questions and categories that would be effective in searching a set. In essence, their access to 
semantic categories and their spontaneous use of strategies could be intact, but they may lack 
an internal forum, provided by inner speech, in which different possibilities are weighed up 
and considered. 
Inner speech processes can be examined in a range of ways, one of the most common 
methods being articulatory suppression, where participants are asked to repeat an irrelevant 
word or sound during a cognitive task in order to block the use of language-based strategies. 
A range of studies have sought to measure inner speech use in groups of participants with 
autism spectrum disorders, with largely mixed results (Holland & Low, 2010; Lidstone, 
Fernyhough, Meins, & Whitehouse, 2009; Wallace, Silvers, Martin, & Kenworthy, 2009; 
Whitehouse, Maybery, & Durkin, 2006; D. Williams, Happé, & Jarrold, 2008; D. Williams 
& Jarrold, 2010). However, a recent study by Williams, Bowler and Jarrold (2012) has made 
an important contribution to this debate, by arguing that autistic individuals differ in the 
kinds of inner speech that they deploy across different cognitive tasks.  
In a study with ASD adults, Williams and colleagues observed evidence of intact inner 
speech use on a short-term memory task, but a lack of verbal mediation on a planning task 
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(the Tower of London).  Following Fernyhough (1996), they argue that understanding inner 
speech in ASD may require a distinction  between “monologic” inner speech, where verbal 
mediation takes a single perspective and may simply resemble a commentary or list of 
internal experiences, and “dialogic” inner speech, in which multiple viewpoints or 
perspectives are considered (akin to conversation).  Thus in the case of their data, ASD 
participants may have deployed monologic inner speech to support their memory processes 
(e.g. by rehearsing items to be remembered), but did not use dialogic inner speech to 
consider multiple moves and possibilities on the planning task (D. Williams, et al., 2012).   
A lack of dialogic inner speech in particular could affect ASD participants’ performance on 
the TQT, as it would theoretically limit the extent to which they could consider multiple 
alternatives in selecting their questions. It could also potentially explain differences within 
the autistic spectrum, although those differences may not necessarily map on to the 
autism/Asperger distinction. The point of dialogic inner speech, in coming from external 
interactions, is that it resembles the back and forth of communication (Fernyhough, 2009). If 
it comes from communication then one might expect those with greater communicative 
abilities to demonstrate more dialogic inner speech – and this is exactly what was seen by 
Williams et al. (2012) for their planning task: measures of communicative skills from the 
ADOS and the AQ were observed to positively correlate with greater inner speech 
deployment. In contrast, although there was no specific group-based comparison included in 
the study, differences in inner speech use were not seen between autistic and AS participants 
(Williams, personal communication). Thus, within-spectrum differences were evident, but in 
terms of communication abilities, rather than diagnosis.  
One idea that could complete the weak argument, then, is that difficulties with problem-
solving in ASD are a result of atypical language history via the abnormal development of 
inner speech processes, specifically for dialogic inner speech. In this case, though, the 
relevance of language history is better understood not in terms of structural language 
abilities, but in terms of communicative development. Here, the AS/HFA distinction may be 
acting as a proxy for differences in communicative abilities or opportunity to communicate 
with others in early years.  
The scores from the AQ, collected from experiment 4, provide some preliminary insights 
into this possibility. Although scores for the Communication subscale of the AQ did not 
significantly differ between AS and HFA participants, they significantly predicted question 
quality performance for HFA participants: HFA participants with fewer communicative 
impairments also asked more efficient questions. This only provides one brief indicator of 
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communicative ability (in contrast to Williams et al.’s use of ADOS scores as well), but it is 
at least consistent with an “inner speech” explanation of TQT performance.  
These are just two possible ways of completing the weak argument, based on findings from 
the neuroimaging of ASD individuals and studies on inner speech use in this group. These 
explanations are not mutually exclusive, and they are presented separately here to reflect the 
areas of research that these hypotheses initially come from. Indeed, with further testing of 
the neural correlates of inner speech they may begin to converge, and a complete account of 
this specific aspect of ASD development will require evidence from multiple areas. Both 
explanations should at least provide some means for making predictions that could be tested 
in future studies, in order to explain more fully how specific higher-order cognitive skills 
develop in ASD.  
It should also be said, though, that endorsing the weak argument in this way does not 
represent a failure to achieve the original aim of the project; that is, to explain why problem-
solving difficulties occur in ASD. The weak argument is so called because it does not make 
an explicit commitment to an intermediary mechanism; it does not specify the route by 
which early language delays lead to later problem-solving difficulties in autism. But it 
nevertheless makes a strong claim: difficulty with this kind of verbal, semantically-based 
problem-solving should be interpreted as a consequence of language delay, not a specific 
deficit in concept formation, and not a “cognitive style” specific to autism. In this respect, 
rejecting the strong argument and endorsing the weak argument makes a significant and 
important contribution to the understanding of problem-solving in autism. 
Whether the intermediary mechanism is one best understood on a neural level, or at the level 
of inner speech, the weak argument itself can also provide specific predictions about 
cognitive skills in autism. If it is correct, other tasks that require the use of language-based 
strategies and heuristics to support complex cognitive processes should also produce 
discrepancies in performance between those with and without language delay on the autistic 
spectrum. The most immediate example of this could be semantic clustering in free recall. In 
that context, language knowledge needs to be used flexibly and efficiently to support 
memory processes. Therefore, according to the weak argument one may expect differences 
in strategy use on recall tasks between those ASD individuals with and without language 
delay.  
On the other hand, strategy use on the TQT requires an explicit consideration of a range of 
alternative approaches to the task, but it is not clear that the same sort of process occurs in 
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the use of clustering strategies to support recall; participants can either group according to 
semantic associations or not.  It may be that the two types of task actually require a different 
level of search through possible strategies, or a different amount of integration between 
systems responsible for executive control and language knowledge.  
Nevertheless, comparisons of strategy use across tasks represent one clear avenue for further 
research (see the Appendix 3 for some preliminary data on this issue). The other benefit of 
testing such a hypothesis is that it would engage with Bowler and colleagues’ ideas about the 
extra need for “task support” in autism (Bowler, et al., 2004), most of which are based on 
data from experiments on memory.   
Another area in which fruitful predictions may be made is in the study of reasoning 
processes in autism. Tests of transitivity, defeasible reasoning, and drawing inferences about 
counterfactuals all require language to be used in a strategic and goal-directed way, and often 
require individuals to imagine or consider large sets of possible information. In this respect, 
they are likely to require the same top-down processes as the TQT, while also drawing on 
some of the same executive demands, such as planning and working memory. If the weak 
argument is right, then performance on such tasks is likely to also be affected by a history of 
language delay. It is crucial, though, that any tasks used have the complexity and sensitivity 
of a measure like the TQT: as the above experiments show, this is a task that produces truly 
rich data about a range of cognitive strengths and difficulties.  
 
Practical Implications 
Before making some concluding remarks, the possibilities for assisting and improving 
problem-solving in ASD will be briefly discussed. While highlighting areas of difficulty in 
problem-solving, the data presented here also point to ways in which such difficulties could 
be addressed and overcome.  
Much of this is based on the data collected in experiment 1. In the first experiment, ASD 
participants showed changes in performance following planning by attempting to ask more 
questions that grouped multiple possibilities at once. It could be that this change from 
baseline simply reflected a better understanding of the aim of the TQT among ASD 
participants (although if this was the case, one might also expect poorer performance on the 
question discrimination task).  In addition, this change in questioning did not translate into 
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an overall improvement in efficiency, suggesting that participants still had difficulty in 
selecting the right question to ask.  
Nevertheless it does imply that the strategies employed by ASD individuals may be 
amenable to change, possibly via a combination of explicit planning activities and some 
form of training to use semantic concepts appropriately. In the context of problem-solving, 
training of this kind has usually involved example-based modelling where an effective 
strategy is explained via a series of steps (e.g. “1. Group the items into categories, 2. Put the 
categories in size order, 3. Ask about the biggest category, etc.”). Model-based training has 
been associated with improvements in TQT problem-solving in typically-developing 
children (Denney, 1972; Denney, et al., 1973; Laughlin, et al., 1969) and children with 
learning disabilities (Barton, 1988; Simmonds, 1990). It may be that similar methods would 
work for individuals with ASD (for an example from social problem-solving see Solomon, 
Goodlin-Jones, & Anders, 2004), although training to utilise semantic relations in other 
cognitive domains has not always been very successful (Smith, Gardiner, & Bowler, 2007). 
Improvement was also seen in the selective attention conditions of the Twenty Questions 
task: the trend observed in experiment 1 suggested that ASD participants had difficulty 
searching the array when items could not be removed, but this difficulty was ameliorated 
with the use of a written record. Thus, the use of explicit planning activities combined with 
written cues could be useful in facilitating problem-solving skills for ASD individuals. In 
educational contexts this is most relevant for multi-stage problems such as exam questions, 
where self-generated strategies might be required to effectively reach a solution. Problem-
solving training can also have wider benefits for children with developmental disabilities, 
such as increased classroom participation (Agran, Blanchard, Wehmeyer, & Hughes, 2002; 
Glago, Mastropieri, & Scruggs, 2009), and improvements in social skills (Solomon et al., 
2004). 
In experiment 4, the overall performance of HFA and AS participants was generally very 
good, with HFA participants only performing at lower level in terms of their questioning 
efficiency. In many cases, difficulties in adopting the right problem-solving strategy led to 
subtly inefficient choices of questions, roundabout methods of finding a target and missed 
chances to solve the problem simply. Given the overall level of intact performance and 
insight into what the task demands, it may be that HFA participants would be able to 
improve their problem-solving via prompts or other simple reminders to always look for the 




Investigating cognitive skills in individuals with autism is inevitably a complex and multi-
faceted process. For problem-solving this is especially the case, as it relies on the successful 
deployment of a number of cognitive and linguistic processes that develop atypically in 
autism. What this research represents is an attempt to take an apparently simple task, Twenty 
Questions, and delineate what drives problem-solving for people with an autism spectrum 
disorder; to not just describe their performance in terms of specific deficit or style, but to 
explain where it comes from developmentally.  
The conclusion presented here is that verbal problem-solving difficulties in autism are a 
likely product of atypical language development, rather than a specific problem of 
information processing or executive dysfunction. The fact that autistic children are closer in 
their problem-solving skills to deaf children than they are to children with Asperger 
Syndrome is the best evidence for this conclusion. The process by which this occurs in 
autism is not necessarily the same as it is for deaf individuals, but they are argued to share 
broad similarities in their origin. 
The comparison with deaf individuals also served to meet an additional aim concerning 
methodology. Here, both with reference to other neuropsychological groups in chapter 1, and 
the comparisons with deaf data in chapters 4 and 5, an attempt has been made to explain 
problem-solving performance by looking outside of autism research, and drawing on other 
examples of atypical cognition. Given the history and breadth of cognitive research on 
autism, it is always easy to develop autism-only theories and explanations that only ever 
reference other theories of autism and only use other developmental groups as controls that 
demonstrate the specificity of a deficit to autism. But if autism is understood as a multi-
component disorder, with a wide range of cognitive strengths and weaknesses, then autism-
only theories are not likely to be enough. There may be many potential overlaps with other 
developmental groups, like the comparison with deafness presented here, that could serve to 
inform understanding of both the etiology and presentation of the autistic cognitive profile.   
As ever, further research is required to explain how exactly atypical language history in 
autism brings about the kinds of residual deficits seen in the case of verbal problem-solving. 
Unfortunately, this may be less rather than more likely to happen in future research, due to 
the changes in diagnostic criteria for DSM-V. At the every least, research of this kind should 
act as a reminder that early language skills are important and may have many subtle long-
term consequences, whatever the diagnosis. Just because a child has “caught” up in terms of 
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their language or their cognitive skills, it does not necessarily mean that they draw on the 
same underlying processes as typically-developing children, or, indeed, other children on the 
autistic spectrum. 
With the move to a more dimensional understanding of autism spectrum disorder, 
acknowledging  individual variation within the spectrum will be just as important, if not 
more so, in making sure that the right sorts of support and assistance are being provided. 
Rather than treating ASD as singular entity, cognitive research will need to continue to 
interrogate how skills differ across the spectrum in order to provide a full account of autistic 
cognition. As in Twenty Questions, the most important thing is to make sure that the right 






Table 1. Individual profiles of deaf adult participants 
 
Participant Sex Age(y) Pref Lang Reason for hearing loss 
1 F 28 BSL Meningitis 
2 F 25 BSL From birth/not known 
3 F 22 Mixed Meningitis 
4 M 28 BSL Genetic 
5 M 24 BSL From birth/not known 
6 M 29 Mixed Meningitis 
7 M 26 Mixed Mumps 
8 M 26 BSL Meningitis 
9 M 26 BSL From birth/not known 
 
Table 2. Individual profiles of deaf child participants 
 
Participant Sex Age(y) Pref Lang Reason for hearing loss 
Additional 
diagnoses/difficulties 
1 M 13 Speech CHARGE CHARGE 
2 M 13 Speech From birth/not known (none) 
3 M 14 Speech From birth/not known (none) 
4 M 13 BSL/SSE Meningitis ADHD 
5 F 14 BSL/SSE Congenital infection (none) 
6 M 15 BSL/SSE Premature birth Moderate LD 
7 M 15 BSL/SSE From birth/not known “Hyperactivity” 
8 F 16 Speech From birth/not known (none) 
9 M 16 Speech Not known, hearing deterioration at 12 m  (none) 
10 M 15 Speech From birth/not known (none) 
11 M 15 BSL/SSE From birth/not known (none) 
12 M 14 BSL/SSE From birth/not known (none) 





Pilot analysis of the Semantic Decision Task (SDT) 
Before applying the SDT to the group of deaf children who took part in experiment 3, the 
task was briefly piloted with five hearing adults. The same procedure of data cleaning and 
analysis detailed in experiment 3 was applied to reaction times for the pilot group.  
Figure A below shows the mean reaction times for this group in each of the SDT conditions. 
As would be expected, reaction times were fastest for basic word recognition, although there 
was a large degree of variability in responses. Mean RTs tended to be next fastest in 
condition 2 (superordinate>basic judgements) and then condition 3 (basic>superordinate 
judgements). However, subsequent analysis of variance indicated that the difference between 
conditions 2 and 3 was not significant. First, a 3x5 (Condition x Participant) ANOVA was 
conducted on all of the accurate SDT trials. (A repeated measures ANOVA could not be 
used because removal of inaccurate trials lead to differing numbers of trials in each round) 
This produced no significant effect of Participant (F (4,248) = 0.752, p = .557, etap
2
 = .012, 
n.s.), so the data were combined for all participants. In the ensuing three-way ANOVA, an 
effect for Condition that approached significance was observed (F (2,260) = 2.755, p = .065, 
etap
2 
= .021). Pairwise comparisons (uncorrected) indicated that RTs for word recognition 
were significantly faster than those for basic>superordinate judgements (p = .023), but all 
other contrasts were non-significant, including the crucial contrast between conditions 2 and 
3 (p = .503).  This suggested that the direction of category judgements did not make a 




















 Figure A. Mean reaction times by pilot participants on the Semantic Decision Task. 1 = 





Pilot comparisons of problem-solving and free recall 
An area of research often cited in discussions of strategy use and concept formation in 
autism is free recall (Bowler, Gaigg, & Gardiner, 2008a; M. Cheung, et al., 2010; Minshew, 
Meyer, et al., 2002). Often, ASD participants have been reported as either failing to benefit 
from semantic relations in their recall, or using them in atypical ways; findings that would 
appear to be concordant with a reduced ability to utilise semantic categories effectively in 
problem-solving (Minshew et al., 2002).  
However, no studies to date have directly compared strategy use in free recall and problem-
solving performance. And while plausible, the link between strategy use in these two areas is 
not necessarily straightforward, not least because free recall depends on effective retrieval 
processes, whereas the TQT does not. In addition, a number of the studies on free recall were 
run with AS rather than HFA individuals (Bowler, Gaigg, & Gardiner, 2008b). If AS 
individuals have difficulty using semantic strategies during free recall, but intact 
performance on a TQT, then this suggests the engagement of different strategic processes. 
In an attempt to gather some pilot data on this issue, the participants in experiment 4 all 
attempted a short free recall task at the end of their testing session. Participants attempted 
three recall trials, each consisting of 12 everyday words that split into three semantic 
categories (BED, CHAIR, SOFA, TABLE; ANT, BEETLE, FLY, SPIDER; BOMB, GUN, 
KNIFE, SWORD). The words were selected based on their presence in the top 10 for each 
category in the Battig and Montague norms (Battig & Montague, 1969). Using E-prime, the 
words appeared consecutively in a random order for 3 seconds each, after which a screen 
appeared, asking “How many words can you remember? Say them now!”. Before testing, 
participants were told that the same 12 words would appear each time, in a different order, 
but that they could say the words in whichever order they wanted to. The design of the task 
was based on a combination of free recall tasks used in Smith, Gardiner and Bowler (2007) 
and Cheung et al. (2010). 
As table A shows, no clear differences were evident between AS, HFA and TD participants 
in terms of overall recall, and the lack of any group effect or group*interaction effect on a 
repeated measures ANCOVA confirmed this to be the case (all p> .500, all etap
2  
<  .03). 
Neither were any group differences observed for use of semantic clustering (here simply 
scored as the proportion of items recalled that were placed next to another item of the same 
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category), when a repeated measures ANCOVA was run (Group effect: F (2, 39) = 0.954, p 
= .394, etap
2
 = .047).  
Thus, far from demonstrating atypical semantic strategies, whether particular to HFA 
participants or across both HFA and AS participants, the data here suggested intact use of 
semantic relations in ASD participants. If anything, the mean scores would appear to point to 
TD participants using clustering the least in their final attempts at recall. In addition, none of 
the task outcomes (total recall or clustering) were related to TQT performance in a 
correlational analysis. 
It is not immediately clear why no group differences were observable on the task, but it may 
be that the measure was too brief an index to reliably assess recall abilities. Cheung et al. 
(2010) utilised a similar paradigm for a “learning phase”, and reported group differences 
between ASD and TD children, but the work of Bowler and colleagues often deploys much 
longer paradigms, with multiple recall trials. Showing a definite null result with regard to 
strategy use in this domain, compared to others, would likely require a much closer 
replication of other recall paradigms. 
 
 
Table A AS HFA TD 
  M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) Sig. 









Trial 1 7.13 1.85 7.07 1.71 7.80 1.42 n.s. 
Trial 2 8.67 1.76 8.13 1.73 9.27 1.53 n.s. 
Trial 3 9.27 1.67 9.20 2.31 9.93 1.39 n.s. 










Trial 1 43.05 27.88 40.11 20.57 43.18 22.61 n.s. 
Trial 2 61.90 21.52 58.21 28.25 51.12 22.35 n.s. 
Trial 3 62.22 23.10 60.63 26.89 51.12 16.17 n.s. 
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